

Corporate Risks

ID	Risk Name	Description	Impact	Key Controls and Activities	Q4 Trending	Q1 Trending	Q2 Trending	Q3 Trending	Residual Risk Rating
CRR03	Operational Training and Embedded Learning	Op Plato Embedding There is a risk that Operational Officers fail to adopt the national Joint Operating Principles introduced to WMP in December 2020 in a timely manner. A new challenge with this risk is the lack of ownership locally now that ORU have rolled out the training to keep this an annual refresher on CPD days within departments.	There is a lack of CPD days within departments and prioritisation of training competes locally to complete the roll out. The risk is that the national doctrine has changed quicker than the ability and competency of officers in adopting these changes.	Separated into two risks due to risk profiles changing and to better reflect The risk scores can be downgraded from high to amber due to: •Train the trainer being implemented •NSR monitoring the NCALT uptake •Classroom inputs being done within this space •Regional reviews suggest training is delivered differently (managed via Major Incident Readiness Board (MIRB)), •Organisational Development & Learning supporting the packages and train the trainer quality (being implemented), NCALT and classroom training	↓	↔	↔	↔	Medium
CRR08	Investigative and Criminal Justice Process and Outcome	- There is a risk that the case backlog that exists due to COVID may result in victims and witnesses losing faith in the Criminal Justice system. The backlog also puts at risk the cost recovery from Police Led Prosecutions. There is also the risk of an additional strain on CJS resources, particularly in Witness Care, due to the new court listings process. - Updates to the Attorney General's Guidelines on Disclosure which sits alongside the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act ("CPA") 1996, has an impact on the working practices of investigations officers and staff, with a short turnaround time for adhering to the guidance.	- The impact is that justice is not served for victims and witnesses and WMPs reputation is at risk as a reduced number of cases are being heard by the Courts (including murder trials). The reduction of Courts will also result in a significant loss of income recovery from PLP. There may also be additional welfare issue for Witness Care staff due to the supplementary work required. - The new guidance has implications for how the police engages with other parts of the CJS, in terms of timeliness, mandatory disclosures and digital evidence. In particular, it increases the expectations on the recording of materials in the course of an investigation - extending requirements to unused material and provision of schedules for all Pre-Charge cases. The combined effect of these changes could result in an increase in the number of bail cases and CPS rejections, creating further demands on the force.	Requests made for update but no further updates received to date - The magistrates court listings have returned to pre-covid levels. Areas nationally being explored at present are considering to allow Magistrates to manage cases that would incur 12 months sentences so less referrals to crown court. Proof in absence cases for minor incidents has had limited impact on reducing case volumes -The crown court delay is approx. 2 years. Additional staff have been recruited into witness care units to support victims (to be reviewed to see if this will be extended through national funding) The staff have been provided with additional trauma informed training to better support vulnerable victims and RASSO / DA cases (now complete and the unit has achieved the national accreditation mark in June '22). Aspects of the new charging model have yet to be agreed locally with CPS for red cases to agree cases that would be defined based on threat/ risk cases and the SLA for discretionary Green cases. (still not agreed nationally). To review the uptake of the video enabling programme allowing Officers to have warnings directly sent from the common platform when it lands in October '22. Thus reducing work in the unit. -The government changes likely to be implemented around Section 28 allowing cross examination for all DA victims – will have significant impact for force around capacity and capability (training of staff for VRI- ABE). This is being managed through crime governance board (CGB) and the NPCC lead is attending CGB and FLC.	↑	↔	↔	↔	High
CRR09	Recruitment & Retention / Uplift	There is a risk of being unable to recruit staff across the Force in a timely manner and aligned with the strategic workforce planning requirements. The uplift targets and their associated entry routes (e.g. PEQF) create significant additional demand on WMP. The failure to meet recruitment targets will impact on the forces resilience and may potentially affect future funding from the Home Office. There is a risk that a number of student officers have been identified as potentially being at risk of dismissal due to repeated failures of university modules.	- WMP will not be able to recruit and retain sufficiently skilled people to deliver our service. Risk to service provision and accreditation status in some cases (e.g. Forensics). Longer-term employee relations impact. Potential loss of confidence from WMP colleagues who were anticipating additional resources to join them. - Due to the sheer volume of demand and complexity of entry criteria, WMP is not able to push through the uplift recruitment pipeline quickly enough resulting in missed targets or not meeting resourcing assumptions. Reputational (and potential financial) impact on WMP from the Home Office. - The impact is this may be significant for WMP and the government's confidence in us. -The impact of a student officer repeatedly failing their modules, will lead to the student being dismissed from their university course, WMP currently has no other training programme available to see them through their probationary period.	Force remains on track to achieve Uplift targets with intakes scheduled through Q3 and Q4 to deliver the required number of new students. Applicant pipeline is tight due to competitive external labour market however there is a high confidence that all intakes will be full. Retirements and resignations for Police Officers continues to be monitored to ensure these do not exceed forecast. Number of student officer dismissals due to academic failure currently is extremely low but is continuing to be monitored. Police Staff vacancy levels are rising with some difficulty in recruiting into specialist areas, this is linked to the current position of the labour market as mentioned above and higher external salaries. Market Supplement process is in place to support the business where required	↓	↔	↔	↓	High
CRR13	Cybersecurity	Failure of the Force's IT&D systems (due to cyber-attack, hardware failure, loss of IT systems via IT services provider or other data security breaches) will lead to severe disruption to service delivery and response.	Loss of access to IT systems due to a failure in our cyber security for an extended period of time could adversely impact WMP's ability to continue service delivery and business operations. This could also lead to potential data breaches, an inability to access key systems and reputational damage.	This risk remains the same. WMP IT&Digital department continue to work closely with the National Management Centre to monitor and mitigate where needed against any potential threat	↔	↔	↔	↔	High
CRR06	Corporate Health, Safety and Wellbeing	- There may be an increase in employee related mental health and wellbeing issues which impacts WMP's ability to deliver and recover operational services during the d post pandemic environment.	- Failure to look after the wellbeing of our staff could have a significant impact on employee confidence, poorer engagement, and increased sickness levels.	Requests made for update but no further updates received to date - Enhanced force approach to trauma risk identification and management (TRIM), with the introduction of the emergency services trauma intervention programme (ESTIP) on a pilot basis - psychological screening for colleagues in the highest risk roles, further engagement with occupational health, focus groups in place. - Efficient signposting to VIVUP, TRIM process, Occupational Health, sporadic clinical supervision, use of watchful waiting and line manager and colleague observations. Increased discussion and conversations regarding wellbeing taking place. -Provision of free flu jab scheme running again in 22/23 with positive uptake in previous years. COVID -Risk assessment process and line management guidance in place to ensure the effective management of COVID within the workplace. -COVID element retained within pregnancy risk assessments, and for consideration for CEV staff via the provision of a reasonable adjustment passport/reasonable adjustments where appropriate. -PPE to remain available for colleagues to utilise based on personal choice/responsibility, including the provision of lateral flow tests for symptomatic colleagues in operational roles. -Protective measures across the estate retained where appropriate. E7	↔	↔	↓	↓	Medium
CRR23	JTAI Connect Risk	Following the Joint Targeted Area Inspection (JTAI) earlier in the year, inspectors raised a concern in relation to the data held within the Connect system. This was specifically in relation to multiple and/or incomplete records held against the same person. There is a risk that incomplete records within Connect could lead to at risk individuals not being linked and identified in a timely manner against individuals who could pose a risk to them.	This risk means that when officers and staff research 'Connect', they may miss important information. This could also pose a huge reputational risk to the Force should the risk materialise.	We continue to work with the connect team who provide a monthly update to the Solihull JTAI board on progress on reducing the duplicate records. Progress is being made with a new question set within connect to better link children to reports.	N/A	New	↔	N/A	High
CRR18	Core Skills Resilience & Training Risk	There has been a drop in Police Officers trained in core skill areas, this has partly been due to COVID and self-isolation measures. This has led to a reduction in the percentage numbers and resilience of Police Officers trained in core skills such as Personal Safety Training, Driver Training, Public Order Skills and Taser. The reduced capacity has also led to a reduced offer from L&D.	The greatest risk is that of the Force to be unable to deploy sufficient numbers of staff to meet calls for service and demand. In addition to this is the length of time it will take to meet the backlog and bring us back in line with demand on courses and meet resilience targets.	Weekly data continues to be sent to Department and NPU SPOCs - both attendance data looking back, and forward facing data. DCC Blog and Performance Panel focus has supported reducing non attendance and late withdrawals Delay to the provision of Qlik data due to system not linking with LDP. LDP needs to be moved to a new server. Taser Gold Group ongoing for Taser - to address issues and risks, including provision of training. Uplift of 5 PCs for Tactical Training agreed by WMG, as issue identified re posts not being transferred post closedown of Taser Uplift in 2019. Recruitment has commenced into Tactical, Physical and Driving School to fill vacancies Pelkin and CWG had impact on ability of L&D to deliver core skills courses. Clear weeks to focus on delivery prior to Salient Night impact being felt. Steering Group set up with Operations, to develop draft policy on departments where L2 PO training could be mandated.	↔	↓	↔	New	High

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CRR01	Vulnerability and Hidden Crimes	There is a risk that the increased identification of vulnerability in demand, and hidden crimes (includes child exploitation, modern day slavery, human trafficking, domestic abuse, missing people) poses a challenge to the Force to manage its complexity. The risk could also impact the response levels provided impacting the delivery of an effective service to those in need.	Increases in volumes or poor identification impacts on the force's capacity to prevent and respond, creating public confidence and safety concerns, and meet our overall requirement to prevent the unnecessary criminalisation of children and improve the overall quality of investigations involving vulnerable people.	The risk remains – the progress on the staff from the major crime team build is set to see 21 officers move into complex to create a non-recent team to deal with rape offences.	↔	↔	↔	↔	High
CRR05	Demand Management	There is a risk that the Force fails to respond to and manage the effective and efficient policing requirements of the region as a result of the increased volume and complexity in demand. The nature of the rise requires an increasing level of sophistication to understand how it moved through the system and may be compounded by resourcing constraints.	Impacts on our ability to create and execute effective plans to ensure effective and efficient delivery of policing. Example: Demand and the management of risk within the P2 grade, which has a service level at 60 minutes. Currently a minority of case are being carried over beyond 24 hours. This is a concern in relation to risk management, service delivery, victim support and impacts on stress to WMP staff seeking to manage this risk when unresourced. Return to 'new normal' at the tail-end of the pandemic creates additional complexity/uncertainty.	Requests made for update but no further updates received to date WMP have invested in the support from Accenture, who are currently working with Force Contact to provide answers to the following: A report is due around 9 September with findings and recommendations. From this report, Force Contact will then work with Business Change experts and other key stakeholders to identify which of the recommendations should be adopted, what activity needs to be undertaken to deliver upon those recommendations, who will own the responsibility to deliver, who will support and when delivery would be expected. This will all happen through a series of meetings with Business Transformation in September, ahead of a presentation to the Force Exec on 23 September, wherein a plan will be put forward for consideration / approval. Incoming demand has remained at higher than anticipated levels, with 999 call demand breaching 80k calls per month for the last four consecutive months The 'Support Desk' went live in June 2022 which aims to remove demand from Contact Handling linked to domestic abuse, missing and mental health. The desk was not fully established from the outset and as of 2 September, Force Contact continue to work with POD and other key stakeholders to bring the 'strength' levels up to the agreed establishment, wherein the desk can then aim to take on all of the agreed work	↔	↔	↔	↔	High
CRR19	WMP Website – Server Capacity	Due to server capacity issues of the WMP website the site can be prone to crashing. There is a risk should the live chat function be unavailable during a major incident.	The total number of people accessing the site if redirected would cause the website to crash. This would lead to members of the public being unable to report crimes and any other issues via the live chat function.	Work has been carried out on the existing infrastructure and the move to AWS will certainly help as well. Data is being provided to IT to estimate traffic levels. We believe this issue will be fully resolved with a move to the new AWS platform which is scheduled to take place this week however, we will have to wait for IT to confirm whether or not its been successful.	↔	↓	↔	↔	High
CRR07	Workforce Representation	Failure to attract, recruit and retain a diverse and representative workforce across the Force and support their progression within the organisation to deliver our services to our diverse communities.	- A less representative Force may affect the level of trust and confidence in some communities. - The impact may be that the legitimacy and trust in WMP is diminished. The impact of not meeting both the PCC's and WMP's target of recruiting more female and BAME officers and staff may lead to reputational damage.	Force continues to progress against the Uplift target with to date 426 officer recruited from an ethnic minority background. Intakes over the last 3 months have been 47% female and 16% ethnic minority. This is higher than overall force representation. Attrition rates for females and ethnic minority colleagues are below overall force representation levels.	↔	↔	↔	↔	Medium
CRR10	Financial Management	i. There is a risk that WMP's finances are not sustainable over the medium term and/or efficiency savings required may adversely impact the operational services. Whilst the police grant has increased for 22/23 to fund increase in officer numbers, there are still unfunded inflationary pressures. ii - There is also a risk that as mandated/national initiatives develop (e.g. ESMCP, National Enabling Programme), the actual costs for delivery far exceed the estimated costs within the affordability envelope.	i - Impact on overall funding position. Medium term financial plan (MTFP) sets out strict budgeting envelope that must be met. ii - The inability to finance all component projects, or needing to de-prioritise other projects within the portfolio if the national changes are mandated.	The financial challenges faced by the force has been shared and discussed at the Senior Leaders Day in Sept 22; FET meetings, with the most recent in October and the PCC. As part of the budget setting exercise, work continues to identify savings, to manage the gap between funding and expenditure forecasts for 23/24.	↔	↔	↑	↔	High
CRR/25	Lack of Briefing Functionality in CONNECT	Implementation of CONNECT and lack of functionality for officer briefings Briefing system within CONNECT since go live does not meet the business requirement and is unworkable with over 150+ individual entries - this cannot be objectively viewed in timescale for a briefing for staff The number of interventions and Civil Orders recorded on Connect (Person Card) continue to increase. Progress is being made to store orders but we are not able to brief officers of persons with orders living on the local area and therefore enforcement is not where it should be.. Tasking from LTDB is reliant upon local briefings rather than corporate system. There is a risk that via CONNECT we are unable to effectively brief our officers for their tours of duty, therefore, we are unable to supply them with the required knowledge and updates.	Ineffective and inefficient tasking of officers for tours of duty due to lack of briefing. Lack of knowledge of persons with orders/interventions therefore lack of enforcement of them. Officers are not equipped with latest knowledge, updates, priorities prior to beginning ToD. Tasking from LTDB will be uninformed/potentially incorrect due to reliance upon local briefings.	New Risk	New Risk				High

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CRR/26	ORU Resilience	<p>Due to the proportion of vacancies within the department and industry standard wage for resilience officer or resilience manager police staff roles not being matched. There is a risk of severe limitations to:</p> <p>WMP's ability to meet statutory obligations under the Strategic Police and Crime Plan, CONTEST, Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and National Guidance.</p> <p>Manchester Arena Inquiry recommendations are key delivery and current capacity does not allow for these to be actioned in a timely way.</p> <p>A lack of robust planning updates and proactive approach to learning lessons from testing & exercising.</p> <p>Some ORU functions have single staffing therefore creating a single point of failure and no resilience e.g. Testing & Exercising Manager; CBRN officer.</p> <p>Transient workforce resulting in a lack of experience, mature knowledge of portfolios and understanding of the wider WMP response to incidents.</p>	<p>Leading to:</p> <p>Reputational damage and litigation as Manchester Arena Inquiry's demonstrated into GMPs preparations ahead of the Arena Inquiry</p> <p>Responding to and preparation for Major Incidents and Civil Emergencies will be impacted which has significant consequences for public confidence.</p> <p>The inability to perform critical core functions within ORU and delivery of critical business.</p>	New Risk					Critical
CRR/27	Overtime App	<p>The Overtime App is not an end to end process and still requires manual checking and data input to the payroll system. Correctly coded OT entered by officers within the App should have been costed to other cost codes, yet has defaulted to home budgets/cost codes or the manual input is not being entered with the cost code correctly.</p> <p>Pay files are taking too long to come back to Accountancy to check, which causes a number of issues. Files sent back to payroll to be re-input to produce the pay file seems to be having an impact on when we receive the whole payroll file for checking causing basic pay to be incorrect at times and requires additional work in Accountancy to correct this.</p> <p>There is a risk that OT is not being allocated to the correct cost code (either through user error, manual input error or automatic default by App to home cost code). Officers can submit OT claims and be paid for the same OT multiple times.</p>	<p>Reduced confidence in the information held in the finance system. This then impacts the accuracy of management information that we report to Heads of Dept. Overtime spend is putting pressure on overall force finances and is a very important area of expenditure for the force to control.</p>	New Risk					High

Risk Trend key - Improved (↓), Worsened (↑) or is Unchanged (↔)

Closed Risks

ID	Risk Name	Description	Impact	Key Controls and Activities	Closed Rationale	Closed Date	Closure reported @ JAC
CRR04	CONNECT Legacy/BRC Data	Data migration into CONNECT could lead to loss of relevant information transferring over from legacy systems into CONNECT. Data loss/gaps could lead to the Force being unable to accurately access historic audit data.	<p>-The impact of this risk may be that data in the back records is missing from the transfer to CONNECT. This could lead to certain data fields in things like DBS historic checks being excluded – e.g. crime reference numbers.</p> <p>-The impact of this risk could lead to potential reputational damage if information provided in DBS certificates do not adequately reflect all current and historic data.</p> <p>-CONNECT Legacy/ BRC Data- Significant issues with this content- not all relevant information has been brought over into CONNECT, plus there are gaps in some outcomes/ markers that did not exist on legacy systems- for example, over 140K post 2018 DA records are no longer identified correctly, and there is currently no solution for accessing audit data.</p>	<p>- CONNECT implementation & assurance board involving a wide range of internal stakeholders (mostly departmental heads) overseeing implementation of system.</p> <p>- CONNECT team continuing to work through system architecture and integration issues with Northgate as part of usual programme management business.</p> <p>- DBS staff and others involved in investigation and disclosure are aware and are currently checking legacy systems to ensure all relevant information is considered.</p> <p>- Issue is under investigation by the Project/ IT&D/ Northgate as a whole and will need to be raised with CONNECT Gold/ Silver & SIMB- until this is resolved WMP cannot delete legacy data.</p> <p>- Second BRC load has completed and is due to be signed off imminently. Some manual migration is still underway to complete the migration of a small number of records. Risk of missing P1 data is now substantially reduced, risk of missing P2 and P3 data is being monitored and a fix/ migration is in progress.</p>	<p>Second BRC load has completed and is due to be signed off imminently. Some manual migration is still underway to complete the migration of a small number of records. Risk of missing P1 data is now substantially reduced, risk of missing P2 and P3 data is being monitored and a fix/ migration is in progress.</p> <p>Manual work is complete - this risk can be closed. Closure approved by Director of Commercial Services Peter Gillett</p>	15/08/2022	29th September 2022
CRR15	S22 Governance	<p>ROCU - If the current model - ARIS (Asset Recovery Incentivisation Scheme) is altered and assets seized were distributed across the region e.g. as per the current funding formula WMP OPCC would stand to lose 47% of current ARIS funding. There is a risk that if ARIS funding is not provided to other forces they may withdraw resource from the ROCUWM as they are not seeing equitable benefits from the regional agreement.</p> <p>CTU – There are two proposed options for the method of transferring Special Branch funding into CT Policing as part of the national SB Reform project. There is a risk that if Option 1 is chosen the transfer of SB funding into CT Grant will result in a 'top slice' from forces across the region that is not consistent with the actual spend of Special Branch. Option 2 would be a one-time adjustment. Based on this information, there is a risk that WMP will see their budget reduced by more than the actual cost of Special Branch.</p>	<p>ROCU - If the current model was altered and assets seized were distributed across the region e.g. as per the current funding formula WMP OPCC would stand to lose approximately 47% of current ARIS funding. This would have a significant impact on the funding of the WMP Economic Crime Team (ECT) and funds available for POCA initiatives.</p> <p>CTU - The impact of option 1 is that there is a possibility that the force will see their budget reduced by more than the current expenditure for Special Branch. Option 2 would be a one-time adjustment meaning that forces' individual funding only decreases by their expenditure on Special Branch.</p>	<p>ROCU With respect to the ROCU and ARIS – The WMP Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) has written to regional PCCs outlining the position and the funding formula will not be changed.</p> <p>CTU - Following an extensive engagement and consultation process with Chief Constables, Police & Crime Commissioners and Ministers, with strong endorsement from the CT Policing Network, the decision was taken by Ministers to approve Option 2 and this is currently being actioned. - All funding and the MOU has now been approved and this has no impact on the current CTU funding. Regionally we have a finance group that will review expenditure across the whole region to ensure we are in line with the budget.</p> <p>Recommended that risk is closed off.</p>	<p>Discussed at Security Governance Board and ACC Meir has happy to downgrade/close from the CRR.</p> <p>ROCU WMP and the OPCC are currently in discussions to provide a regional solution to the current arrangement. A plan is being developed to discuss a way forward.</p> <p>CTU - Following an extensive engagement and consultation process with Chief Constables, Police & Crime Commissioners and Ministers, with strong endorsement from the CT Policing Network, the decision was taken by Ministers to approve Option 2 and this is currently being actioned. - All funding and the MOU has now been approved and this has no impact on the current CTU funding. Regionally we have a finance group that will review expenditure across the whole region to ensure we are in line with the budget.</p>	30/09/2022	15th December 2022
CRR02	Serious Violence in Under 25s	There is a risk that interventions to address multiple risk factors/indicators are not impactful or effective. The increase in volume of serious youth crime and serious violence (gun and knife crime) in the under 25s could lead to the cumulative risk around community safety. There could be a perceived failure that the Force is not responding adequately to prevent and respond to crime involving young people.	<p>- Increases in volumes impacts on the force's capacity to prevent and respond to increased demand.</p> <p>- Increases in serious youth violence reporting in the media could undermine community confidence in policing and contribute to safety concerns.</p> <p>- Demand pressures could have an impact on crime prevention initiatives. Force response becomes more reactive than preventative.</p>	<p>Grip funding grant been agreed with Home Office. Circa - £3m p/a for 3 years. Match funding requirement. A number of posts are now being actively recruited into Analytical Systems and Activity</p> <p>- Following geofencing / crime mapping capability now confirmed (and resolution of some Connect data issues) the Data Lab are refreshing our hotspots overlaid with OCG activity and predictive knife crime data.</p> <p>Using grip funds we are enhancing our analytical capacity to include</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Higher Analyst drawing Serious Youth Violence (SYV) themes and opportunities from across violence portfolios - pending recruitment o Enhanced regional analytical support to include tracking our Targeted Guardian Patrols - Pending Recruitment o Dashboard development - ongoing o Data scientist time to support Randomised patrol methodology - Pending recruitment o Specialist knife crime analyst to support a CAPTIVA Knife crime meeting – tracking knife assaults, intelligence and interventions led by D.Supt <p>Operational Hotspot Activity - Pending recruitment</p> <p>- Paper submitted to expand taskforce through 2023 uplift</p> <p>- App in development with Thames Valley to deliver Randomised Patrol Methodology has been found not compatible with WMP - so WMP IT have commenced development of a new system</p> <p>- NPU refresh of Serious Youth Violence Plans – to launch internal comms programme including Target Guardian Patrols to frontline staff and Rimush community engagement principles – to commence 1/9/22 post CWG</p> <p><u>Problem-Orientated Policing</u></p> <p>- Investment in investigations resources (PSI,PSIOS to enhance OOOD and outcomes)</p> <p>- NPU SYV Reduction Plans to include Public Health and Multi Agency SARA approach underpinned by CSP Violence Board structures.</p> <p>- Round Midnight Virtual Reality Schools program wider roll out being scoped with County Lines lead</p>	<p>During Sept LPGB ACC Ward authorised for this risk to be closed off CRR</p>	September 2022	15th December 2022
CRR12	Mutual Aid & Resourcing	There is a risk that significant resources abstractions (police officers and staff) will be required from operational business and duties during the operational period of the Commonwealth Games. There is a risk that a local, regional or national critical incident could see Mutual Aid and / or WMP officers and / or vehicles abstracted to resource the incident response.	The impact of this risk may be that WMP will have gaps in the Games staffing model, potentially causing a security / public safety risk. Should vehicles be unavailable, then officers' ability to perform their roles may be impacted and / or alternative transport may need to be found at short notice and with additional cost.	<p>Risk can close:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1.Mutual Aid agreed to not be deployed to any WMP BaU operation/incidents. 2.Changes to CWG resourcing models agreed with BaU Gold Command in the lead up to the Opening Ceremony/Closing Ceremony. 3.Commonwealth Games has taken place; the operation and BaU managed successfully – Military deployment worked well and CVAF enacted 01/08 to mitigate PCS shortfall. 4.Formal de-brief sessions planned for September – October to identify key learning. 	<p>1.Mutual Aid agreed to not be deployed to any WMP BaU operation/incidents.</p> <p>2.Changes to CWG resourcing models agreed with BaU Gold Command in the lead up to the Opening Ceremony/Closing Ceremony.</p> <p>3.Commonwealth Games has taken place; the operation and BaU managed successfully. Military deployment</p>	19/08/2022	15th December 2022
CRR22	Non-Compliance with CPIA biometric data retention	A previous Biometric Commissioner's Office audit in 2019 highlighted the need for WMP to ensure a cohesive and robust audit process for CPIA samples. These recommendations have not been fully implemented and it is likely the Force will be subject to an audit later this year as part of the national cyclical audit plan. There is a risk that WMP may not be fully compliant with the CPIA. There is a risk that a new audit by the Biometric Commissioner's Office could highlight weaknesses in WMP's management of the relevant data.	<p>- Significant weaknesses highlighted in an audit by the Biometric Commissioner's Office.</p> <p>- Trust and confidence of our stakeholders in relation to our processes around biometric information.</p> <p>- Non- compliance with the CPIA and the potential notification to the Home Office.</p>	<p>- A working group has been set up and the terms of reference is being finalised. The group aims to bring together key stakeholders to develop a procedure to ensure a compliant and ethical biometric data storage process.</p> <p>- Working group will work to implement Biometric Commissioner's recommendations made as a result of findings from a recent national report.</p> <p>Following discussions at the June Crime Governance Board (CGB) last quarter, it was highlighted that due to the mitigating actions now in place, this risk can now be managed at Portfolio level. Risk will be put for closure during Quarter 3</p>	<p>Following discussions at the June Crime Governance Board (CGB) last quarter, it was highlighted that due to the mitigating actions now in place, this risk can now be managed at Portfolio level. Risk will be put for closure during Quarter 3</p>	12/09/2022	15th December 2022

Closed Risks

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CRR21	Cannabis Disposal Storage Capacity	Due to a substantial increase in cannabis growth in the region, there has been an increase in the quantity of cannabis seized by Officers. The rapid increase could lead to a inability to manage the disposal capacity effectively.	This has led to insufficient cannabis storage capacity to manage the increased quantity seized. Increase in the health and safety risk to staff with excessive quantities being held on site.	<p>-Extensive work has been completed between Shared Services, Corporate Asset Management and Operations Cannabis Disposal Team (CDT) to implement a clearer communication structure, prioritised, planned and regular collection cycle and an upgrade in disposal capacity at Smethwick.</p> <p>-There has been a marked and sustained improvement in collections from local NPU-based stores and essentially ensures that cannabis is collected and moved to the central disposal store within twenty four hours of a NPU store nearing capacity. It has also reduced the risk of theft of seized cannabis and reduced complaints/health and safety incident reports.</p> <p>-Conducted a thorough review of DP processes, individual bags of cannabis handled by CDT can now be recorded and tracked on the DP system and confirmed as disposed of, removing any risk of cannabis going missing or unaccounted for in the collection process.</p> <p>-Following the Gold group meeting on 18/08/22, it was agreed by all stakeholders to reduce residual risk scores to 'Green' status.</p> <p>It has been recommended to remove this risk from the CRR and monitor at portfolio level.</p>	<p>Following the Gold group meeting on 18/08/22, it was agreed aby all stakeholders that this risk to the force has now been reduced adequately to return to 'Green' status on the risk register.</p> <p>Recommended for closure off CRR and to monitor on portfolio register</p>	19/08/2022	15th December 2022

RISK SCORING GUIDANCE

Risk Scoring = Impact x Probability

Impact	Service	Performance	Finance	Reputation	Legal	Safety	Human Rights / Diversity	Wellbeing
5	Major impact on a critical service area or multiple service areas with widespread and sustained disruption	Significant impact on performance resulting in not achieving more than one of the key Force performance objectives	Costs over £2m	Sustained national media coverage over sustained period / Removal of Command Team member / External inquiry	Prosecution. Major Claims/fines against the Force.	Multiple fatalities or multiple permanent injuries	Major unjustified impacts or interference	Very likely to have a significant impact on officer/staff wellbeing and will require coordinated response and referral to support services.
4	Serious impact on key services with a noticeable impact for the public	Large impact on performance resulting in not achieving a key Force performance objectives	Costs of between £1m and £2m	Sustained adverse local media coverage	Serious Claims/fines against the Force.	Single Fatality or severe injury to several people	Serious unjustified impacts or interference	Likely to have a serious impact on officer/staff wellbeing and will require coordinated response and referral to support services.
3	Impact on non-critical service or short term disruption	Impact on performance resulting in potential difficulties in achieving key Force performance objectives but where corrective action can still be taken	Costs of between £500k and £1m	Some local adverse publicity	Significant Litigation /claims against the Force. Within insurance cover	Major injury	Some limited unjustified impact or interference	Likely to impact officer/staff wellbeing and require referral to support services.
2	Slight impact on service delivery	Impact on performance resulting in small impact on key Force performance objectives but which can be managed	Costs of between £100k and £500k	Short term customer dissatisfaction	Claims, minor complaints Within insurance cover	Minor or slight injury	Impact of interference is manageable with existing resources	May impact officer/staff wellbeing and could require referral to support services.
1	Impact is easily manageable or is of little concern to public	Short Term impact on performance but not to the extent where the achievement of key force performance objectives are impacted	Costs of below £100k	Manageable customer dissatisfaction	Unlikely to lead to a claim	Unlikely to have any safety implications	No impact on diversity / human rights	Negligible impact on officer/staff wellbeing and unlikely to require referral to support services.

Probability	Description	Detailed Description	% Chance	Relative	Frequency
5	Very Likely	Has regularly occurred within the Force / Area / Department or there are strong indications that the risk will happen	80% or more	As certain as we can be that it will happen	More than once a year
4	Likely	Has previously occurred within the Force / Area / Department or there are indications that the risk will happen	50% - 80%	More likely to happen than not to happen	Once every 1 to 2 years occurrence
3	Some likelihood	Some indications that the risk will happen	20% - 50%	More likely not to happen than to happen	Once every 2 to 5 years occurrence
2	Unlikely	Limited indications at this point that the risk will happen	5% - 20%	Unlikely to happen but possible	Once every 5 to 10 years occurrence
1	Remote	No indications at this point that the risk will happen	0% - 5%	Extremely Unlikely	Once every 10 years or more occur

Risk Scores

	5	10	15	20	25
Probability	4	8	12	16	20
	3	6	9	12	15
	2	4	6	8	10
	1	2	3	4	5
		Impact			

For grading risk, the scores obtained from the risk matrix are assigned grades as follow:

1 - 4	Low risk
5 - 10	Medium risk
12 -16	High risk
20 - 25	Critical risk

Calculate the risk rating by multiplying the impact score by the probability score:

$Impact \times Probability = risk\ rating/score$