

**Accountability & Governance Board
Tuesday 25th February 2025**

Police and Crime Plan Priority: Responding to National Threats

Title: Strategic Policing Requirement

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Purpose of Paper

1. The purpose of the report is to provide the PCC and the Accountability Governance Board (AGB) with assurance that the Force is effectively and efficiently engaged in addressing national policing threats as set out in the Strategic Policing Requirement (SPR), with a specific focus on:
 - **Serious and Organised Crime**
 - **Counter Terrorism**
 - **Public Order**
 - **Civil Emergencies**
 - **The response to a national cyber security incident**
 - **Violence Against Women and Girls**
 - **Child Sexual Abuse**
 - **Cross-Cutting Capabilities**

Background

2. This paper provides an update to the last briefing to the Strategic Policing Crime Board on 23rd April 2024.
3. Introduced in 2012, the SPR established the foundations for a national level policing response to identified threats. The objectives of the SPR are to set out existing and emerging threats, describe the required capabilities to counter them and to provide a framework for a co-ordinated, aggregated response which are just as, if not more, relevant today.
4. The SPR articulates the balance between local level policing and the need for collaboration at a national level in order to tackle identified threats and harms. In response to a recommendation from Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC), the requirement was reviewed in 2015 to ensure it remained relevant and effective.
5. This review provided an updated threat profile, comprising; Serious and Organised Crime, Threats to public order or public safety (that cannot be managed by a single force), Civil emergencies (requiring an aggregated response across police force boundaries) and Child

Sexual Abuse.

6. The associated policing response to these threats in the 2015 SPR was articulated as the '5Cs'; Capacity and Contribution; Capability; Consistency; and Connectivity.
7. February 2023 saw the publication of a revised SPR. This was informed by an extensive review and consultation exercise with key stakeholders and partners, and also reflected changes to the strategic and operational landscape such as the creation of the National Policing Board in 2019.
8. The resulting revised SPR continues to provide a framework setting out the biggest threats to public safety, ensuring the police have the capabilities to deliver a robust, national response.
9. The 2023 SPR sets out seven identified national threats - six of which remain from the 2015 version (as set out above), and with the key addition of Violence against Women and Girls, reflecting the threat it presents to public safety and confidence.
10. The 2023 SPR also builds on and expands the 2015 iteration in other ways, for instance:
11. The Serious and Organised Crime threat response has been expanded to include reference to drugs trafficking, specifically the county lines model, and fraud which, highlighted during the review as threats that cross police force boundaries.
12. Providing strengthened detail around the action required from policing at the local and regional level to critical national threats.
13. Supporting Chief Constables and PCCs by clearly linking the local response to the national threat, highlighting the capabilities and partnerships policing need to fulfil its responsibilities.
14. Moving forward, the SPR will be clearly referenced in police and crime plans. They will show how it has been considered in setting the strategic direction and objectives within forces and how these will contribute to tackling national priority threats.
15. In summary, the SPR remains a cornerstone of policing, identifying threats and providing a framework for response at both a local force level and from a national perspective. WMP welcomes the revised SPR as a framework for strategic planning and operational delivery. As a force we reflect all seven identified national threats in our service planning and delivery approach.
16. In particular, we highlight our role in tackling Violence Against Women and Girls (VAWG): we were one of four pilot forces for Operation Soteria, transforming the way we investigate rape and serious sexual violence and putting victims at the very heart of the work we do, we also play a key role in tackling VAWG as part of the West Midlands Violence Reduction Partnership hand in hand with West Midlands PCC.

Serious & Organised Crime

17. The Regional Organisational Crime Unit West Midlands (ROCUWM) provides a range of niche

specialist policing capabilities to regional forces;

18. ROCUWM investigative capability reactively and proactively investigates and disrupts those involved in serious crime activity. The culture within the investigative teams is to maximise criminal justice opportunities to remove criminal commodity from the streets of the West Midlands Region.
19. Through the Regional Tasking & Coordination Group (TCG), the investigative teams conduct a diverse array of threat-based operations. Clearly, the criminal use of firearms is of concern to all across our region and is a priority in support of a co-ordinated response. During quarter three of the 2024/25 performance year, ROCUWM led on operations across the region that saw 17 firearms being recovered.
20. **Investigative Demand** - Investigations into serious organised crime and the severe nature of sentences that accompany such offences, result in lengthy and complex criminal trials. This is compounded by delays in the criminal justice system which, at times, elongates the criminal justice process & places significant strain on the departments investigative resource.
21. **Technology** - As technology develops, criminals continue to exploit digital platforms to support their business models. As a result of this there is significant evidence/intelligence opportunities available within digital hand-held devices, computers, hard drives and gaming consoles.
22. ROCUWM are in the process of conducting a technological review to ensure we are working efficiently and effectively within this digital space, as well as ensuring that we are maximising artificial intelligence platforms to process large data sets that accompany the abstraction of data from such devices.

The working relationship with the National Crime Agency, including day-to-day tasking and requests from the Director General to perform a task under Section 5(1)(a) Crime and Courts Act 2013.

23. The National Crime Agency (NCA) continues to embed staff within each ROCUWM and share a close working relationship.
24. ROCUWM continues to work closely with the NCA's Regional Organised Crime Co-ordinator (ROCC), attending weekly meetings to support our operational efficiency and effectiveness.
25. Furthermore, the NCA continues to be a partner in the monthly Regional Tactical Tasking & Co-ordination (RTTCG) meeting. ROCUWM continues to be able to access NCA resources when necessary, to support the challenges in tackling Serious Organised Crime (SOC).
26. The NCA provide support as a partner in the Strategic Governance Groups which are aligned to Commodities, Vulnerabilities and Prosperity priorities. These groups were reinstated in 2022 and produce, own and implement strategic action plans through de-confliction and rationalisation of national plans, whilst being cognisant of local priorities.
27. Any s.5(1)(a) Crime and Courts Act 2013 tasking actions received by the ROCUWM continue to be taken directly to the RTTCG meeting for both visibility and accountability purposes. The activity itself and progress is tracked through that forum.

The impact of the NCA tilt and how this is affecting regional capacity/tasking. What level of activity previously undertaken by NCA is WMROCU now delivering?

28. The relationship with the NCA continues to be developed. The tilt in NCA development and sanctioning of investigations has had an impact. Whilst this has seen an increase in intelligence dissemination, the processes that are imbedded have kept ROCUWM in a strong position to accept this dissemination and deal with it expeditiously. These processes are as follows;
- Using the ROCUWM Gateway for support requests and dissemination of intelligence
 - Use of the ROCUWM Head of Intelligence or on call duty arrangements for decision making
 - The requests for support (only tasking takes place under s.5(1)(a) Crime and Courts Act 2013) assessed and taken to the ROCUWM weekly tasking process for agreement in terms of support or otherwise.

The resilience of the capacity and capabilities required for SPR compliance, including reference to vacancy rates

29. The below table illustrates the ROCUWM establishment at the time of writing.

	Officer establishment	Officer headcount	Officer vacancies
WMP	235	227	8
WK	35	15	20
WM	70	51	19
ST	67	57	10
Total	407	350	57 (14%)

30. ROCUWM has finalised its 2025/26 establishment having realigned 24 officer posts over the next performance year back to WMP. As a result of a Priority Based Budget exercise, the majority of these officer posts will be realised immediately due to them predominantly being vacant posts - the remaining posts will be realised within the first six months of the forthcoming performance year.
31. The below table captures the 2025/26 expected establishment, which includes a reduction in officer posts from 407 to 371.

	Officer establishment	Officer headcount	Officer vacancies
WMP	211	213	-2
WK	32	20	12
WM	65	51	14
ST	63	58	5
Total	371	342	29

How is Clear, Hold, Build being used to tackle SOC across the region

32. Clear, Hold, Build (CHB) is a framework for bringing the tackling of serious and organised crime threats into neighbourhood policing. It also involves partners and the community in delivering and sustaining reductions in serious organised crime and related crime.
33. CHB uses a place-based approach to understand the totality of serious and organised crime threats. It provides a model that forces can use to work in a more structured and coordinated way with partners. It ensures the community is involved in the response and has a say in the interventions that impact local areas. It ensures that the local response to serious and organised crime is sustainable and moves beyond conventional enforcement tactics.
34. ROCUWM continues to be the subject matter experts into the partnership response to CHB across the region. Resources from ROCUWM continue to support forces and key strategic partners with the operational response through a lead, support and co-ordinate lens.
35. ROCUWM continue to support projects within West Midlands and the deployment of the ROCU TOEX (Tackling Organised Exploitation Programme) capabilities has resulted in the identification of sexual exploitation offences being committed within the targeted geographical space presenting enforcement opportunities for local teams to act on.
36. ROCUWM continues to support the four Force's approach to CHB across the following regional sites -

West Midlands Police	Op Elevate - Washwood Heath Op Fearless - Erdington
Staffordshire Police	Op Alberio - Shelton & Hanley Park
Warwickshire Police	Op Stronghold - Croft Pool Estate
West Mercia Police	Op Sargasso - Oswestry Op Restore - Cleeve Prior/ Bredon & Eckington

37. Operation Elevate relates to police activity designed to address serious & organised criminality in the local community. This included the investigation into a suspected drug line operating in the Washwood Heath (and surrounding) area and the co-ordinated disruption of organised crime gangs (OCGs), their networks and business interests.
38. Launched in Erdington in January 2025, Operation Fearless is a WMP initiative focused on reducing crime & improving the quality of life for local people combatting Drugs, ASB, Robbery, Violence, Shoplifting, Sale of stolen goods & Exploitation.

Counter Terrorism

39. Counter Terrorism Policing (CTP) is a collaboration of the United Kingdom's police forces working with the intelligence community to help protect the public and national security. CTP consists of a network of operational units based centrally and regionally across the UK, delivering specialist counter-terrorism services on behalf of forces.
40. CTP West Midlands, local force colleagues and partners continue to work tirelessly in the delivery the Governments CONTEST strategy, by preventing, investigating, preparing for and protecting against terrorist activity and other national security threats.

41. West Midlands Police have the appropriate capability, relationships and tested mechanisms to prioritise resources against cases or threats that pose the most risk - keeping the public of the West Midlands region safe by delivering the outcomes set out in the Strategic Policing Requirement.

The number of national and regional investigations that are ongoing across West Midlands Counter Terrorism Unit compared to the same time frame last year.

42. The threat to the UK from international terrorism is currently at SUBSTANTIAL, meaning an attack is likely; but the threat is both enduring and evolving. Despite a prevalence of lower sophistication attacks in the UK, the threat seen today and in the coming years, is more diverse, dynamic and complex. This is compounded by an operating environment where accelerating advances in technology provide both opportunity and risk to counter-terrorism efforts.
43. Since March 2017, CTP and UK Intelligence Services have disrupted 43 late stage attacks and across the UK, Counter Terrorism Policing are working on more than 800 investigations, the majority of which are in partnership with MI5.
44. Over the past two years, the total number of open terrorism related investigations within the West Midlands region has increased year on year, in 2023 by 43% and in 2024 by 12% respectively.
45. Counter Terrorism Policing will continue to balance protecting communities from terrorism against the need to tackle state-sponsored activity. Partners in the United Kingdom Intelligence Community also share this mission, and MI5 highlight that in the last year the number of their state threat investigations has increased by 48%.

An update on activity and performance against the “4Ps” of Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare

46. CTP West Midlands continues to work closely with partners to detect, investigate and disrupt terrorist activity. There are mature policies and processes that allow effective sharing of information to enrich the understanding of the terrorist threat at a local level.
47. A whole system approach enables a range of interventions to be considered, some delivered by a wider range of partners to divert vulnerable people away from committing harm, but CTP West Midlands retains the appropriate capability to pursue criminal justice outcomes for those suspected of committing serious offences.
48. Terrorism investigations are complex and the Unit often has to move at pace to mitigate identified risks to the public - around 30 people were arrested in 2024 with 28 official disruptions submitted to CT Policing Headquarters. Officers and staff have recently jailed dangerous individuals who have designed a 3D-printed armed drone for Islamic State in West Africa, attempted to join terrorist groups overseas, built guns, blended and tested explosives, possessed material likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism and shared videos encouraging others to follow their warped views used to justify violence.
49. The Unit, supported by the wider CT Network, has the ability to respond to CT incidents declared in our region. Last year an offender was arrested by frontline colleagues on suspicion of attempting to murder a man in a hotel. This was the starting point for a successful CT

investigation which an extreme-right-wing obsessed individual was convicted of terrorism offences.

50. Demand for service continues to pose the one of the biggest challenges for CTP West Midlands, especially within the investigation capability. This is due to the complexity of the terrorism threat, levels of new investigations and the emerging national security mission (the new National Security Act introduces new measures and powers to modernise counter-espionage laws and address the evolving state threat to national security). These three factors provide pressure and uncertainty - all against a national investigative staffing profile that reduced 12 DCs from the investigations departments establishment.
51. Disciplined risk-based prioritisation ensures that new leads and investigations are appropriately resourced, although lengthy and complex criminal trials, compounded by criminal justice delays provide strain on existing resources. A formal lean improvement project focusing on Intelligence and Investigative functions has been commissioned by the Head of Unit to establish opportunities to make existing processes more efficient and to explore how resources can be optimised in times of higher demand and surge.
52. An increase in young people have been seen in both National and in West Midlands investigations. Nationally, around 13% of all those being investigated for involvement in UK terrorism are under 18, around a threefold increase in the last three years. Extreme right-wing terrorism in particular skews heavily towards young people.
53. With minors becoming radicalised online, traditional criminal justice outcomes are not always appropriate. The risk and threat posed by these individuals has to be managed in a more innovative and an often more time-consuming way. Officers are working closely with traditional and non-traditional partners to deliver the best protection for the public and the Prevent function continues to invest heavily in Continued Professional Development for its people.
54. Many Prevent Ambassadors are also schools link officers, allowing them to support schools more effectively in delivering interventions and over time enabling statutory agencies to identify and safeguard youngsters susceptible to radicalisation earlier, supporting them in delivering their statutory duty under Prevent. In addition, the work of the national Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit aims to reduce the online reach and influence of those terrorism-promoting agendas by decreasing the quantity of online terrorist and violent extremist material.
55. Technology is playing a significant factor within Counter Terrorism, in particular mobile devices and computers with greater storage poses significant operational challenge - the volume of material that must be processed during the course of an investigation is significant.
56. The Strategic Policing Requirement outlines the importance of working to specific requirements and standards that must be met - the ongoing work to retain ISO accreditation for mobile phone and computer examinations and to gain accreditation for the wider forensic management capability meets this goal. This ongoing effort related to accreditation provides significant challenges to officers and staff who are already under operational pressures described earlier. CTP West Midlands is committed to demonstrating the unit's assets are technically competent and have confidence in the reliability and accuracy of results in accordance with the requirements of national and international standards and regulations.
57. Convicted individuals in prison for terrorism or extremism offences, who are now being

released into the community also add to an ever shifting and complex West Midlands threat picture. Managing convicted terrorist offenders on their return to our communities within the West Midlands is a significant element in the evolving threat picture.

58. CTP West Midlands have a highly effective and dedicated nominal management capability and joint intelligence sharing processes are stronger than ever. There have been new, innovative and practical changes implemented in partnership with prison and probation services. The nominal management function has a range of robust tactics and measures available to enable mitigating action in individual cases.
59. CTP West Midlands Protect and Prepare capabilities are robust and well-co-ordinated; the unit continues to regularly test and exercise plans for a range of counter-terrorism operations and scenarios. In 2024, 18 Counter Terrorism exercises were successfully conducted to test a range of CT response plans, this included simulating and testing multi-agency responses to large scale and complex Marauding Terrorist Attacks in a number of different public places.
60. Organisational learning is embedded into business and usual, around formal 20 debriefs have been conducted over the past 12 months on a range of operational matters including Executive Action. All of these have generated learning which is tracked and monitored locally, regionally and nationally from within CTP.
61. Working closely with partners, the Protect and Prepare capability conducts deep dive assessments to help close identified gaps with local authorities, sporting venues and other iconic places. This work enables specialist staff to provide targeted advice and guidance on the terrorist threat, methodologies and mitigations to stakeholders allowing them to consider protective security and asset deployment.
62. Other Prepare capabilities enable the empowerment of staff from front line policing and the business sector to identify and deal with suspicious activity. Over 2000 call handlers, neighbourhood officers and other frontline officers from West Midlands Police have been trained so far. This has been complemented by various other external event inputs to upskill over 300 organisers and other relevant groups.
63. CTP West Midlands now has responsibility for the Project Servator capability within the region. Project Servator officers are deployed to conduct highly-visible and unpredictable deployments using range of tactics to disrupt criminal activity, including but not limited to terrorism, whilst providing a reassuring presence for the public.
64. Since April 2024, Servator has deployed to the streets and public venues to the West Midlands over 1200 times generating 50 arrests, and 179 intelligence submissions. End of year projections are expecting an 13% increase in deployments, a 33% Increase in arrests and 72% increase in intelligence logs compared with the previous year. Servator deployments in West Mercia and Warwickshire have also been piloted, although the release of cadre staff continues to provide challenges.
65. To improve physical security a new regional capability has been formed to covertly test the security posture of important locations. West Midlands is only one of two forces in the UK that have this highly specialised capability. Deployments have been made against police premises, key locations and events across the region and have generated learning and recommendations for senior leaders to consider. To help mitigate this wider security related risk, a regional Hostile Reconnaissance plan has also been developed. This is being

progressed in West Midlands Police and will be rolled out to the wider region in 2025, work to influence senior leaders continues to ensure this work is prioritised appropriately.

66. There has also been good progress regarding the Hostile Vehicle Mitigation capability. A key tactic is the continued use of physical barriers, which are designed to prevent or mitigate harm caused by vehicles, by being installed in strategically placed locations to safeguard public places, events, and infrastructure.
67. External challenges for Protect and Prepare capabilities relate to the maturity of local Protect and Prepare Boards across the Region. Although this is the responsibility of the Local Authority in question, at a strategic level CTP West Midlands continue to influence senior leaders to ensure that appropriate governance is in place and there is clear focus and investment into the vulnerabilities identified with their areas. From a more tactical perspective officers from the Unit attend all Local Authority Boards to provide support, guidance and share best practice.
68. The Terrorism Bill (Protection of Premises) is currently being considered in Parliament. The draft legislation requires those responsible for certain premises and events to take steps to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack and reduce harm in the event of a terrorist attack occurring. In addition to this, certain larger premises and events must also take steps to reduce the vulnerability of the premises to terrorist attacks.
69. Counter Terrorism Policing has contributed to the preparatory work and in evidence to the Commons Committee stage, ACSO Matt Jukes underlined the usefulness of the proposed provisions to enhancing public safety. However, uncertainty regarding the impact this will present to CTP Policing is still being considered and there is still scope for significant change. If the Bill is passed, it is expected that Counter Terrorism Policing's role will be to support the Home Office in the implementation process, particularly in providing advice to venues and events who will be covered by its provisions. Preparations are in place to ensure that organisations seeking practical advice and guidance can find it easily, but if the Bill is passed it is likely to create significant demand for the CTP West Midlands Protect capability.
70. Prevent capabilities that gather and assess all received Prevent referrals and associated information within the West Midlands are strong; more Prevent ambassadors combined with efforts to raise awareness with partners have contributed to an 18% increase in referrals compared to 2023. Around 70 referrals per month are now received, risk assessed, prioritised and progressed more quickly through a redesigned and more efficient process. Targeted work has resulted in referrals being received from those geographical areas that really matter - areas deemed more vulnerable are identified within Counter Terrorism Local Profiles. Shifting focus to better support the four forces within the region has seen referrals from local policing also increase year on year.
71. Due to a drive to improve the quality of referrals, unknown motivational or ideological classification has reduced from 19% to 5%. This allows specialist Prevent officers to better identify and align the right intervention resource to mitigate any risk of the referred person being drawn further into extremism or acts of terrorism. Insight obtained from new Prevent processes is enabling strategic decision-making regarding intervention provision, resource allocation and funding coupled with ongoing work linked to onward referral pathways. This will help see a more effective and sustainable approach to intervention and prevention in the future.
72. Primarily due to the successful work to increase the quantity of referrals from the most

vulnerable geographical areas and the quality of referrals now submitted, the Prevent Capabilities are also forecasting challenges with a further 5% increase in demand anticipated. This is compounded by inconsistencies regarding the level of FTE provided by regional forces and current arrangements are unsustainable in long term. This will be escalated to Executive Level to enable a solution to be identified and implemented.

In the short term, the function is working hard to quickly filter out and make onward referrals to enable non-CT vulnerabilities to be addressed, allowing CT Prevent officers to focus on cases that pose the greatest risk. This is complemented with a programme of informative Continued Professional Development and a continued evolution of the Prevent Partnership Team. Improving internal processes providing a clear demarcation between Prevent and Intelligence roles and responsibilities has reduced the risk of individuals with associated vulnerabilities falling between department gaps.

73. Neurodiversity is featuring more in the Prevent caseloads and wider CT Investigations. To address this trend, CTP West Midlands is currently collaborating with Birmingham & Solihull Mental Health Trust, looking at data associated with individuals referred with conditions of this nature. The insight from this work could open up intervention opportunities that may have not been initially considered.
74. Reductions in public spending and Local Authority budgets present another significant challenge for Prevent, as authorities and intervention providers prioritise non-essential services, potentially scaling back non-statutory activity. Strategic discussions this year will look to mitigate any risks that may be presented, although CT Policing will need to focus on the unique policing related role they must undertake to satisfy the objectives of CONTEST.

The resilience and capacity of West Midlands Counter Terrorism Unit to ensure compliance against the SPR in the face of an uptick in pressure on the counter terrorism service.

75. West Midlands Police and CTP West Midlands have the capacity and resilience to ensure compliance against the SPR in the face of an uptick in pressure on the counter terrorism service.
76. April 2024 saw the first terrorist incident to be declared in the West Midlands region in recent memory. The attack, which led to a large-scale investigation, resulted in the offender being jailed for life for the attempted murder of a 25-year-old man in Worcestershire. Appropriate resources were mobilised to ensure a methodical and diligent investigation and at the same time the Unit demonstrated resilience in order to maintain its other investigations and other priority work across the 4 P's of the CONTEST Strategy.
77. Through mature and thoroughly tested mechanisms, the strength of the CT Network allows national, regional and local policing resources, supported by the wider intelligence community and other specialist partners, to be mobilised to proactively or reactively to meet any terrorism threat within the West Midlands.
78. CTP West Midlands are alive to the risk that global events - like the situation in the Middle East - could trigger CT related activity in the UK. The ripples from conflicts such as these will be filtered through the lens of online media and mixed with existing views and grievances in unpredictable ways.

79. Front line police colleagues have responded to rising public order, hate crime and community safety challenges as we saw with last October's knife attack in Hartlepool, but the UK hasn't yet seen this translate at scale into terrorist violence - the CT Network will be prepared for this eventuality.
80. CT Policing will continue to play a role in helping protect the security of elected officials, politicians and political processes and the network works closely with Parliamentary authorities to support their work protecting members of Parliament. It plays an active role alongside local forces in delivering the Defending Democracy Protocol.
81. Recruiting into Counter Terrorism Policing still remains problematic and presents significant challenge across the UK, particularly within CTP Headquarters. Workforce planning, preparing and developing how the network operates to meet the demands of the future is an ongoing and complex piece of work. Innovative thinking and approaches will need to be adopted and CTP West Midlands have been working closely with Police Now and WMP Learning & Development to develop a pathway for 40 new detectives to be recruited directly into Counter Terrorism Policing, a first for any region outside of London.
82. Delivering CONTEST is complex, multi-faceted and challenging. A national review of CONTEST connectivity, led by West Midlands Police will conclude this year. The aim of the review is to take a whole system approach ensuring that national, regional and local CONTEST related delivery is properly aligned and fully connected. West Midlands Police will be early adopters of the new CONTEST connectivity principles and they will influence the continued development of the regions and force CONTEST Meetings.
83. As part of Counter Terrorism's continuing commitment to remain at the forefront of protecting national security in the UK and internationally there has been a re-evaluation of the network's strategic direction. A new 5-year CT Policing Strategy will be launched later this year. The strategy will become a critical framework for assessing future investment requirements, design work and business planning. Regional CT Planning has a deliberate focus on action and on detail drawing together significant milestones and activities agreed at a national, regional and local level which will take Counter Terrorism policing forward in terms of effectiveness and efficiency, mitigating and managing related threat and risk.

Maintenance of the CT armed uplift capability beyond March 2025.

84. The Firearms Operations Unit (FOU) has an establishment of 258 Authorised Firearms Officers (AFOs). The FOU work to a service level agreement of 10 Armed Response Vehicles (ARVs), a Firearms Tactical Advisor on a 24/7 basis and a dedicated Armed response capability provided to Birmingham International Airport (BHX) in line with their risk assessment, as agreed under the PSA.
85. In addition, the Tactical Firearms Team (TFT) comprising of Counter Terrorism Specialist Firearms Officers (CTSFOs), provide the WMP response to planned deployments and an on-call response for both internal force armed demands. Furthermore, they also include a national Intervention Response Team (IRT) required by the CT Network on a 24/7 basis in order to provide support to counter terrorist operations, hostage rescue intervention and threats to life.
86. The present strength of the FOU comprises 248 AFOs which is an increase of 15 constables when compared to the last figures provided to this board. FOU remains under establishment due to a series of promotions, retirements, transfers and restricted officers being posted to other departments. Currently, the FOU have three Initial Firearms Courses (IFCs) delivered annually. By July 2025 the FOU anticipated strength will be at, or near, full establishment. It is

of note there is a national decline in officer recruitment and retention in armed policing roles.

87. The CTSFO numbers in force are currently 40, against an establishment of 56. There are 4 Specialist Firearms Officers (SFOs) qualified in force, who are currently on a CTSFO upskill course. In addition to those current SFOs, an ongoing process of identifying new candidates for pathway courses (taking AFOs from ARV on to CTSFO) is in hand with 18 ARV officers expressing interest in 2025 sessions.
88. West Midlands Police are supporting a national piece of work to review the CTSFO pathway. The strategic aim of this work is to support the national CTSFO network to reach the resourcing target and ensure the CTSFO pathway is inclusive, supportive and delivers a fully interoperable national network of CTSFOs.
89. To provide additional organisational resilience, WMP have launched a local Mobile Armed Support to Surveillance (MASTS) course in January 2025, which has 9 ARV officers enrolled. If successful, they will be available to deploy as part of WMP MASTS operations.

Public Order

The capacity and capability of West Midlands Police to meet and sustain the commitment in the National Policing Requirement for public order policing.

The current availability within WMP of suitably trained public order trained officers.

90. WMP provides just under 55% of the regional contribution towards the National Policing Requirement for Public Order policing. This amounts to a required capability of just under 18 Police Support Units (PSU's).
91. In terms of officer numbers, our required contributions equate to 54 PSU Commanders (Inspectors), 159 Sgts and 371 PC's.
92. The current Service Level Agreement (SLA) requires 1272 officers within the force to be Level 2 Public Order trained. Our current level of trained Level 2 officers is 1030 but this figure fluctuates between 900-1100 as it is affected by a number of factors, including the expiration of PST & First Aid qualifications.
93. The force has a recommended training target of over 1300 Level 2 trained officers. This is subject to monthly reviews through the Public Order Public Safety portfolio board, chaired by the Assistant Chief Constable of Operations.
94. From January 2025, this training will be delivered at Tally Ho! - by West Midlands Police - rather than regionally. Warwickshire Police will also train at this site. West Mercia and Staffordshire Police will continue to train at the RAF Cosford.
95. As a Force we continue to develop and increase specialist capability within the public order arena - including an increase in officers trained as Police Liaison Teams, Evidence Gatherers, Public Order Medics. In 2024, we have also developed our own Protest Removal Capability which will support both the regional and national capability to mitigate against this threat from protest groups.

96. Command capability and resilience continue to be maintained with 24/7 rotas in place for all Public Order Public Safety command roles. Overall numbers continue to be reviewed through the Public Order Public Safety portfolio board with shortfalls being anticipated in advance and addressed through the delivery of command training.
97. There are currently 24 Bronze Commanders, 17 Silver Commanders and 7 Gold Commanders trained in force.

Lessons learned from the police mobilisation in response to this summer's disorder.

98. Demand for public order, public safety remains high. Over the past 12 months there have been large scale deployments for the Conservative party conference in Birmingham, a busy football schedule (including European football fixtures), and support to national and regional requests over the summer to respond to the disorders following the Southport attacks.
99. A structured debrief has taken place following the disorders in the summer, and despite there being no major disorder within the West Midlands, officers were deployed to provide mutual aid to regional and national colleagues. Our mobilisation plans, and levels of trained officers were tested, alongside our ability to continue to deliver business as usual to the West Midlands. Results of the debriefs are being collated and the learning (both areas for improvement and good practice) will be shared through the Risk and Organisational Learning Board to be disseminated through force.
100. Following the Southport knife attack in July 2024, HMICFRS were commissioned to review the policing response to the subsequent national disorder (Operation Navette). In the resulting report, Police forces were advised that they must be better prepared for serious future violence and highlighted the positive role police horses can play in restoring order.
101. With the oversight of a Project Board chaired by ACC Operations, West Midlands Police will be re-introducing its Mounted Unit. Subject to planning permission, the unit - which will comprise 12 horses and a team of dedicated officers and staff - will be located at Tally Ho! and become operational in Autumn 2025. The creation of the unit means the force is in a strong position to address any future HMICFRS recommendations.

Civil Emergencies

A summary of the learning from the past year of civil emergencies in the Force area and how this is being implemented, any gaps or challenges.

102. Over the last 12 months, the West Midlands area has witnessed national events under the banner of Operation Navette (referred to as Operation Rootlet within West Midlands), with the Force supporting other regional Forces to prevent further escalation of serious disorder as well as managing tensions within the region.
103. There continues to be organisational learning identified from both critical and major incidents, which has been captured through a structured debrief process.
104. WMP has strengthened relationships between Corporate Development, the Operations

Resilience Unit and Learning & Development to ensure the learning is captured and embedded within training material and also reflected in a more effective and efficient operational response to such incidents. This process is overseen by the Organisational Learning Board, chaired by the Deputy Chief Constable.

105. Whilst West Midlands Police have not had any specific civil emergencies in the past 12 months, it remains cognisant of learning to be taken from major incidents, both regionally and nationally.
106. In partnership with the West Midlands Local Resilience Forum (LRF), West Midlands Police works to understand the impact of such events on local communities and how the response to them can be improved. On a local level, this includes the following -
 - Op Valegro - Just Stop Oil Protestors at Birmingham Airport
 - Op Rootlet - Response to Southport Stabbings
 - Op Sidus - Chemical spillage into the Walsall Canal network
 - Op Biotas - Response to community tensions in Middle East
 - Op Drakeful/Early Dawn - Prison capacity/Prisoner early release scheme
107. In examining the learning from national civil emergencies, WMP has been integral in supporting the analysis and dissemination of information throughout the LRF partnership. On a national level, this includes understanding the outcome of inquiries relating to events such as the Grenfell Tower Fire & Covid-19.

The response to a national cyber security incident

Information on the planning expectations within the force to response to a major cyber incident, and the work of the Cyber Resilience Centre within WMROCU.

108. In the event of a major cyber event each Force has its own cyber incident response plan. This is produced and maintained by the senior force IT manager. In the event of such an incident, the NCA (through TICAT) will assess and categorise the incident, apply a level of intelligence and then forward to the appropriate team (NCA/ROCU/FORCE). The intelligence for such major incidents is managed by the National Management Centre (as part of the Police Digital Service).
109. WMP has a bespoke Cyber response plan, Force Cyber Business Continuity Plan and Disaster Recovery planning within Information Technology and Digital (IT&D). These arrangements collectively allow WMP to acknowledge the unique impact that a cyber incident would pose to both force resilience and the public.
110. Large scale high impact cyber incidents require a unique command structure and differs to those implemented for traditional civil emergency command incidents. Awareness of roles and how to respond to the initial cyber incident are outlined within the planning arrangements so that commanders can draw upon the expertise quickly during the initial stages. Cyber resilience planning takes into consideration the potential for an internal (Business Continuity disruption) and external (Civil Emergency) command structure which could be established and co-exist at the same time and are therefore mutually recognised.

Cyber Attack National Categorisation System:

111. There is a national and co-ordinated system for the response to all Cyber incidents contained within the National Categorisation System. The National Categorisation System determines which organisation(s) will respond dependent upon the size and scale of the cyberattack.
112. Cyber dependent crimes are managed through a Local to National 'tiered' system, and relate to crimes where the offending relies upon the use of the cyber space to commit offending, this includes attacks on organisations' cyber security systems, and often leads to the damage or loss of data as a result of the offender's actions.
113. The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) provides a single, central body for cyber security at a national level and is the UK's technical authority on cyber. It manages national cyber security incidents, carries out real-time threat analysis and provides tailored sectoral advice. GCHQ is the parent body for the centre, meaning that it can draw on the organisation's world-class skills and sensitive capabilities.
114. The incident category definitions give increased clarity on response mechanisms for incidents by identifying what factors would happen to activate a specific classification, which organisation responds and what actions they would take, table below:

	Category definition	Who responds?	What do they do?
Category 1 National cyber emergency	A cyber attack which causes sustained disruption of UK essential services or affects UK national security, leading to severe economic or social consequences or to loss of life.	Immediate, rapid and coordinated cross-government response. Strategic leadership from Ministers / Cabinet Office (COBR), tactical cross-government coordination by NCSC, working closely with Law Enforcement	Coordinated on-site presence for evidence gathering, forensic acquisition and support. Collocation of NCSC, Law Enforcement, Lead Government Departments and others where possible for enhanced response.
Category 2 Highly significant incident	A cyber attack which has a serious impact on central government, UK essential services, a large proportion of the UK population, or the UK economy.	Response typically led by NCSC (escalated to COBR if necessary), working closely with Law Enforcement (typically NCA) as required. Cross-government response coordinated by NCSC.	NCSC will often provide on-site response, investigation and analysis, aligned with Law Enforcement criminal investigation activities.
Category 3 Significant incident	A cyber attack which has a serious impact on a large organisation or on wider / local government, or which poses a considerable risk to central government or UK essential services.	Response typically led by NCSC, working with Law Enforcement (typically NCA) as required.	NCSC will provide remote support and analysis, standard guidance; on-site NCSC or NCA support may be provided.
Category 4 Substantial incident	A cyber attack which has a serious impact on a medium-sized organisation, or which poses a considerable risk to a large organisation or wider / local government.	Response led either by NCSC or by Law Enforcement (NCA or ROCU), dependent on the incident.	NCSC or Law Enforcement will provide remote support and standard guidance, or on-site support by exception.
Category 5 Moderate incident	A cyber attack on a small organisation, or which poses a considerable risk to a medium-sized organisation, or preliminary indications of cyber activity against a large organisation or the government.	Response led by Law Enforcement (likely ROCU or local Police Force), with NCA input as required.	Law Enforcement will provide remote support and standard guidance, with on-site response by exception.
Category 6 Localised incident	A cyber attack on an individual, or preliminary indications of cyber activity against a small or medium-sized organisation.	Automated Protect advice or local response led by Law Enforcement (likely local Police Force).	Remote support and provision of standard advice. On-site response by exception.

National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC): Cyber Attack National Categorisation System (2018)

115. All cyber dependent crimes are reported via the National Action Fraud line. They are assessed, placed into a category system and allocated accordingly. The WMP Cyber Team manage the lower risk and lower complexity investigations (Category 5 and 6), with the ROCU's Regional Cyber Crime Unit (RCCU) taking responsibility for the investigation and response into all WMP based category 3 and 4 cases on behalf of the Force. The highest risk and complexity cases, and those that have a national impact, are allocated to and managed by the National Crime Agency. The RCCU also contain a Dark Web team proactively scanning the dark web for WMP related threats and supporting both WMP and ROCU investigators.
116. Both WMP's Cyber team and the RCCU work together to ensure there are established response plans in place to effectively coordinate the force's response to a cyber-attack in collaboration with the NCA, and local stakeholders.

Violence Against Women & Girls

A summary of how West Midlands Police have ensured compliance with the new requirement to consider Violence Against Women and Girls as a critical national threat.

The capacity and possibility for opportunities for regional collaboration around VAWG now it has been included in the Strategic Policing Requirement.

117. WMP launched it's new VAWG Strategy 2024–2027 which adopted the principles of the 2024 National Framework for Delivery (NFD) - endorsed by National Police Chiefs Council in December 2023. The Strategy evidences WMP continued prioritisation and commitment to tackling VAWG.
118. WMP has adopted the Home Office definition of VAWG to refer to acts of violence or abuse that we know disproportionately affect women and girls.
119. Under the 4P approach and identified key strategic aims, which will be supported by a delivery plan. Our aims are to:

Prepare: Policing to effectively identify, respond to, and reduce VAWG
Protect: To protect individuals and communities from VAWG
Pursue: Relentlessly pursue VAWG perpetrators and pursue the right outcome for each victim
Prevent: People from committing VAWG
120. The scope of VAWG is wide and far reaching and therefore governance is executed through a number of Boards, Steering Groups and Panels at operational, strategic, and executive levels. The internal governance docks into partnership governance to drive the necessary whole system approach.
121. There are a number of keys areas on which WMP is focusing to deliver its VAWG strategy. These areas - which will be subject of a full briefing to the Accountability and Governance Board in March 2025 - include;

Safer Spaces

Domestic Abuse - Repeat offenders

Domestic Abuse - Crime & positive outcomes

Domestic Abuse - Civil Orders

Domestic Abuse related Harassment Crime and Positive Outcomes

**Stalking and Harassment
Rape and Serious Sexual Offences (RASSO)
Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conferences (MARAC)**

Child Sexual Abuse

Performance in relation to management of registered sex offenders and online child abuse intelligence packages

122. Sex Offender Managers (SOMs) is now well integrated into PPU after transitioning from LPAs in April 2023. HMICFRS removed SOM from enhanced monitoring in September 2024.
123. The force has a robust performance framework for SOMs supported by a Qlik platform. Data is available for visits, Active Risk Management System (ARMS) and Risk Management Plan (RMP) reviews. Data is also used to predict future demand so resources can be managed effectively. There are clear reporting lines through the PPU SLT and into ACC Crime.
124. Between December 2023 and April 2024, the department initiated Operation Rosaria to address overdue work, reducing it significantly to within controlled levels. By introducing daily reporting and a Red, Amber, Green status for each team, demand was monitored closely and resources prioritised accordingly. There is a clear trigger plan in place should demand increase and where there is overdue work, this is easy to identify and remedy. The force has consistently achieved a 'green' status since January 2024 which means that less than 5% of overall visits, ARMS and RMPs are overdue.
125. The overall number of Registered Sex Offenders (RSOs) continues to increase, showing an increase of over 4% in the last 12 months. This is in part attributable to more positive outcomes from sexual offence investigations, but also due to the West Midlands being a net importer of RSOs from other areas owing to the availability of accommodation in the region.
126. An increase in resources over the last 12 months has supported the organisational response and provides future resilience (with an increase of 2 sergeants and 22 Constables). Overall ratios of SOM to RSO are 1:42 which is comfortably within national recommended limits and provides capacity for proactive work. By the end of January 2025, all existing SOMs should have completed mandated MOSOVO and ViSOR training.
127. Two new proactive teams have been created with a focus on RSOs are either wanted or missing. There is an increased use of covert/technical capabilities against the highest risk offenders. Additional support has been provided by the Digital Forensics Unit with regular visits to SOMs locations by the Scene Assessment team and the support of other force assets such as the digital detection dogs from Force Operations.
128. Wellbeing support is provided to SOMs through clinical screening and follow up support from Occupational Health. There is also a bi-monthly SOMs Wellbeing Forum where all SOMs teams are represented and can raise concerns.

Online Child Abuse:

129. The Online Child Sexual Exploitation Team (OCSET) is the force single point of access for the Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre (CEOP) within the National Crime Agency

(NCA).

130. OCSET own all elements of the organisational response, except for some specialist services provided by Digital Forensic Unit (DFU). The process stages include; receipt of intelligence, development of intelligence to a stage where it can be progressed further, enforcement, grading of Child Sexual Abuse Material (CSAM), case file building and court attendance. OCSET retain their own intelligence professional capability to support the management of incoming referrals.
131. Throughout all these stages, safeguarding children is at the forefront of OCSET activity. With full consideration of all statutory duties under; The Children Act 1989 and Working together to Safeguard Children 2023. The team also comply with the Regional Multi Agency West Midlands Safeguarding Children Procedures.
132. In response to the SPR, OCSET maintain their own intelligence team within the department, who are trained in the Kent Internal Risk Assessment Tool (KIRAT) and this is completed for all applicable cases.
133. Over the last two years, West Midlands Police has increased uploads to the Child Abuse Image Database (CAID) and is the 5th highest enforcement agency in terms of uploads to CAID for this year. This process is supported by an investment in software that helps automate CAID uploads.
134. Within the 2023-25 PEEL report, HMICFRS identified a cause for concern regarding the way in which the force managed the risk posed by online child abuse offenders. The report also made a series of eight recommendations designed to address this concern.
135. Between April-June 2024, HMICFRS revisited the force on three separate occasions to review progress against the recommendations. Consequently, all recommendations were closed.
136. As part of this improvement, OCSET facilitated a review by the NPCC Hydrant Programme, which supports child protection investigations. Operating procedures have been redeveloped and OCSET now operates in line with best practice outlined in NPPC Online Child Sexual Abuse and Exploitation Practice Advice for Investigating Online CSAE. This includes the use of KIRAT time scales and the Prioritisation Tool for Online CSA Investigation.
137. As a result, there has been a significant increase in warrant enforcement, a reduction in the number of open investigations, and an increase in the number of offenders charged and children safeguarded. This has all been achieved despite a rise in demand for 2024, with approximately 600 additional referrals.
138. Since September 2024, the NCA has significantly increased the number of referrals sent to police forces, to tackle an increase in referral from industry. The NCA's backlog remains unchanged, with 32,000 cases awaiting assessment and dissemination. The NCA's goal is to reduce this backlog in 2025, and to achieve this, they aim to double the number of referrals they send to UK police forces. This increased demand will be a challenge for all Forces across the UK.
139. Due to the nature of Online Child sexual abuse, there is a requirement for Public Protection and Digital forensics to work hand in hand. As such, we have recently seen an increase in

resources in the scene attendance team within digital forensics. HMICFRS commented on this capability and the support it provides to Investigators, which is not replicated in all Forces.

140. An oversight report has been commissioned to assess OCSET's ability to meet increasing demand. This report also considers a range of options and contingencies to address the growing demand from the NCA.
141. Between August and December 2024, DFU has seen an increase in the number of cases submitted. This represents an increase from the baseline average of 26.3 cases per month to approximately 32 submissions per month. We anticipate that this number will continue to rise further in 2025/26.

An explanation as to how the work of the Under Cover Online team in WMROCU co-ordinates with force led investigations

142. The Regional Undercover Unit is nationally recognised as a high performing capability in terms of the investigation into subjects involved in this area of criminality and the safeguarding of victims who are at risk of Child Sexual Abuse and Exploitation. Over the last performance year the department has identified a significant number of sexual perpetrators who have been brought to justice.
143. Through Project Atari, WMP uses undercover on-line operatives to target predators involved in on line child sexual exploitation and the threat they pose to vulnerable children. The most effective ways to reduce offending is to proactively target those who pose the greatest threats and bring them to justice. This requires investment in prevention, early intervention and addressing the underlying causes, not only for children, but for the whole family.
144. WMP also has a dedicated County Lines Task Force which uses covert and overt policing tactics to target those linked to drug lines offering class A commodity both within the West Midlands and the wider Region. The Police and Crime Plan has a clear focus to -
 - Monitor the number of drug trafficking offences recorded by West Midlands Police, directing resource appropriately to tackle supply
 - Monitor the number of reports via the National Referral Mechanism which are flagged as County Lines related
 - Increase/improve disruption activity by West Midlands Police as part of pro-active drug supply investigations
145. West Midlands Police aligns its Project Atari work with the Major Crime Unit - Proactive Team. This sits out of kilter with most police forces nationally who use their on-line Child Sexual Exploitation Teams (OCSET) within Public Protection Units. The WMP approach has been recognised Nationally as high performing. As the evidential package once received is treated as a 'crime in action', this sees the offender arrested within 24 hours, often in the same tour of duty, with safeguarding being a priority where suspects live with or have access to children.
146. More widely, WMP has increased its capacity and capability to use undercover operatives to investigate Child Criminal Exploitation (CCE) in the County Lines arena to identify, enforce and safeguard those linked to drug lines.

147. The County Lines Task Force (CLTF) have been highly effective in 2024. The 2024/25 Home Office performance target is to close 281 type 1 drug lines. As of 16th December 2024, they had achieved 93% of this target with 3 months of the performance year remaining. The CLTF have invested in a dedicated team focused on safeguarding called 'Skyclash'. This activity proactively looks to identify and safeguard vulnerable children linked to CCE.
148. The Regional Covert Investigation Unit (RCIU) are responsible for the management and dissemination of evidence and intelligence obtained through Under Cover On-line (UCOL) activity, providing a sterile corridor between the Regional Under Cover Unit (RUU) and investigation team.
149. The RCIU ensure tasking is proportionate and meets the operational objectives set by regional SIOs and tasking processes. The RCIU are then responsible for briefing and de-briefing assets in line with the objectives set. The intelligence/evidence will then be disseminated. Currently, there are two on-line authorities to support regional tasking:
- Online generic crime authority - which also supports controlled deliveries & fast parcels. The UCOL tactic will support force priorities such as Clear, Hold, Build intensification enforcement periods.
 - CSAE/MHST online investigations, proactive management of registered sex offenders identified through the SOM network providing an opportunity to manage high risk, high harm offenders who are a known risk to children.
150. Through the deployment of UCOL assets, the RCIU manage evidential disseminations to police force's regionally and nationally that are subject to a tiered assessment through use of the NPCC National Prioritisation Tool.
151. Where the deployment of the UCOL tactic identifies a risk of harm to a child, use of the prioritisation tool informs the time scales for the safeguarding response required. In addition, the RCIU manage use of the Lucy Faithful Foundation to provide diversionary support to individuals who have shown an interest in CSAM but have not committed any offences. The below data sets from Project Atari show improvements in all areas.

2023

Metric	Jun-23	Jul-23	Aug-23	Sep-23	Oct-23	Nov-23	Totals
Disruptions	37	29	14	23	19	22	144
Arrests	13	6	6	7	4	5	41
Charges	11	5	2	11	6	6	41
Sentencing	14	5	5	7	6	11	48
Years	37.5	8.58	9.01	15.5	11.8	35.8	118.19
Safeguarding Children	34	25	19	26	22	34	160

2024

Metric	Jun-24	Jul-24	Aug-24	Sep-24	Oct-24	Nov-24	Totals
Disruptions	34	46	36	38	39	30	223
Arrests	12	18	16	17	25	18	106
Charges	9	8	4	9	9	9	48
Sentencing	11	16	10	8	9	9	63
Years	25	22.5	24	22	25	34.75	153.25
Safeguarding Children	44	50	41	41	54	46	276

152. Between June 2023 and April 2024, 61 class A drug lines have been identified and enforced against.
153. Between May 2024 and January 2025, 42 class A drug lines have been identified and enforced against. Consequently,
154. 61 individuals have been safeguarded.
155. The continuous professional development within the RUU has greatly enhanced how operatives deploy & engage with offenders to provide RCIU with intelligence and evidence. The RCIU process ensures that any material obtained by an undercover operative is efficiently processed and an owner identified.
156. All undercover activity is authorised and reviewed by a Senior Officer at ACC level and all authorities are regularly scrutinised by a specialist lawyer from the Crown Prosecution Service.
157. All undercover operatives are accredited by College of Policing and supported in line with legislation.
158. ROCU WM has recognised that within the social media space, there is a lack of diversity across the portfolio - with 92% of males arrested being white. There is a clear need for a far more diverse catalogue of profiles within the team as it is anticipated that opportunities are being missed - especially with 'Grooming Gangs' which have been subject of recent political commentary. Steps are being taken to increase capacity and capability in this area including a positive recruitment campaign – encouraging applications by reaching out to officers from diverse backgrounds to dispel myths around undercover policing.

Cross Cutting Capabilities

Details of force response to the identified cross cutting capabilities identified in the SPR23

159. Whilst the SPR treats national threats separately, many of the threats - and the capability to respond - will overlap. The capabilities listed should not be considered in isolation or as the only capabilities required to respond to the national threats. There are some specialist capabilities that are not exclusively deployed in response to a single threat.

160. West Midlands Police have considered these capabilities as part of a continual thread throughout this report including armed policing, digital forensics, and JESIP.
161. With regards to Roads Policing, West Midlands Police roads policing capabilities play an essential role in tackling the criminal use of the roads network. They are also essential in managing public disorder or civil emergencies incidents. Roads Policing activities in the West Midlands are aligned to the NPCC Roads Policing strategy 2022/2025 and our performance delivery is measured against this.
162. Our Intelligence and ANPR activity are focussed on the use of complex alerting and the development of intelligence, working in partnership with NCA/CTU/ROCU/PPU to tackle these challenges.
163. Our roads policing department has increased in establishment with dedicated roles identified to tackle threats including ring fenced motorway resources to ensure disruption to national infrastructure is minimised. This is particularly important since the disestablishment of the Central Motorway Policing Group (CMPG).
164. Staff have the requisite procedural knowledge and training to meet their operational objectives.
165. We have close collaborations with other enforcement partners, such as DVSA, to assist in specialist knowledge and enforcement on a routine basis.
166. The board is asked to take note of the contents of this report.

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