

Accountability and Governance Board

27 January 2026

Agenda Item 3: Operation Parkmill

Questions for AGB

The WMP Report does acknowledge serious concerns and shortcomings: Including:

- Evidence being overstated
- A failure to engage earlier enough with the local Jewish community
- There should have been contact made with police forces in other countries
- The meeting with Dutch Police on 1 October should have been recorded
- A lack of adequate internal regulation relating to the use of AI

1. The build up to the decision of the Birmingham SAG on 16 October 2025

- An elaborate command structure is established under the title Operation Parkmill. That includes: Gold, Silver, Bronze Commanders. Experienced and accredited staff. With thematic responsibilities. With the involvement of the Operation Planning Department.
- WMP has extensive institutional experience of planning and preparing for major events. The APP was to be adhered to. With Public Order Public Safety and POPS Advisers. Having benefited from the College of Policing course: with mentoring and CPD.
- The National Decision Model: College of Policing 10 Principles of risk and 6 Core Principles of Public Order. To review and adjust to response and threat assessment.
- The National UKFPU risk assessment Matrix to inform decision making.
- And yet – despite this elaborate structure - ultimately the system fails: The purpose of today is to consider some of the reasons WHY it failed so catastrophically, from the commencement of the Operation on 1 September 2025 leading to the HMIC Preliminary Letter dated 14 January 2026?
- On 2 September one of the first actions that takes place is for WMP to request team information from the National Football Intelligence Partnership through the UK Football Policing Unit – that appears to be a pack with the MTA Team Overview. What would that have consisted of? Was it received? Would it include any intelligence about the team’s fans and previous public order related matters? Was regard had to this? If not, why not?
- The minutes of the very first Op Parkmill Gold on 16 September speak of the Gold Commander having a low risk appetite for a repeat of the disorder seen at the AVFC v Legia Warsaw match in 2024. Did this low risk appetite - and the experience of the Legia Warsaw match, prompt WMP to become too risk averse in its approach to the fixture? Are you satisfied that the Gold Commander had the relevant training and experience for a policing operation of this complexity and scale?
- Was there any known suspected terrorist threat relating to the fixture? If so, who was the target and what was the suspected motivation of those involved? Was action taken to identify and mitigate that threat?
- Early intelligence reports include reference to local people “arming” themselves in preparation for the fixture. What did WMP take that to mean in terms of scale, level of threat and with what purpose

were people arming themselves? Was the intelligence actionable? Was anything done to pursue further lines of enquiry to identify the source of this intelligence, identify them, investigate the threat and consider an arrest and charges? Why not?

2. *The HMIC letter with preliminary views*

I now turn to the HMIC Preliminary Letter dated 14 January. I had no prior knowledge as to the contents of this letter. I first had sight of it on 14 January.

It identifies what it refers to as concerns and shortcomings. It is my intention to take WMP through these.

The HMIC report states:

To be clear, I have found no evidence to support a view that antisemitism played any part in WMP stating that its preferred tactical option was to reduce to zero the ticket allocation to Maccabi Tel Aviv fans.

However, in respect of any individual officers, the evidence I have seen doesn't point to their actions having been influenced by political interference, antisemitism, any other lack of impartiality, or malign intent.

Turning to the concerns and shortcomings:

At Page 3:

However, I am concerned that in some respects, the force either didn't fully appreciate – or its response didn't demonstrate that it appreciated – the extent to which national and international context would lead to far-reaching consequences if the fixture and wider associated events were not policed effectively. I am not convinced that the force fully considered the consequences of its preferred tactical option. It focused on reducing the risk of short-term disorder and long-term damage to local community relations due to the presence of Maccabi Tel Aviv fans. It lacked the necessary foresight to recognise the long-term, global consequences.

Is that accepted?

If not, Why not?

What is being done at a systemic level, to ensure that there is no repetition?

At Page 3

It is also clear that WMP sought and obtained additional information about other Maccabi Tel Aviv fixtures. But I note that WMP spoke only to Dutch police. It appears that the force didn't speak to policing counterparts in other jurisdictions where Maccabi Tel Aviv had more recently played European fixtures.

Is that accepted?

If not, Why not?

What is being done at a systemic level, to ensure that there is no repetition?

At Page 4

However, on 10 October 2025, the WMP gold commander at that time wrote a letter to the Chair of the SAG. That letter contains some statements that are inaccurate. It also contains a lack of balance regarding the behaviour of different groups in Amsterdam. It appears that on 24 October 2025, the silver commander – with approval from the most senior level of the force – repeated these inaccurate statements in a written report to the SAG. That report also contains further inaccuracies.

Is that accepted?

If not, Why not?

What is being done at a systemic level, to ensure that there is no repetition?

At Page 4

The force's 16 October 2025 oral briefing didn't repeat the inaccuracies of the 10 October 2025 letter, and it didn't include the same lack of balance. It also didn't introduce the further inaccuracies that appeared in the 24 October 2025 report. But those inaccuracies would of course have been in the gold and silver commanders' minds when they decided to recommend the force's preferred tactical option.

Is that accepted?

If not, Why not?

What is being done at a systemic level, to ensure that there is no repetition?

At Page 4

In this letter, I conclude that there was an imbalance in the weight of evidence that WMP presented to the SAG in respect of the previous behaviour of Maccabi Tel Aviv fans. I have formed the view that confirmation bias, in relation to the anticipated behaviour of Maccabi Tel Aviv fans and the potential disorder their presence might cause, influenced both the content and strength of assessments WMP gave to the SAG.

Is that accepted?

If not, Why not?

What is being done at a systemic level, to ensure that there is no repetition?

At Page 5

However, I am concerned about the accuracy of the written report that WMP gave the Chair of the SAG for the meeting on 24 October 2025.

These inaccuracies included the following:

"The most recent match Maccabi Tel Aviv played in the UK was against West Ham United in the UEFA Europa Conference League group stage on 9th November 2023"

"The police response saw 5,000 officers deployed over a number of days"

"Over 200 [of the 2,800 Israeli fans who travelled to the November 2024 Ajax fixture] were linked to the Israeli Defence Forces"

"The day before the [Ajax] fixture saw approximately 500–600 Maccabi fans apparently intentionally targeting Muslim communities"

"[The 500–600 Maccabi fans] tearing down Palestine flags"

"[The 500–600 Maccabi fans] committing... serious assaults on Muslim taxi drivers"

"[The 500–600 Maccabi fans] throwing innocent members of the public into the river"

"Several [Dutch police] officers were injured during the sustained confrontation"

Is that accepted?

If not, Why not?

What is being done at a systemic level, to ensure that there is no repetition?

At Page 6

Also, the 10 October 2025 letter from the WMP gold commander to the Chair of the SAG refers to Maccabi Tel Aviv fans at the Ajax fixture “setting fire to Palestinian flags”. From our interview with the Dutch police, and from a letter from the Mayor of Amsterdam to the city’s municipal authority, we understand that there was only one report of a person attempting to set fire to a single Palestinian flag.

Is that accepted?

If not, Why not?

What is being done at a systemic level, to ensure that there is no repetition?

At Page 6

My conclusion is similar to that of Lord Mann, who in his evidence to the Home Affairs Committee on 1 December 2025 said that the problem in Amsterdam had been “greatly exaggerated”.

Regardless of any misunderstanding about what the Dutch police said, I have concluded that WMP overstated the extent to which the disorder at that fixture was attributable to the Maccabi Tel Aviv supporters. All of this leads me to conclude that confirmation bias, in relation to the behaviour of the Maccabi Tel Aviv fans, played a part in the way WMP reached its preferred tactical option, and the strength with which it presented it to the SAG.

In these circumstances, banning away supporters was a wholly exceptional decision. The recommendation to the SAG should have been subject to greater challenge and consideration within WMP.

Is that accepted?

If not, Why not?

What is being done at a systemic level, to ensure that there is no repetition?

At Page 7

I have further concern about the way WMP handled intelligence material. In respect of the written report that WMP gave the SAG on 24 October 2025, I have found that:

- not all the information and intelligence in the report had passed through the force’s dedicated intelligence structure; and
- the intelligence bronze commander wasn’t involved in the report’s preparation.

As a result, the force didn’t properly validate all the material it subsequently relied on. This is of significant concern, given that the SAG intended to use it for a wholly new consideration of the risk. The Chair of the SAG had asked that information made available to the SAG be “robust and capable of carrying the weight which may be placed on it”. I am especially concerned about the way WMP handled sensitive intelligence when it created and disseminated the 24 October 2025 report.

Is that accepted?

If not, Why not?

What is being done at a systemic level, to ensure that there is no repetition?

At Page 8

I have also found that there were further shortcomings in WMP’s approach to planning for and responding to the Aston Villa v Maccabi Tel Aviv fixture. These shortcomings are in four fundamental areas:

Lack of effective local community engagement

Imbalance in communications

Poor record keeping and retention

Is that accepted?

If not, Why not?

What is being done at a systemic level, to ensure that there is no repetition?

At Page 10

Given the wider context in which the fixture took place, and the additional complexities that WMP was evidently aware of, I am concerned that the force didn't set up a sufficiently robust command structure during the planning phase. As I have set out, the consequences of not doing this led to shortcomings in intelligence handling, ineffective engagement with the local Jewish community, poor record keeping, and an imbalance in the force's communications.

The shortcomings in the command structure were also apparent in the force's decision not to declare a critical incident, even after public concerns mounted. This is contrary to authorised professional practice.

Is that accepted?

If not, Why not?

What is being done at a systemic level, to ensure that there is no repetition?

At Page 10

Declaring a critical incident may also have prompted the force to explore special grant funding at an early stage. It is clear that WMP initially considered a range of tactical options to mitigate the risks associated with travelling Maccabi supporters, many of which were included in a report by Lord Mann. However, during the planning stage, certainty of such funding may have prevented the force from discounting the widest range of tactical options and allowed it to more fully explore the range of mitigations.

Is that accepted?

If not, Why not?

What is being done at a systemic level, to ensure that there is no repetition?

At Page 10

The evidence I have seen so far suggests that these shortcomings are symptomatic of a force not applying the necessary strategic oversight and not paying enough attention to important matters of detail, including at the most senior levels. These things are surprising. Senior officers told us that they had recognised the fixture's wider significance. However, I am concerned about an apparent lack of foresight in respect of the predictable repercussions of a number of their decisions, including, but not limited to, the force's recommendation to reduce the ticket allocation to zero. In this respect and others, my view is that the force could and should have prepared more effectively.

Is that accepted?

If not, Why not?

What is being done at a systemic level, to ensure that there is no repetition?

- It has been widely asserted that the risks posed by those who wanted to target MTA fans and the team were the greater risk. It has been asserted that WMP downplayed this risk in its messaging to

reduce the risk of increasing local tensions. Is that true and would WMP continue to justify that or would WMP accept that was a mistake?

- Is it reasonable to suggest that WMP was fixed on reducing the public safety risks associated with the fixture – which came from a variety of sources – and saw a ban on the attendance of away fans as a way to influence the only variable they could meaningfully control – which was the absence of the away fans from the match?
- How will WMP ensure it appropriately redacts intelligence material before it is shared with partnership groups, such as SAGs?
- What steps can be taken to reduce the risk of confirmation bias arising in the future?

3. The meeting with the Dutch Police on 1 October 2025 and the Ajax – MTA fixture in November 2024

- On 1 October as part of the planning process, the Head of the Football Unit, who was also one of the 3 Bronze Public Order Public Safety Commanders met with the Gold, Silver and Bronze Commanders from the Dutch Police, that had been responsible for the policing of the 2024 Ajax v Maccabi TA football match in Amsterdam via MS Teams.
- There are a number of problematic matters that arise from this meeting. Let me summarise my concerns: It states in the Op Parkmill Order of Events document: A meeting of this nature would normally be attended by the Football Unit, however due to this being a unique event, it was the intention of WMP that Gold, Silver and Bronze Commanders would attend.
- However, at the time, the Silver Commander was deployed abroad as Head of Delegation for another fixture and the Gold Commander had other operational commitments, So, only the Bronze Commander attends, who is also the WMP Head of Policing Unit.
- According to HMIC on 1 October 2025, it has not been able to establish exactly what the Dutch police said or how the WMP attendee interpreted it. This is because: a) the meeting wasn't recorded; b) relevant documentation and interviewees' accounts vary; and c) the WMP attendee told us he made a handwritten record of the meeting, then converted it into an email (which we have reviewed), and then disposed of the handwritten record.
- So, we no longer have the contemporaneous notes – because they were disposed of, following the preparation of an email – that was prepared 8 days after the meeting - on 9 October. It is said that email summarises the outcome of the meeting. However, the outcome of the meeting on 1 October was immediately briefed to the Gold and Silver Commanders, by the Bronze Commander following the meeting.
- The reason why the meeting on 1 October is important is because: According to the UK FPU Peer Review, it is following the information arising from the meeting with the Dutch Police on 1 October, that the working assumption – that was up until then that the away fans will attend – now changes to a working assumption that there will be no away fans attending.
- It is referred to in the Peer Review Report. “This was a ‘tipping point’ for WMP Silver in respect of the Intelligence picture that had been developing up to this point?” “The Dutch intelligence brief marks the shifting point in terms of assessing the threat.” The intelligence from the meeting is assessed by Commanders as ‘highly relevant.’ This is the single largest WMP operation in 2025 – it has been assessed as high risk – BUT a key shifting point is to be based on this meeting and the record of the outcome of the meeting.

- I note that WMP now concede that: This MS Teams meeting should have been recorded. Would that be usual practice? And that the information received from the Dutch Police should have been appropriately assessed and managed through existing intelligence structures. Why did neither of these happen? What are WMP intending to do to ensure this does not happen again?
- However, there are other concerns. There is only one WMP officer present – it had been intended there be 3. Is that not a problem? If the meeting had been attended by the Football Unit only in the usual way, how many WMP officers/staff would have attended?
- HMIC say the meeting was conducted in English? Were there any language issues? How long did the meeting last?
- No-one attends to assist with taking notes. Is that not a problem, because as well as conducting the meeting with 3 other people – and presumably asking questions - the officer has to take a contemporaneous Note at the same time? What is the usual practice with meeting such as this?
- There is no attempt to write to the Dutch Police to confirm the outcome of the meeting? No attempt to agree a Note or Memorandum of the meeting. Or ask the Dutch Police to confirm their views in writing?
- As is referred to in the HMIC letter - the importance of record keeping is explained in several parts of the College of Policing's Authorised Professional Practice. I have had cause to raise this issue with the former CC albeit in a different context – but it did concern a high-profile case. It has also been referenced in joint internal audits. Refer to the previous exchange of correspondence.
- Surely, this needed to be the best possible version of the outcome of that meeting there could be? Particularly because this was an overseas force – that you would not have had a pre-existing or ongoing relationship with? But that did not happen.
- Given the importance of this meeting, does WMP accept that more should have been done to absolutely verify its accuracy, in view of the weight that was to be placed on the information obtained at this meeting?
- For instance, once it became clear that that Dutch Police information was the tipping point that would lead to a non-away fans decision, why was a written account of (i) the intelligence; and (ii) the policing response not sought from Dutch Police?
- Both the Policing Minister and I wrote to the former CC seeking confirmation as to the accuracy, credibility, reliability and provenance of the intelligence received from by WMP from the Dutch Police. The CC wrote to the Policing Minister and the ACC Gold Commander wrote to myself stating that the CC was satisfied as to the credibility, reliability, veracity and provenance of the intelligence received from the Dutch Police. Do I understand it that WMP no longer stands by this assessment of the intelligence?
- Some intelligence was clearly provided by Dutch Police verbally in the meeting. But what information was provided that enabled WMP to assess the credibility, reliability, veracity and provenance of that intelligence? Or was it simply based on an interpretation or understanding of what the Dutch Police Officers had said?
- WMP now accepts that it could have contacted police forces in other countries which had previously hosted matches involving MTA away fans. Why was that not done? What would be WMP's usual practice? If usual / best practice was not followed, why was this the case? Was this an example of what HMIC refer to as confirmation bias?

- UKFPU describes not speaking with Israeli police as “a missed opportunity”. Should more have been done engage with the Israeli police? While you have described the efforts to engage which did not meet with a response, could this have been escalated via the Israeli Embassy?
- It would appear that Israel does not have a National Football Information Point, as most if not all European countries do? However, this does not appear to be established until 7 October – the day of the first SAG? Why was this - and an alternative means of obtaining relevant information from Israeli police - not established earlier, in view of it being good practice? Was there a pre-visit by the Israeli Police to the host Euro Team? Is this something that needs to be addressed at UEFA level?

4. The hallucinatory AI-induced 2023 West Ham fixture

- It was HMICFRS, not WMP, that found the fictitious West Ham match was the product of the AI tool Copilot. Does WMP accept that this is illustrative of a failure to ensure that there was adequate oversight and management of the use of AI within WMP?
- Given the importance of ensuring the effective, lawful and responsible use of AI tools in policing, how was it that members of the senior leadership team within WMP did not know that Copilot was routinely being used by Force Intelligence?
- Notwithstanding the confusion relating to the AI intelligence what weight was placed on the intelligence relating to the West Ham match? Did it make any difference to the risk assessment and policing options?
- Since the (hallucinated) information concerned a West Ham fixture, why was there not liaison with the Met Police to seek intelligence about the fixture and its policing? Surely, just as the Amsterdam match was seen as highly relevant this should have also been a highly relevant inquiry given that it was a relatively recent fixture, in the UK?
- Particularly given that, on the face of the AI generated intelligence, there had apparently not been any difficulties arising from the behaviour of the away fans. Is the failure to enquire further another example of confirmation bias?
- What confidence does WMP have that there are no other AI induced hallucinations that have influenced operational decisions beyond this fixture and football policing? What action and due diligence is WMP implementing to proactively check this?

5. Information and Intelligence to the SAG on 24 October 2025

- On the 17 October – the same day that matters have become a focus of national and international interest – there is an official transfer of Gold Command - due to the then Gold Command being on a period of annual leave.
- Surely, that was the very worst possible time for there to be a transfer of the Gold Command? Would it not have been better to have had continuity in the command structure at that time? At a critical time in the planning a new Gold Commander has to step up having not been part of the preparation and planning process up until that date? Surely, that is not going to be conducive to facilitating the effective and efficient management of this policing operation?
- MTA announced on 20 October it would not accept away fans tickets. Given this announcement, why was a further SAG, with a remit to reconsider the decision dated 16 October, convened on 24 October 2025? Because even if the SAG had revised its decision and decided to allow away fans –

at that stage they were not attending anyway - so what was the purpose of the SAG on 24 October? As far as the attendance of the fans, was concerned had it not become academic?

- At the SAG Meeting on 16 October, was the decision to ban away fans an agreed decision or was there any disagreement or opposition from anyone else on the SAG? At the SAG Meeting on 24 October, was the decision to ban away fans an agreed decision or was there any disagreement or opposition from anyone else on the SAG? Would you accept that, at a SAG, the other members of the SAG are reliant on the police's summary of police-held intelligence and the police's assessment of risk.
- There is reference to the usual practice being that SAGs proceed on the basis of verbal briefings – is that the case – and if so – is that not a rather casual basis on which to proceed? Surely, it would be better for written briefings to be provided? I appreciate that the SAG does have a written report from the Gold Commander on 16 October – and there is a written report on 24 October – but that appears not to be the norm? Would it not be preferable for there always to be written reports?
- The HMICFRS report is critical of intelligence briefings provided to that SAG on 24 October 2024. It says that it repeated previous inaccuracies, and added new ones. It says the briefing was approved by, what the Chief Inspector refers to as "the most senior level of the force".
- There are questions to be asked concerning the role that the former Chief Constable had in the preparation or approval of the intelligence briefing for the SAG on 24 October 2025. What the role of a CC would normally be in these circumstances? What materials or resources were available to the CC to test the intelligence summary?
- There are questions to be asked regarding the process via which the briefing for the SAG on 24 October was signed off. Why was it that the intelligence briefing was not cleared by the Intelligence Bronze and whether this would usually happen?
- Do WMP want to offer any comment or response to any of these questions? In view of my referral of the former CC to the IOPC, I do not intend to press you for any for any further comment or response.
- However, are you satisfied that the briefing presented at the SAG on 24 October could genuinely be described as the basis for a "a wholly fresh consideration of the issue" as was the intention of the Chair of the SAG?
- Was the SAG in a position to provide a fresh consideration of the issue in view of the inaccuracies, errors and exaggerations that HMICFRS found in the WMP briefing?
- After the Prime Minister's intervention on 16 October and the public interest this resulted in, to what extent, do you think, WMP became increasingly focused on justifying its recommendations to the SAG on 24 October, rather than critically assessing and scrutinising them, particularly given the errors, inaccuracies and exaggerations that have been identified? Was this an example of the defensiveness that the Acting Chief Constable referred to when providing his apology statement last week?
- Given the level of public interest, why did WMP not give more attention to ensuring the robustness of the intelligence relied upon to date, and the accuracy of the report for the 24 October SAG?
- The former Chief Constable has suggested that some of the debate concerning the intelligence assessments was more about "nuance" than inaccuracy. Is it not the case that every "nuance" described was in the direction of amplifying the risk that the MTA fans presented? Was this not a pattern of exaggeration and an example of what the Chief Inspector refers to as confirmation bias?

- Had the resources available to WMP played a role in the decision making of WMP in reaching its recommendation to the SAG on 16 October? If so, what was the consideration?
- After the Prime Minister's intervention on 16 October and the discussions with HO and the offer of additional resources, what was the position of WMP, as far as working with government to secure the attendance of the away fans? If MTA fans had decided to attend, what would the policing operation have looked like? What action was taken to consider mounting such an operation? Was that something that was capable of being achieved?
- After the Prime Minister's intervention on 16 October, WMP commissioned a review by the UK Football Policing Unit on 20 October. That review refers to the first SAG on 7 October that resulted in a starting position that there will be no away fans at the match. The collective decision was that the safest option was to have no away supporters attend. It is stated the Police position was that this was a preference. Amongst other matters, the Review stated that it was the belief of the Review Team that the Intel picture was sufficient to justify a risk grading of HIGH. At the SAG on 7 October, the position had been accurately and openly conveyed to the partnership who reached a reasonable decision based on the likely behaviour of away supporters.
- What was the impact of this Peer Review Report on WMP's assessment of whether it had made the correct decision or not? Did the UKFPU review provide WMP increased confidence in its decisions to date, validate its position and lead to an insufficiently robust approach to continuing to evaluate the intelligence assessment?
- Although the Peer Review appears to address the SAG Meeting on the 7 October, it does not appear to address the SAG Meeting on 16 October – why is that – after all, that was the decision that was now in question?
- On Monday 20 October, and following disorder at a match in Tel Aviv at the weekend, MTA announced that it would not accept away tickets for the fixture, even if they were offered. This reduced the risks and complexity associated with the fixture.
- Was WMP in any way aware of or consulted about that decision, before it was announced by the club?
- What impact did this announcement have on WMP planning? Did this announcement lead WMP to be less rigorous in the approach to the intelligence assessment and decision making when preparing for the SAG on 24 October?
- According to a timeline I have seen: On 20th October 2025, UKFPU provided WMP with an Ajax v Maccabi post-match report detailing groups involved, numbers and key incidents that occurred before, during, and after the match. This appears to be highly relevant. Why was the UK FPU only sharing that report at this stage? What did it say?
- Was that report then checked and cross referenced with the record of the meeting with the Dutch Police on 1 October – and other intelligence - if so, with what outcome? If not, then why not? Was it incorporated into the report for the SAG on 24 October? If not, why not?
- On 21st October 2025, UKFPU shared with WMP a mayoral report dated 11th November 2024 from the Mayor of Amsterdam regarding events of Ajax v Maccabi. This appears to be highly relevant. Why is the UK FPU only sharing that report at this stage? What did it say?

- Was that report then checked and cross referenced with the record of the meeting with the Dutch Police on 1 October – and other intelligence - if so, with what outcome? If not, then why not? Was it incorporated into the report for the SAG on 24 October? If not, why not?
- At what point were WMP aware of the Dutch Inspectorate and Justice Report? Was this a report that WMP became aware of as a consequence of its own research – or was it brought to the attention of WMP from other sources? If not, then why not? Was that report then checked and cross referenced with the record of the meeting with the Dutch Police on 1 October – and other intelligence - if so, with what outcome?

6. *The attendance of MTA “Ultras”*

- At the Home Affairs Committee on 1 December 2025, Lord Mann gave evidence that by 16 October 2025, it was known that the MTA “Ultras” would not attend the fixture. He said, “The Maccabi ultras—the so-called Fanatics—were not coming.”
- My AGB report request follows up this issue: “Did [Lord Mann], or anyone else, convey this intelligence to WMP, the UKFPU, or any other body at any point prior to the Home Affairs Committee hearing on 1 December 2025?”
- The AGB report states, “It was always our planning assumption that the away fans travelling to the UK would include the sub-section referred to as the “Ultras”. On the 20 October 2025, MTA formally announced on their website that they would not accept any away ticket allocation.”
- Page 6 of the UKFPU report, completed on 20 October 2025, states, “The suggestion of the club was that the Ultra group would not seek disorder with the local Muslim community and many of the risk group were afraid to come to Birmingham. However, in the absence of police reporting the veracity of this statement is difficult to assess.”
- In a letter to the Home Affairs Committee dated 5 January 2026, Lord Mann writes, “I rang Chief Constable Guildford in early September, proposing an early kick off and highlighting my concerns and had other text and phone interactions. Chief Constable Guildford informed me of the police advice to have no fans on October 8 or 9.”
- There are therefore questions to be asked that include:
 - Whether by 20 October 2025, WMP and UKFPU were aware that there was a “suggestion” that attendance by the Ultras might be less of an issue than anticipated.
 - Whether WMP is able to say who made this “suggestion”? And to whom was this “suggestion” made?
 - Whether WMP are able to say whether Lord Mann or anyone conveyed this intelligence to WMP, the UKFPU, or any other body at any point prior to the Home Affairs Committee on 1 December 2025?
 - Why was the “suggestion” that the MTA Ultras may not attend either, a) followed up to determine its “veracity”, or b) reported to the SAG on 24 October 2025?
- Whether the former Chief Constable conveyed to WMP colleagues the substance of his conversations with Lord Mann? If so, did these discussions include anything about whether the MTA Ultras were coming?

- Assuming Lord Mann had provided this information, what steps would / should have been taken to confirm its veracity? If there were credible evidence that the “Ultras” were not attending, might this have altered the risk assessment?
- Do WMP want to offer any comment or response to any of these questions? In view of my referral of the former CC to the IOPC, I do not intend to press you for any further comment or response.

7. *Damage to relationships, communities and trust and confidence*

- Reference has been made during the course of public debate, to the Home Secretary and the Home Office not having raised any concerns when briefed by the former Chief Constable that a ban on away fans was likely. However, when, for example, the Community Security Trust and the Leader of Birmingham City Council expressed concerns about the likely ban, it does not appear to have led WMP to reflect on whether the recommendation was the right one. Why was that?
- The former Chief Constable briefed the Home Secretary, the Leader of Birmingham City Council and Lord Mann on the change in circumstances and planning after the meeting with the Dutch Police, between 8-10 October, but not me. Paragraph 36 of the Policing Protocol requires: The Chief Constable is expected to ensure that their PCC is regularly informed of their decisions and operational activity in a timely manner so that the PCC can hold the Chief Constable to account for the totality of policing within their force area, including the operational delivery of the police service.
- That absence of proactive briefing by the Chief Constable is referred to in the HMIC preliminary letter. Do you accept that was a significant omission on the part of the former CC? Can you confirm that you will ensure you proactively brief me on matters of this level of public importance in the future, as required by the Policing Protocol?
- The Home Office, Home Secretary and Ministers are key partners and stakeholders.
- What impact will the statement in Parliament on 14 January, in which the Home Secretary stated she no longer had confidence in the former CC, have on the relationship between WMP and the Home Office?
- Will it be harder, easier or make no difference to you working with Home Office officials and ministers as a result of the statement?
- The debate about the fixture has had negative impacts on both the Jewish and Muslim community and the wider general public in our region. How much damage has been done to community relations, and relations between the police and the public?
- WMP covers one of the most culturally and ethnically diverse areas in the country and in many respects WMP has an effective track record of engaging with communities across the West Midlands. It is therefore all the more incomprehensible that WMP's local public engagement on such a sensitive event failed. What went wrong?
- At the Home Affairs Committee, it was asserted that WMP engaged with (rather than "consulted") local community groups and mosques as part of the preparations for the fixture. As part of this engagement was WMP aware of any racism, anti-Semitism or extremism in this engagement and if so, would it be challenged by WMP?

- WMP have emphasised the need to remember that officers were motivated by ensuring public safety and were doing their best. The former CC has said that he wished to protect them from unfair criticism. However, is there a risk that this approach is perceived as a wish to deflect any criticism, and a failure to be willing to learn from mistakes?
- Does WMP usually conduct Equality Impact Assessments on a per-event basis, for example - a football fixture; a protest?
- If so, how are the consideration and the conclusions of the EIA documented - not just the fact that the Equality Act has been considered
- I expect WMP to comply with the public sector equality duty, embedding equality at all levels of the force, including the use of equality impact assessments to evaluate policies, procedures, practices and decisions.
- I expect WMP to regularly review the impact of local, regional, national, and international conflicts on community tensions and understand how these tensions can manifest locally. WMP will remain a trusted source of information, proactively addressing tensions and combating disinformation and misinformation that could escalate them.
- I would put it to you, that had a dedicated Equality Impact Assessment been carried out, it would have ensured a structured process to consideration and decision making, that would have made it more likely WMP would have been alerted to ensuring engagement with all communities – including the local Jewish community – and would have ensured earlier and more effective engagement. How could such a sensitive local issue not have been considered via a dedicated Equality Impact Assessment? Would WMP ensure matters were done differently in the future? If so, how?