



ACCOUNTABILITY AND GOVERNANCE BOARD

27th January 2026
Operation Parkmill

Presented by:
Chief Officer Team

Introduction (from Acting Chief Constable Scott Green)

I want to start with a full and sincere apology from me on behalf of West Midlands Police. The failings identified by His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS), in their update letter to the Home Secretary in relation to our planning, policing and subsequent response to the Aston Villa versus Maccabi Tel Aviv, are damning.

A direct impact of our actions has been a loss of trust and confidence from the public of the West Midlands. More specifically I know we have damaged our relationship with individuals and Jewish communities – locally, nationally, and internationally.

Our response to criticisms of the force, and our reaction to the Home Secretary's statement to Parliament on 14th January 2026 was too defensive.

I am committed to West Midlands Police learning from these events, but most importantly, taking immediate action focused on repairing the damage which has resulted in the loss of the confidence the public and communities have in us. The public losing confidence in policing, undermines the core principles of British Policing. We will work tirelessly to restore that trust, ensuring that we police without fear or favour.

We will continue to fully engage with HMICFRS and the Independent Office of Police Conduct (IOPC) as their work continues and we will respond promptly and effectively to all matters raised by them. I am steadfast in ensuring that we do not repeat our wrongs, we listen and make changes.

Background

For context, the below questions in bold have been set out by the OPCC as part of their outline request.

1. A brief chronology of the significant events, from the draw that announced the fixture between Aston Villa Football Club (“AV”) and Maccabi Tel Aviv (“MTA”), and the departure of MTA from the UK on 6 November 2025.

30/08/25 Fixture announced. Kick off scheduled for 20:00hrs on Thursday 6th November 2025 at Villa Park. Information/intelligence gathering, and planning commenced.

01/09/25 Assistant Chief Constable (ACC) Parnell appointed as Gold Commander.

02/09/25 - 03/09/25 CI Wilkinson (Head of WMP Football Policing Unit) attends a UEFA conference. It is attended by all football teams and Police representatives competing in the three UEFA competitions – Champions League, Europa League and Europa Conference League. During this conference CI Wilkinson met with representatives of Maccabi Tel Aviv (MTA).

03/09/25 In anticipation of the fixture and likely role of Community Bronze, CI Robinson (Birmingham LPA) initiates contact with links from Jewish and Muslim communities and suggests the commencement of a Community Impact Assessment (CIA).

04/09/25 Supt Hadley appointed as Silver Commander. 3 x Bronze Public Order Public Safety (POPS) Commanders identified as CI Wilkinson, CI Sweeney and CI Butler.

17/09/25 Operation Parkmill Gold Meeting chaired by ACC Parnell (Gold Commander).

24/09/25 Operation Parkmill Silver Meeting chaired by Supt Hadley (Silver Commander).

24/09/25 Threat Assessment commenced.

25/09/25 Operation Parkmill Gold Strategy v1.1 created by ACC Parnell (Gold Commander).

30/09/25 Operation Parkmill Gold Meeting chaired by ACC Parnell (Gold Commander).

01/10/25 As part of the planning process CI Wilkinson (POPS Bronze Commander) met with Commanders from the Police in the Netherlands via MS Teams

06/10/25 UKFPU Football Risk Assessment Matrix created.

07/10/25 First Safety Advisory Group (SAG) held. Online meeting via MS Teams.

08/10/25 ACC Parnell (Gold Commander) sends a letter to the SAG Chair to clarify the position from the SAG.

10/10/25 ACC Parnell (Gold Commander) sends further letter to the SAG Chair following the email request for further information.

13/10/25 Operation Parkmill Gold Meeting chaired by ACC Parnell (Gold Commander).

15/10/25 Operation Parkmill Silver Meeting chaired by Supt Hadley (Silver Commander).

16/10/25 Second SAG held (brought forward). SAG decision based on the risk assessments and operational updates. The SAG formally confirmed the restriction of away fans to zero for the AVFC vs Maccabi Tel Aviv fixture.

16/10/25 Prime Minister posted on social media stating that it was the “wrong decision”. National and International media commentary followed.

17/10/25 Official transfer of Gold Command due to ACC Parnell being on a period of annual leave.

17/10/25 Operation Parkmill Gold Meeting chaired by ACC O'Hara (Gold Commander).

17/10/25 WMP Former Chief Constable Guildford commissioned an independent review of the WMP approach which took place on the 20th October 2025.

24/10/25 Third SAG held.

28/10/25 Operation Parkmill Gold Meeting chaired by ACC O'Hara (Gold Commander). Community Engagement Strategy tasked to Community Bronze to complement the CIA.

28/10/25 Operation Parkmill Silver Meeting chaired by Supt Hadley (Silver Commander).

02/11/25 Updated Gold Strategy v1.2 by ACC O'Hara (Gold Commander).

04/11/25 Operation Parkmill Gold Meeting Chaired by ACC O'Hara (Gold Commander).

04/11/25 Operation Parkmill Silver Meeting Chaired by Supt Hadley (Silver Commander).

05/11/25 Updated Gold Strategy v1.3 by ACC O'Hara (Gold Commander).

06/11/25 Aston Villa vs Maccabi Tel Aviv. WMP operationally deployed 1166 officers and staff to the event, ensuring the safety of all involved which included protesters, counter-protesters, 21,000 fans and local communities. Hundreds of local and nationally based individuals turned out to protest. A total of 11 people were arrested. Jewish and Muslim community observers were present within the operational control room during the deployment. WMP also welcomed the Israeli Charge d'Affaires and her diplomatic team who thanked us for the way we had managed the security of the event.

2. A description of the role of Safety Advisory Groups ("SAG"). A description of the role of WMP, in connection with the decision making by the SAG.

2.1 Safety Advisory Group (SAG) – The SAG is a multi-agency body, usually convened by the local authority, that brings together key stakeholders such as emergency services, health agencies, and other relevant partners. Its primary purpose is to provide expert advice and guidance to event organisers to ensure public health, safety, and welfare at events.

2.2 The group promotes best practice and a coordinated approach to risk management, covering areas such as crowd safety, traffic management, emergency planning, and contingency arrangements. While the SAG does not hold statutory powers to approve or refuse an event, its recommendations carry significant weight and are intended to support organisers in meeting their legal obligations and safeguarding the public.

2.3 West Midlands Police (WMP) Role – WMP participates in the SAG as a key partner, offering policing expertise and information to support discussions. The force's role in

decision-making is advisory rather than directive; WMP provides a professional recommendation based on its assessment of public safety, crime prevention, and operational risk. This input helps shape the overall safety plan and ensures that policing considerations are integrated into the wider multi-agency strategy.

3. What action was taken by WMP, from the outset, to implement planning and preparation for this fixture?

3.1 Following the announcement of the fixture, WMP commenced operational planning and put in place a gold, silver, bronze (GSB) command structure with experienced and accredited staff.

3.2 In addition to the operational command structure, several roles were assigned thematic responsibilities covering intelligence, community liaison, crime, protest liaison, communications, licensing, legal and traffic.

3.3 To supplement this command structure, the Operations Planning Department were commissioned to support Operation Parkmill. This team are responsible for receiving notifications of operations and events across the force and ensuring that the required level of resources are planned, coordinated and deployed.

3.4 They are also responsible for co-ordinating our region on behalf of the National Policing Co-ordination Centre regarding mutual aid requests.

4. Did that planning and preparation follow usual guidance and procedures or were any particular steps taken on this occasion and if so why?

4.1 WMP have extensive experience of planning and preparing for major events and as such the approach taken was in line with good practice for policing sporting events.

4.2 For the planning of this fixture, WMP adhered to Authorised Professional Practice (APP) guidance in implementing the gold, silver, and bronze (GSB) command structure.

4.3 Public Order Public Safety (POPS) Commanders were supported by POPS Advisors (POPSA), all of whom have successfully completed the College of Policing

course, followed by a structured mentoring period and ongoing Continuing Professional Development (CPD).

4.4 Other key processes and considerations were followed, including but not limited to, the National Decision Model (NDM) and the College of Policing Ten Principles of Risk and the 6 Core Principles of Public Order.

4.5 The National Decision Model (NDM) acted as a continuous guiding framework throughout all phases of the operation, complemented by the application of professional judgment informed by experience.

4.6 During the operation, the NDM was repeatedly applied, prompting POPSA assessments and requiring commanders to review and adjust their approach, response, and threat assessment.

5. What was the initial risk assessment associated with the fixture, and on what information was this reached?

5.1 WMP utilise the National UKFPU risk assessment matrix to inform decision making, threat assessment and resourcing requirements for all football fixtures. The matrix provides a framework to support consistent risk assessment and takes consideration of a wide range of factors that impact on the football fixture.

5.2 Whilst not an exhaustive list, considerations include; time of kick off, significance of the fixture, attendance numbers, profile of supporter attendance, travel arrangements and any specific intelligence or information linked to the fixture. Each of these factors is scored on a scalar and then added together to give a final overall risk score.

5.3 On the 6th October 2025, the AVFC Designated Football Officer (DFO) completed the initial UKFPU scoring matrix risk assessment based on the available information and intelligence at that time. This first assessment gave the fixture an initial score of 77 points, making this a 'high risk' fixture.

5.4 The risk matrix was updated during the week commencing 27th October 2025 and scored at 87.

5.5 The risk assessments took into account the attendance of supporters from MTA, the intelligence flow regarding potential protest, violence aimed at MTA away fans, community tensions and the significance of this fixture from a national perspective.

5.6 The scoring for this fixture was shared with the Silver Commander as part of the information and intelligence gathering process to support decision making through the National Decision-Making Model.

5.7 The threat assessment is always informed by the information and intelligence, and following a review of this, the Silver Commander then documented several working assumptions. These were recorded as follows:

- There may be **pre-planned** disorder and ASB at the match.
- There may be **pre-planned** ASB across the city.
- It is highly likely that there will be **spontaneous** disorder before, during and after the match.
- It is highly likely that there will be **spontaneous** ASB before, during and after the match.
- There will be protest activity across the city and outside the stadium.
- Attempts to disrupt the fixture will be made using a wide range of tactics.
- The majority of fans at the match are intending to enjoy the sport and support their team.
- Both sets of fans will consume alcohol to excess; this will affect their behaviour.
- Risk fans from MTA will attend the match, they will be loud and very visible. They may seek disorder with opposing risk groups if confronted.
- The MTA fans will not comply with police direction and will be highly organised.
- Local communities and business communities will be concerned about the attendance of MTA.

5.8 Taking the above into account, the Silver Commander's threat assessment at that time was as follows:

Threat	Assessment
Minimise threat toward Pro-Isreal protesters	HIGH
Minimise threat towards MTA team and supporters	HIGH
Minimise threat of Spontaneous ASB and disorder amongst groups	HIGH
Prevention and detection of crime.	MEDIUM
Minimise threat towards local Muslim communities and Pro-Palestinian groups	MEDIUM
Minimise Risk to Far Right counter protesters	MEDIUM
Minimise risk to Trust & Confidence, Legitimacy of WMP	MEDIUM
Minimise risk to WMP staff on the operation	MEDIUM
Minimise risk of disruption to communities of Birmingham and Aston	MEDIUM
Minimise risk to staff of Aston Villa	LOW
Minimise risk from terrorism	LOW

6. What was the initial working assumption, regarding the attendance of away fans, adopted by WMP?

6.1 WMP's initial and ongoing planning assumption was that away supporters would attend the fixture.

6.2 From the outset, the Silver Commander's planning assumption was that Maccabi Tel Aviv fans would attend the fixture and plans were developed to facilitate this.

6.3 To ensure the appropriate level of resourcing, at the request of the Silver Commander, an annual leave embargo was authorised on the 12th September 2025.

6.4 WMP's continued working assumption is evidenced in the Gold meeting which was held on the 17th September 2025. A number of actions were raised regarding the planning and resourcing of the visiting MTA fans. These included:

- Arranging a briefing from the Dutch Police to understand the challenges faced during the Ajax fixture.
- Exploring whether an earlier kick off time was feasible and the benefits of such.
- Exploring logistics with the Metropolitan Police regarding the travelling of MTA fans into Heathrow Airport and travelling to Birmingham.

6.5 On the 19th September 2025, the Silver Commander contacted the Metropolitan Police via email to request a co-ordinated policing response in anticipation that MTA fans would be gathering in their force area prior to the fixture. A response was received the following day whereby the Metropolitan Police stated they would prepare for this and informed WMP that London based protest groups intended to travel to the fixture.

6.6 On the 22nd September 2025, the Silver Commander met with the three nominated Bronze Public Order Commanders. Operational plans were developed to accommodate the travelling MTA fans as well as other anticipated groups and scenarios. As a result, further Bronze Public Order Commanders were identified to support delivery.

6.7 On the 24th September 2025, a site visit was conducted at Aston Villa with key partners and stakeholders. Considerations included the use of the coach park, access routes for both sets of fans and multiple potential protest locations.

6.8 The operational plan also considered resourcing requirements and explored various scenarios based on away fan ticket allocation numbers.

6.9 In summary, the working assumption and operational planning was to facilitate MTA away fans attendance at the fixture from the outset.

7. Why was a decision taken, to obtain intelligence from the Dutch Police?

7.1 It is standard practice for football policing units to engage with colleagues from other countries when policing European fixtures to obtain a shared understanding of threat and risk. This was tasked by the Gold Commander which was then facilitated by UKFPU and attended by the Head of the Football Unit.

7.2 The decision was taken to engage with the Dutch Police, given their direct operational experience in managing the Ajax vs MTA fixture in November 2024. This engagement aimed to inform WMP's planning and operational responses for the upcoming AVFC v MTA fixture.

7.3 WMP accepts that there should have been contact made with police forces in other countries which had previously hosted matches involving MTA away fans and we accept that our discussions with the Dutch Police should have been recorded. The information received from the Dutch Police should have been appropriately assessed and managed through existing intelligence structures.

8. Is it usual practice to obtain intelligence from overseas police forces, in connection with the policing of football matches? If not, then why on this occasion?

8.1 Yes, it is usual practice to obtain information and intelligence from overseas police forces for non-UK fixtures wherever possible. This is facilitated in the UK by the UKFPU. It would be the expectation of any Police Commander to consider incidents

arising from previous fixtures and to speak directly to informed individuals in the relevant host force.

8.2 The UKFPU facilitate the sharing of the information between overseas forces via the National Football Information Point – all European countries should have an NFIP. Without this information police forces would be limited in their understanding of the visiting teams' supporter behaviour, culture, and risk presented.

8.3 As one of the European Silver Heads of Delegation, the Head of the Football Unit would typically conduct a pre visit to the host European team. Engaging with overseas police colleagues to obtain information and intelligence is considered best practice.

8.4 This approach supports threat and risk assessments, informs decision making and provides a good source of information and perspective.

9. How was the intelligence obtained from the Dutch Police, who provided it, how was the intelligence provided at the meeting on 2 October noted/recorded and how was it assessed?

9.1 On the 1st October 2025, as part of the planning process, the Head of the Football Unit met with Commanders from the Police in the Netherlands via MS Teams. We accept that our discussions with the Dutch police should have been recorded. The information received from the Dutch Police should have been appropriately assessed and managed through existing intelligence structures.

9.2 An email was sent by the Head of the Football Policing Unit on the 9th October 2025. The contents of this email have already been shared with the PCC.

9.3 Dutch Commanders provided information and reflections based on their first-hand experience of the fixture which they policed between Ajax and MTA in 2024. It was assessed by Commanders as highly relevant.

10. How did the intelligence provided by the Dutch police change the risk assessment and the initial working assumption, regarding the attendance of away fans?

10.1 The match had already been assessed as high risk prior to the meeting with Dutch police, and WMP were preparing to deliver a high-risk football operation to reflect this. The information provided by Dutch police helped inform the Silver Commander's assessment of the risk.

10.2 The information obtained during this meeting, combined with other information and intelligence, such as planned protests and potential violence aimed at MTA fans, reinforced the need to implement an operational policing plan to mitigate the risks associated with travelling high risk MTA fans.

10.3 On 7th October 2025, the Silver Commander provided a verbal briefing to the SAG which incorporated the Dutch information. This resulted in the SAG determining a working assumption of no away fans.

11. Is WMP satisfied as to the credibility, reliability, veracity and provenance of the intelligence received from the Dutch Police?

11.1 WMP accepts that we organisationally 'overstated the evidence' within the material which was shared during the third SAG meeting. We are unable to comment further as this matter now falls within the scope of the IOPC investigation.

12. In view of various allegations casting doubt on the credibility, reliability, veracity and provenance of the Dutch Police intelligence, has WMP reviewed the intelligence provided by the Dutch Police? If not, why not?

12.1 We accept the wider observations of HMICFRS and WMP note that these are matters that have now been voluntarily referred into the IOPC for their consideration.

13. If it has reviewed the intelligence received from the Dutch Police, what was the outcome of that review? What correspondence has taken place with the Policing Minister and the PCC setting out WMP's position?

13.1 We are unable to comment further as this matter now falls within the scope of the IOPC investigation.

14. What other intelligence was obtained by WMP relevant to the fixture? From whom? When?

14.1 An Intelligence Bronze was appointed to co-ordinate the receipt, review and assessment of intelligence. WMP obtained information and intelligence from multiple sources, forming the wider assessment relating to the fixture.

15. What other representations were made to WMP by any other parties or stakeholders, before 16 October 2025 regarding the fixture? By whom? When?

15.1 In addition to the information documented in the Community Impact Assessment, a Community Bronze was appointed to engage with communities and stakeholders and obtain a wide range of views and feedback on the impact of the fixture.

15.2 This included statutory partners, the Local Community Safety Partnership (LCSP), elected officials and other community leaders. A meeting with Birmingham City Council took place on 6th October 2025 and a further meeting involving both Birmingham City Council and Ayoub Khan MP on 7th October 2025 (after the first SAG meeting).

15.3 In relation to the general representations received, the primary focus was on maintaining community safety and mitigating potential risks associated with the fixture. This included reassurances that as part of operational planning, appropriate measures were in place to maintain public order and protect local communities.

15.4 WMP became aware of community petitions being circulated but can confirm these were never received or shared directly.

16. If any additional representations were made what, if any, regard was had to them, in terms of their influence on WMP decision making/recommendations?

16.1 The decision-making process and any recommendations provided to the Safety Advisory Group (SAG) were entirely independent and were not influenced by representations in any way.

17. What was the role of the UK Football Policing Unit (“UKFPU”) in supporting WMP’s approach to the fixture?

17.1 The United Kingdom Football Policing Unit (UKFPU) are a team of police officers and police staff, dedicated to supporting police forces and partner agencies to ‘reduce incidents of football related anti-social behaviour, violence and disorder involving UK supporters.

17.2 The UKFPU gives advice, assistance and training to all police forces in England and Wales to provide a consistent approach to football events.

17.3 The UKFPU are the National Football Information Point (NFIP) for the United Kingdom, as such operational updates for the fixture were provided to the UKFPU. UKFPU facilitate the relationship between WMP and the NFIP and international stakeholders such as UEFA.

17.4 WMP provided the below timeline to the Home Affairs Committee (HAC) regarding communication with the UKFP in relation to the fixture.

17.5 Throughout the planning of the fixture, the Head of Football Unit remained in regular contact with the Director of UKFPU. On 2nd September 2025 WMP’s Football Unit requested details and an information pack on MTA from the National Football Intelligence Point (NFIP) via the UKFPU.

17.6 On 18th September 2025, an email from the Head of the Football Unit was sent to UKFPU requesting they provide contact details for the Dutch Police commanders involved in the Ajax v Maccabi fixture in order to arrange a meeting.

17.7 On 22nd September 2025, an email was received from UKFPU NFIP providing contact details for the Dutch Commanders.

17.8 A further email was received citing Home Office interest and asking for updates on the policing plan, details of any additional restrictions, details on exchanges between the UK, Israeli and Netherlands NFIP and if there were any plans to refuse entry to the UK to known risk Israeli fans.

17.9 On 26th September 2025, a conversation regarding the upcoming fixture took place between the Head of Football Unit and UKFPU.

17.10 On 2nd October 2025, following the attack at the Heaton Park Synagogue in Manchester, WMP received an email from UKFPU highlighting interest from the Home Office in relation to the fixture.

17.11 WMP replied confirming that the Gold Commander would be contacting the National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) Lead for Football Policing. On the same day, and as referenced above, the Head of the Football Unit made contact with UKFPU to discuss engaging with UEFA. This was prompted by media reports regarding the potential ban of Israeli teams from FIFA competitions.

17.12 On 4th October 2025, the DFO emailed NFIP to request information of the Israeli Head of Delegation to identify their equivalent roles for MTA.

17.13 On 6th October 2025, communication took place with UKFPU regarding the involvement of Border Force to establish opportunities for port operations and intelligence regarding travelling fans.

17.14 On 7th October 2025, an email from UKFPU NFIP confirmed that there was no Israeli delegation identified, as there is no NFIP for the country.

17.15 On 13th October 2025, UKFPU shared intelligence reports from Norway with WMP following a World Cup qualifier between Norway and Israel. This intelligence included details of pro Palestinian protest where tear gas was used, the match was disrupted by protest and there was a post-match altercation involving players and coaching staff.

17.16 On 15th October 2025, a further email from UKFPU confirmed that NFIP reports would be provided regarding the Norway v Israel and Italy v Israel fixtures.

17.17 On 16th October 2025, an email exchange confirmed that the second SAG meeting had been brought forward and that WMP would update UKFPU following the meeting.

17.18 On 17th October 2025, UKFPU emailed WMP suggesting contact with the Crown Prosecution (CPS) in preparation for the fixture.

17.19 On 20th October 2025, UKFPU provided WMP with the Ajax v Maccabi post-match report detailing groups involved, numbers and key incidents that occurred before, during, and after the match. UKFPU also shared intelligence regarding Stephen Yaxley-Lennon (aka Tommy Robinson), indicating that he may attend the fixture.

17.20 On 21st October 2025, UKFPU shared with WMP a mayoral report dated 11th November 2024 from the Mayor of Amsterdam regarding events of Ajax v Maccabi.

17.21 On 23rd October 2025, UKFPU confirmed that no Israeli policing delegation had been identified or had plans to attend the fixture.

18. What engagement took place with, a) MTA Football Club, b) the Israeli ambassador or Israeli government and c) Israeli police, before 16 October 2025? By whom? When? If not, why not?

18.1 MTA Football club

18.2 The initial interaction between WMP and MTA took place during the UEFA meeting in Budapest on the 2nd and 3rd September 2025.

18.3 The Head of the Football Unit represented WMP at this conference, which brings together all participating football clubs and police representatives involved in the three UEFA competitions: the Champions League, Europa League, and Europa Conference League.

18.4 The second day of the conference focused on direct engagement with all teams competing in the tournament. A meeting was held with MTA representatives and the Head of the Football Unit.

18.5 During the meeting, MTA representatives expressed concerns regarding the fixture with Aston Villa, citing potential risks of disorder linked to community tensions.

18.6 Although 3,500 tickets were potentially available, estimates from MTA representatives at the time of the meeting suggested that only around 1,500 fans were

likely to attend. During the meeting, MTA representatives also discussed away fan logistics and security, which included potential escorting of coaches from London.

18.7 Issues surrounding the use of pyrotechnics by 'Ultras' were discussed, with agreement that strong advice and clear guidance would need to be communicated to fans to assist with mitigating the risks.

18.8 On 22nd September 2025, the Head of the Football Unit emailed the MTA Operations Manager to extend an offer to meet to discuss the fixture. A reply acknowledging the email was received on the 30th September 2025 with an agreement to meet and a request for dates.

18.9 As is standard for these fixtures, liaison with MTA was coordinated through Aston Villa Football Club (AVFC), who engaged with the team to address operational and logistical requirements. Updates regarding the away team's plans were then communicated in the usual way via the established Silver Commander meeting structure.

18.10 Israeli Ambassador

18.11 On the 29th October 2025, former Chief Constable Guildford received an email on behalf of the Charge d'affaires of Israel, Daniela Grudsky Ekstein, to arrange a phone call with ACC O'Hara (Gold Commander). This was to discuss WMP's preparation ahead of the fixture. As a result of this the Silver Commander spoke to the Charge d'Affaires of Israeli on several occasions.

18.12 During the initial conversation, reassurance was provided regarding police plans to ensure the team's security. A subsequent discussion on 3rd November confirmed arrangements for the Charge d'Affaires' visit to Birmingham.

18.13 On the 6th November 2025, WMP welcomed the Israeli Charge d'Affaires and her diplomatic team who thanked WMP for the management of the security of the event.

18.14 Israeli Police

18.15 After the UEFA conference, attempts to engage with the Israeli police were facilitated by the UKFPU.

18.16 The contact made by UKFPU was through the FCDO (Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office) in the country as they did not have a NFIP contact.

18.17 The initial request for information or contact from Israeli Police was made on 23rd September and followed up on 26th September. There were no details supplied to either of these requests. This is not unusual in countries where there is not an established NFIP.

18.18 On 23rd October 2025, UKFPU confirmed that no Israeli policing delegation had been identified or had plans to attend the fixture.

19. What guidance or procedures or protocols are in place, regarding consultation/engagement with relevant local communities, when preparing recommendations for SAGs, whether for football matches or otherwise? Would consultation/engagement be usual practice.

19.1 WMP utilises both formal and informal community advisers drawn from established partnerships, including faith leaders, local councillors, and representatives from community safety organisations.

19.2 This was particularly relevant for this fixture to gauge the feeling of the community in assessing the wider community tensions and impact for this fixture. This is usual practice for any large-scale event.

19.3 To support the SAG's deliberations, BCC's Community Cohesion officer sits on the SAG.

19.4 As this was a major event, the Community Bronze supported updates for the SAG and personally attended on 7th October and 24 October 2025.

19.5 Broader engagement was aligned to guidance set out by the College of Policing's 'Community engagement, impact assessments and communication'.

20. What, if any, consultation/engagement took place with relevant local communities, regarding the planning and process, leading to the recommendation made by WMP to the SAG?

20.1 As outlined by Acting Chief Constable Green's public statement on his first day in office and our apology at the most recent HAC, our learning and regret is that we did not engage early enough with the local Jewish Community and this is reflected in the feedback from HMICFRS.

21. The intelligence reports prepared for the fixture included reference to a match between West Ham and MTA in 2023 that did not take place. How did this error occur, and what lessons have been learned?

21.1 The erroneous fixture was subsequently included in the SAG document dated 23rd October 2025.

21.2 The former Chief Constable apologised in a letter dated 12th January 2026 to HAC following references made around the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI).

21.3 Since this error has been identified, WMP is undertaking a review into the force's use and policy regarding AI and will be seeking to improve our processes as part of the operational debrief. The Acting Chief Constable has also taken the decision to block access to Microsoft Co Pilot on WMP systems until further notice.

22. Public commentary has questioned the WMP assessment that there were 5000 police officers deployed for the fixture between Ajax and MTA in November 2024, as a Dutch report mentions only 1200 officers. Please provide an explanation of the discrepancy.

22.1 As explained at the first HAC session, the figure of 5,000 comes from the professional assumption of the Silver Commander. Based on information gleaned from the Dutch Commanders and official reports, overlaid with professional judgement, it was the assessment of the Silver Commander that the 3-4 day deployment in

Amsterdam required approximately 5,000 officers. This also supported WMP's understanding of the level of resources that could be required for the upcoming fixture.

22.2 WMP acknowledge the observation from HMICFRS that they 'found no evidence to substantiate this statement'.

22.3 This was a mistake on our behalf and within the SAG document, WMP should have been clear that this was a professional assessment from the Silver Commander.

23. What Equality Impact Assessment(s) did WMP undertake in preparation for the fixture? If not, why not? If so, what were the main findings?

23.1 There has been no Equality Impact Assessment undertaken for this operation. WMP have considered our Equality Act duties throughout this operation.

23.2 WMP were not the decision-making authority; our role was limited to providing a risk assessment to the Safety Advisory Group (SAG).

23.3 We are not aware whether the Local Authority undertook a formal Equality Act assessment before reaching its decision.

23.4 However, through the Risk Assessment, Gold and Silver Strategies, and the Community Impact Assessment, WMP has discharged its obligations under the Public Sector Equality Duty. Section 149 of the Equality Act 2020 states:

(1) A public authority must, in the exercise of its functions, have due regard to the need to—

- (a) eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and any other conduct that is prohibited by or under this Act;
- (b) advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it;
- (c) foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it

23.5 Although WMP did not produce a formal, standalone Equality Act assessment, the Community Impact Assessment serves as a strong indicator that WMP carefully considered our Public Sector Equality Duty.

23.6 Specifically, the Community Impact Assessment highlights this at page 2, paragraph 5 under the section on purpose and benefits of the assessment:

23.7 To meet our legal duty to assess the impact of policing activity under the Public Sector Equality Duty, under S149 Equality Act 2010 and WMP's Diversity & Equality policies in eliminating discrimination and promoting good relations and positive attitudes for all diverse groups across all nine strands of diversity

23.8 Furthermore, the gold and silver strategies clearly demonstrate consideration of Section 149 of the Equality Act 2010, even though it is not specifically cited.

23.9 Both strategies were developed in accordance with Authorised Professional Practice (APP) and the National Decision Model (NDM), ensuring that equality considerations were embedded throughout the decision-making process.

24. What Community Impact Assessment did WMP undertake in preparation for the fixture? What were the main findings?

24.1 A Community Impact Assessment was commenced on the 8th September 2025. This was a 'living' document which was frequently updated by the Community Bronze Commander.

24.2 This was complemented by a Community Engagement Strategy which was tasked to the Community Bronze Commander on 28 October 2025.

24.3 The initial assessments undertaken in late September 2025 identified extensive concerns from a number of different community groups and an overall community impact assessment grading of 'Moderate High.'

24.4 This assessment was revised to 'High' after the SAG decision on 16 October recognising the Manchester attack, significant national and international focus the fixture was now receiving and the increase in tension reporting across differing groups and communities.

25. What briefings were provided to a) Home Office ("HO") officials, b) HO Ministers, c) the Department for Culture Media and Sport and d) the Prime Minister's Office ("No10") before the fixture? When, and by whom?

25.1 On 8 October 2025, a Teams call was held with former Chief Constable Guildford, the Home Secretary, HMICFRS, and other Metropolitan Chiefs to discuss police protest powers.

25.2 At the conclusion of the meeting, former Chief Constable Guildford updated the Home Secretary regarding the upcoming fixture. Former Chief Constable Guildford outlined that MTA fans may be prohibited from attending, however this decision would rest with the SAG.

25.3 WMP are aware that later the same day, an email from the Home Office to UKFPU confirmed that former Chief Constable Guildford had briefed the Home Secretary regarding the potential ban of away fans: *“We’ve heard that the West Midlands Chief briefed the Home Sec earlier that a condition of the match going ahead may be to ban away fans.”*

25.4 UKFPU confirmed to the Home Office that the SAG had met, but no decision had been made. However, the working assumption remained that away fans would be banned.

25.5 Subsequent to the decision being made by the SAG, on the 17th October 2025, the Home Office contacted the former Chief Constable to offer government support to facilitate away fan attendance.

25.6 In spite of the SAG decision, former Chief Constable Guildford asked the Gold and Silver Commanders to continue to explore a range of options to achieve this, noting that the operational risk had escalated significantly due to heightened political and media interest.

25.7 On 17th October 2025, the former Chief Constable briefed Home Office officials and provided details contained within the Community Impact Assessment (CIA).

25.8 On 20th October 2025, former Chief Constable Guildford briefed Home Office officials and discussed the anticipated timeline, intelligence flow and the full range of Home Office support was reiterated.

25.9 On 23rd October 2025, the Gold Commander received an email from the Head of Public Safety Emergency Response, Public Safety Group (PSG) asking for a further update and reassurance on the developing operational plan.

25.10 On 24th October 2025, the Gold Commander responded and agreed to have follow-up conversations to ensure the Home Office remained updated on progress.

25.11 On 27th October 2025, there was an email exchange between the Gold Commander and the PSG and arrangements were made for a follow-up meeting.

25.12 On 3rd November 2025, the Gold Commander met with PSG via Teams and provided a briefing on the developing operational plan. On 5th November 2025, former Chief Constable Guildford and the Gold Commander briefed the Policing Minister via a Teams meeting.

26. If briefings were provided as above, what, if any, response was received from each and/or any of them?

26.1 There were no specific responses noted from the engagement outlined above.

27. In public evidence, HO officials have asserted that they were told by the UKFPU that “all options were on the table” as late as 15 October 2025, and therefore there was no reason for them to believe that a ban on away fans was the likely SAG recommendation. Is this considered by WMP to be an accurate representation of the position by the HO?

27.1 The Home Secretary was briefed by former Chief Constable Guildford and Home Office officials followed this up with UKFPU on 8 October 2025. UKFPU confirmed via email that the working assumption was that away fans would be banned (subject to a SAG decision).

28. Did, at any point, government officials or ministers express any concern that an option to ban MTA fans from attending was “on the table” prior to 16 October 2025? Was any warning given that the Prime Minister or the Home Secretary would object to such an option being recommended, and would regard it as facilitating anti-Semitism?

28.1 WMP can confirm that no concern was raised.

29. Did, at any point, government officials or ministers make WMP aware that additional resources would be available to facilitate the attendance of MTA fans, prior to 16 October 2025?

29.1 The offer of additional resources was given following the increased public and media interest which had been a result of the Prime Minister’s social media post.

30. In public evidence, Lord Mann has asserted that it was known by 16 October 2025 that MTA “Ultras” fans would not seek to attend the fixture. Did he, or anyone else, convey this intelligence to WMP, the UKFPU, or any other body at any point prior to the Home Affairs Committee hearing on 1 December 2025?

30.1 It was always our planning assumption that the away fans travelling to the UK would include the sub section referred to as ‘Ultras’. On the 20th October 2025, MTA formally announced on their website that they would not accept any away ticket allocation.

31. On what evidential basis and what were the reasons relied on by WMP, in reaching its decision to recommend exclusion of away fans from the fixture?

31.1 Attendees at SAG meetings do not provide ‘evidence’, they provide information and intelligence which is considered by all partners before their final recommendation.

31.2 The reasons for the recommendation emanate from our core responsibilities of public safety. Birmingham SAG was the decision maker in relation to the exclusion of away fans. WMP provided detail on risk, community impact and the policing operation.

31.3 The SAG, upon recommendations provided to them by various partners involved, arrived at a working assumption of no away supporters following the meeting on 7 October 2025.

31.4 WMP provided information and intelligence from a wide range of sources including the Intelligence Sit Rep, Community Impact Assessment and the meeting with the Dutch Police. The overarching consideration was the protective duty under Article 2 ECHR.

31.5 As we have stated throughout this report, WMP accept that we have '*overstated the evidence*' as highlighted by HMICFRS.

32. What was the process via which the recommendations made by WMP to Birmingham City Council ("BCC") SAG, on or before 16 October 2025, were communicated and/or agreed?

32.1 WMP provided verbal updates to the SAG meetings conducted on the 7th and 16th October 2025. This is normal practice for attendees at BCC SAG meetings.

32.2 For the third SAG meeting on the 24th October 2025, all partners provided a written submission at the request of the Chair to support their deliberations.

33. Following the intervention of the Prime Minister on 17 October, what impact, if any, did that have on WMP and what consequences followed from this intervention and the consequential and wider public interest and concern that followed?

33.1 WMP experienced a significant surge in public interest surrounding the fixture following the social media post by the Prime Minister. WMP saw a substantial increase in communications and social media engagement from members of the public expressing their views and concerns on the SAG decision.

33.2 Our assessment is that, in the short term, this created significant pressure which was considered at the Gold meeting on 17 October 2025. This pressure was particularly acutely felt in the Communications Department, Force Contact and Professional Standards.

34. Following the decision of the SAG on 16 October and the immediate public concern and interest, what action was taken by WMP to review its decision/recommendation, including communication and meetings with relevant government departments, to review the position, with a view to away fans attending, including the operational policing plans required and the offer of additional financial support from government?

34.1 On the 17th October 2025, former Chief Constable Guildford commissioned an independent Peer Review which was conducted on the 20th October 2025. A copy of this Peer Review has already been provided to the PCC.

34.2 On the 17th October 2025, WMP further liaised with the Home Office who offered additional financial support in an effort to facilitate MTA fan attendance.

34.3 The Silver Commander documented a provisional breakdown of costs and resources required to police Maccabi Tel Aviv fans subsequent to the increased profile and community tension.

35. What were the main findings of the UKFPU “Rapid Review” of the WMP management of Op Parkmill, up to and including the rapid review, requested after 16 October 2025?

35.1 The Peer Review was commissioned by former Chief Constable Guildford on 17th October 2025 and was made up of two parts.

35.2 The first part was to retrospectively assess the approach taken and whether the recommendation made to the SAG on the 16th October 2025 to ban away fans was reasonable. The Peer Review confirmed that it was.

35.3 The second part was a prospective assessment based on the situation when the review took place on the 20th October 2025. The Peer Review states the following:

“The effectiveness of the proposed mitigation- no away fans- has been reduced as a consequence of the high-profile commentary around the fixture which has seen diametrically opposed positions becoming entrenched.”

35.4 Findings in the second part detailed a number of options available to the operation on 20 October 2025 including having no supporters, reduced away allocation, no away supporters, and full capacity. The Peer Review states the following:

“Any of the above options would require a sizeable and cross-force policing operation due to the nature of the threat, harm and risks posed. The lack of away supporters naturally removes the likelihood of serious disorder between opposing football supporters and with the police (as was the case when Legia Warsaw visited Villa Park) but does not eradicate risks. If this option is pursued, the high profile commentary is still likely to have increased the risk and scale of opposing protest groups.”

“The issue of policing protest and community tension becomes the focus in the absence of rival football supporter behaviours. The narrative will not remove the over-arching risk entirely regardless of which option is implemented. In essence there is no preferable option, but the least worst would be away fans with a reduced allocation, or subject to ongoing discussions with Government to retain the ban on away fans.”

35.5 However, it should be noted that this recommendation became redundant, as on the 20th October 2025, MTA announced that they would not accept any away ticket allocation.

36. What further recommendations were made by WMP to BCC SAG between 16 October and 6 November 2025?

36.1 On the 21st October 2025, the Gold Commander requested that the Chair of the SAG reconvene the SAG to reconsider the advice previously given. This was documented in an email and was as a result of developments in information and intelligence and a changing threat and risk picture.

36.2 On the 24th October 2025, for the third SAG meeting, WMP and all key partners provided a written submission summarising their positions. Previous submissions to the first two SAGS were provided verbally as is normal practice.

36.3 The WMP written submission contained a high level summary of the Silver Commander's assessment of information, intelligence and professional judgement.

36.4 There were two parts to the Silver Commander's written submission. The first part was his summary of all the submissions briefed into the first two SAGs and the second part being his additional assessment taking into consideration further information and intelligence subsequent to the decision on the 16th October 2025.

37. Had the SAG recommendation changed and, hypothetically, c. 2,500 MTA fans had attended the fixture, what would have been the likely requirements and scale of the policing operation?

37.1 The policing operation would have been substantial and spanned several days at a cost of over £5 million. To facilitate this scenario, WMP would have seen a 4-day operation across multiple police force areas requiring a range a specialist resources.

37.2 This would have included a dedicated cross border command structure involving 7 Home Office forces and British Transport Police with an extensive deployment of resources to meet operational need.

37.3 In addition to the above estimated costs, there would have also been the ancillary costs of fleet, fuel, accommodation, and food. In addition to this, there would have been potential further costs relating to partner agencies in each of the geographical regions including Ambulance, Fire, Local Authorities, Highways and Military.

38. What action did WMP take to ensure that it discharged its responsibilities to police the fixture on 6 November in a way that prevented crime, ensured community safety and maintained public order, as between everyone who would be attending the fixture and what was the ultimate outcome of the policing operation?

38.1 WMP deployed 1166 operational officers and staff to the event, ensuring the safety of all involved which included the local community, protesters, counter-protesters and 21,000 fans.

38.2 Measures were implemented to manage the safe movement of approximately 21,000 fans, as well as protesters and counter-protesters. This included designated protest zones, controlled entry points, and liaison with stewards and venue security.

38.3 A total of 11 arrests were made for a range of offences, but there were no serious incidents of disorder or harm. The event concluded safely, maintaining public confidence and demonstrating WMP's commitment to balanced and effective policing.

39. What were the financial and operational opportunity costs arising from Operation Parkmill?

39.1 Due to the extent of Mutual Aid resources deployed and financial processing, WMP do not yet have an overview of actual costs to date. WMP estimate this to be in excess of £1 million.

40. What lessons and recommendations have arisen from the post-fixture operational debrief?

40.1 A full structured debrief has been commissioned. However, due to our obligations of responding to IOPC this is yet to be conducted.

40.2 Please see Paragraph 43 below for a full explanation on the next steps.

41. What is WMP's assessment of and response to, the findings and recommendations of the HASC Report and do any actions and/or matters arise from the Report?

41.1 WMP are yet to receive an update from the HAC, so cannot provide an update, but have engaged throughout with the Committee and any correspondence received.

42. What is WMP's assessment of and response to, the findings of the HMICFRS review of the match assessment and categorisation that West Midlands Police provided to the Birmingham City Council safety advisory group? [it is recognised that this will not be available until January 2026]

42.1 On 14 January 2026 WMP received a copy of the letter from HMICFRS containing preliminary views which may be subject to change.

42.2 However, we have carefully studied the report and our response is captured and referenced at Paragraph 43 below.

43. What steps has WMP taken to maintain the trust and confidence of, a) the local and wider Jewish community, b) the wider public, and c) stakeholder partners including BCC and AVFC, since 16 October 2025?

43.1 On Friday 16th January 2026, former Chief Constable Guildford retired from West Midlands Police with immediate effect. The Police and Crime Commissioner appointed Scott Green as the Acting Chief Constable.

43.2 On Monday 19th January 2026, his first full day in office, Acting Chief Constable Green made a public statement apologising for West Midlands Police's handling of these matters.

43.3 He also took the decision to make an immediate voluntary referral to the IOPC to consider any conduct matters by West Midlands Police senior officers involved in these events.

43.4 On Tuesday 20th January 2026, Acting Chief Constable Green along with the Police and Crime Commissioner met with members of the local West Midlands Jewish community, where he again apologised and set out his determination to repair the damage caused by these events to public confidence.

43.5 Acting Chief Constable Green will be meeting with other faith groups, stakeholders and others to continue to rebuild the trust that the public of the West Midlands have in the force.

43.6 West Midlands Police had already established Operation Fernmore in the immediate aftermath of the publication of the HMICFRS letter to the Home Secretary on Wednesday 14th January 2026.

43.7 This has now been superseded by Operation Strive.

43.8 Operation Strive will coordinate West Midlands Police's response and recovery from these events as the force seeks to rebuild the trust and confidence of the public of the West Midlands and the wider public. Acting Chief Constable Green is taking personal

responsibility for this operation as the Gold Commander and has appointed Acting Deputy Chief Constable Mattinson as the Silver Commander.

43.9 The overall strategic aim of Operation Strive will be to:

43.10 Restore the trust and confidence that the public have in West Midlands Police and learn the lessons from how we responded to the fixture.

43.11 Acting Chief Constable Green will give a fuller update on the objectives and detail within Operation Strive to the Police and Crime Commissioner.

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23rd January 2026