Corporate Risks

ID	Risk Name	Description	Impact	Key Controls and Activities	Q4 Trending	Q1 Trending	Q2 Trending	Residual Risk Rating
CRR18	Core Skills Resilience & Training Risk	There has been a decline in the percentage numbers and resilience of Police Officers trained in core skills. This affects areas such as Personal Safety Training, Driver Training, Public Order Skills and Taser. The numbers of those trained and retention of skills has been affected by COVID in that we have been unable to train the numbers of staff we would ordinarily train in one session. Reduced capacity has led to a reduced offer from L&D. There has also been an increased number of course cancellations and failed attendances at courses, some of which can be attributed to the impact of COVID cases and self isolation measures.	The greatest risk is that of the Force to be unable to deploy sufficient numbers of staff to meet calls for service and demand. In addition to this is the length of time it will take to meet the backlog and bring us back in line with demand on courses and meet resilience targets.	- We have invested in contingency funding to secure additional courses for Personal Safety Training, specifically targeting those officers who need to retain public order skills also. This will meet a significant proportion of PST backlog by September 2021. - We are in the process of recruiting PST trainers to bring the team up to full establishment. This is underway and we will be at full establishment by October 2021 and therefore able to then meet the additional demand and backlog. - All other courses can begin to meet backlog and continue to address BAU demand as we now return to normal classroom sizes. - We have greater scrutiny on course non attendance to ensure our classrooms are filled to maximum capacity and with the greatest efficiency	N/A	N/A	New	**Critical**
CRR03	Operational Training and Embedded Learning.	**Op Plato Embedding** There is a risk that Operational Officers fail to adopt the national Joint Operating Principles introduced to WMP in December 2020 in a timely manner. A new challenge with this risk is the lack of ownership locally now that ORU have rolled out the training to keep this an annual refresher on CPD days within departments. **JESIP Command Training.** Limited roll out of the JESIP re-accreditation courses. This has been caused by insufficient access to training venues and JESIP trainers amongst the tri-service and could lead to a delay in re-accreditation of the JESIP Commanders and upskilling new staff.	There is a lack of CPD days within departments and prioritisation of training competes locally to complete the roll out. The risk is that the national doctrine has changed quicker than the ability and competency of officers in adopting these changes.	- SLD performed Force wide testing of a Plato scenario (June 2021). We also have ongoing testing and exercising managed by the resilience unit having signed off an annual plan with the FET prioritising threats against impact/likelihood/preparedness. All firearms command have undergone CPD training incorporating Plato and Siege scenarios. JOPS2 updates have been briefed out to all operational staff and a video box embedded in the force intranet - ORU has completed Plato plan update, ACC tests of Plato Activation and Debrief is being written. - Op Mooring findings and debrief conducted. - Ex Impertior tri-service command exercise went ahead on 9th February which tested multi-agency command interoperability channel ESICRTL and also confirmed the use of IC1 as the FCP channel. - Manchester Inquest findings are being monitored and the training and exercising programme being amended accordingly for assurance. - Op Mooring considerations have been embedded back into training and planning practises. - ORU is rolling out NPU/dept. training with large tests conducted every 2 months within FCC (Ex Impertior) as well as Ex Overlored planned for July 2021 testing for the first time, MTA on a Train. Dip sampling will be conducted at the end of the roll out period to review progress of embedding. - JESIP NCALTS - All staff awareness, Operational Command and Tactical Commander. - A paper is being prepared to implement the funding requirement to support the JESIP Command demand as we run up the CWG. - Op Plato and Force Control Room Command exercising of JESIP Principles.	New	New	→	**High**
CRR15	S22 Governance	ROCU - The majority of income generated through ARIS (Asset Recovery Incentivisation Scheme) is through either Confiscation Orders or Cash Forfeitures. There is a risk that if the current model was altered and assets seized were distributed across the region e.g. as per the current funding formula WMP OPCC would stand to lose 47% of current ARIS funding. This would have a significant impact on the funding of the ECT and funds available for POCA initiatives. There is a risk that if ARIS funding is not provided to other forces they may withdraw resource from the ROCUWM as they are not seeing equitable benefits from the regional agreement. CTU - There are two proposed options for the method of transferring Special Branch funding into CT Policing as part of the national SB Reform project. There is a risk that if Option 1 is chosen the transfer of SB funding into CT Grant will result in a 'top slice' from forces across the region that is not consistent with the actual spend of Special Branch. Some forces would give up more funding than they spend whilst others would give up less. Option 2 would be a one-time adjustment meaning that forces' individual funding only decreases by their expenditure on Special Branch. Based on this information, there is a risk that WMP will see their budget reduced by more than the actual cost of Special Branch.	ROCU - The majority of income generated through ARIS (Asset Recovery Incentivisation Scheme) is through either Confiscation Orders or Cash Forfeitures. Under the current agreement all forfeitures seized are returned to the OPCC. - If the current model was altered and assets seized were distributed across the region e.g. as per the current funding formula WMP OPCC would stand to lose approximately 47% of current ARIS funding. This would have a significant impact on the funding of the WMP Economic Crime Team (ECT) and funds available for POCA initiatives. CTU - There are two proposed options for the method of transferring Special Branch funding into CT Policing as part of the national SB Reform project. Option 1 would reflect a share of police funding as calculated by the Police Funding Formula, not the 'real-world' cost of a force's respective Special Branch functions. Option 2 would be a one-time adjustment meaning that forces' individual funding only decreases by their expenditure on Special Branch. - The impact of option 1 is that there is a possibility that the force will see their budget reduced by more than the current expenditure for Special Branch. It is unknown at this time how much WMP would be required to transfer to CT Policing.	ROCU - WMP and the OPCC are currently in discussions to provide solutions to the current arrangement. CTU - 1) The Home Office is conducted a briefing to Chief Constables and PCC's in the region in July, providing more information on the proposals. 2) A regional response has been sent to the Home Office detailing option 2 as the preferred method of transfer for the West Midlands region	N/A	N/A	New	**High**
CRR09	Recruitment & Retention/Uplift	There is a risk of being unable to recruit staff across the Force in a timely manner and aligned with the strategic workforce planning requirements. The uplift targets and their associated entry routes (e.g. PEQF) create significant additional demand on WMP. The failure to meet recruitment targets will impact on the forces resilience and may potentially affect future funding from the Home Office. There is a risk that a number of student officers have been identified as potentially being at risk of dismissal due to repeated failures of university modules.	- WMP will not be able to recruit and retain sufficiently skilled people to deliver our service. Risk to service provision and accreditation status in some cases (e.g. Forensics). Longer-term employee relations impact. - This has an impact of prolonged recruitment delays/unplanned recruitment forecasting resulting in a rise in vacant posts and our inability to deliver services. - Due to the sheer volume of demand and complexity of entry criteria, WMP is not able to push through the uplift recruitment pipeline quickly enough resulting in missed targets or not meeting resourcing assumptions. Reputational (and potential financial) impact on WMP from the Home Office. - The impact is this may be significant for WMP and the government's confidence in us. The operating model established as part of the PBB Process may be impacted, with WMP having insufficient resources to fully realise the aligned benefits. Potential loss of confidence from WMP colleagues who were anticipating additional resources to join them. -The impact of student officer repeatedly failing their modules, will lead to the student being dismissed from their university course, WMP currently has no other training programme available to see them though their probationary period.	- Workforce plan to meet targets to the end of March 2023 - Understanding of staff turnover and retirements to 2023 - Review where student officers are posted across organisation - Clarity of the expectation of ESFA and Ofsted audits - Recognition of prior education/meeting entry criteria in an alternative way (e.g. via essays) - Virtual assessment centres put in place. - Engagement with other universities to offer policing degrees (including for Specials) - Recruitment is in progress to increase the recruitment team. Some "no recruitment" activity is now being completed by Shared Services there freeing up some of the recruitment team. - Delivery of a targeted, segmented media campaign. - An increase in tutors across all PDUs will be received. Change the ratios to 3:1. - Some mitigation has been possible through engagement with the University to offer appeal and comment on operational competency. University are offering additional support to at risk students and the opportunity to re-submit work, but in some cases even this intervention has not resolved concerns.	→	→	→	**High**
CRR13	Cybersecurity	Failure of the Force's IT&D systems (due to cyber-attack, hardware failure, loss of IT systems via IT services provider or other data security breaches) will lead to severe disruption to service delivery and response.	Loss of access to IT systems due to a failure in our cyber security for an extended period of time could adversely impact WMP's ability to continue service delivery and business operations. This could also lead to potential data breaches, an inability to access key systems and reputational damage.	IT&D operate a suite of mitigations to prevent Cyber Attack, this ensures we have a robust approach to security and helps defend our data and systems: - We Secure by Design – All designs for systems have oversight of both a Security Architect and Information Assurance experts who validate best design/secure practise in technology solutions before implemented. - We operate a multi-layer defence approach at our network boundary (DMZ, including IPS/IDS functionality with Zones for access in/out of the network. - We only allow access 'out' of the WMP Network by an Internet Proxy as standard – this providing another layer of outbound defence. - We perform ITHC (IT Health Checks) at points throughout the year by expert external security companies – trying to attack our systems internally, and remediating any issues. - We patch our systems regularly in-line with enterprise recommendations. - We backup our data to prevent corruption, and this data is stored separate to the system by geographic resilience. We test our backup restore processes and document the outcomes. - We employ a dedicated IT Security Officer – part of this role is to ensure national and local coordination of 'threat alerts' and organises appropriate action accordingly as a result (i.e. patch the F5 devices due to an immediate risk identified by another force etc.).	N/A	N/A	New	**High**
CRR06	Corporate Health, Safety and Wellbeing	- There may be an increase in employee related mental health and wellbeing issues which impacts WMP's ability to deliver and recover operational services during the d post pandemic environment. - There is a risk of post-Traumatic Stress Disorder to forensic services staff caused through constant exposure to trauma, death, violence and sexual scenes and evidence and the subsequent raw emotion of victims and families. **COVID** - the risk of staff infection / requirement to self-isolate / backlog of rest days and leave, as well as the need to deliver against national and local objectives could lead to placing additional challenging demands on the workforce, outside of their normal business.	- Failure to look after the wellbeing of our staff could have a significant impact on employee confidence, poorer engagement, and increased sickness levels. Staff who are exposed to traumatic images and investigations over a prolonged period of time are likely to be at increased risk of experiencing detrimental impacts on their physiological wellbeing. **COVID** -Workforce resilience and ability to serve the public as part of business as usual. This may be significantly more impactful in a post lockdown environment as the demand is not static and is going up/reverting to normal levels. There may also be some unintended consequences of new ways of working e.g. Virtual Remand Hearings - prisoners usually taken to court now remain in custody blocks having case heard via live link; creates custody capacity issues, additional tasks for custody staff and staff contingency requirements.	- Enhanced force approach to trauma risk identification and management (TRIM) - questionnaires to high risk roles, further engagement with occupational health, focus groups in place. - Efficient signposting to Vivup, TRiM process, sporadic clinical supervision, use of watchful waiting and line manager and colleague observations. Increased discussion and conversations regarding wellbeing taking place. Higher risk role assessment underway with more tailored support offered where identified. **COVID** - SCG & TCG structure in place for external liaison, led by ACC Ops as Gold - Measures implemented across WMP estate and improved physical protective measures and staff awareness in place - WMP encouraging workforce to take part in the COVID vaccination programme. Staff and Officers are providing the COVID Team with information relating to their vaccinations to help assess and assist in the management of risk and welfare, as well as staff health and safety in future deployments.	↗	→	→	**High**

ID	Risk Name	Description	Impact	Key Controls and Activities	Q4 Trending	Q1 Trending	Q2 Trending	Residual Risk Rating
CRR16	Police Cadet Leaders - Safeguarding	There is a risk that WMP Police Cadets policies, procedures and process fail to comply with the National Safety and Safeguarding guidelines (UKYSSF). The guidelines are set out by the National VPC who advises that WMP aligns its practice to the UK Youth Safer Spaces Framework (UKSSF) backed by the NPCC Enforcement.	- Increased spotlight on other Forces could increase media focus on all Police Force's across the country including WMP. - If WMP does not ensure compliance with the safeguarding practices around recruitment of Police Cadet Leaders, this could increase the likelihood of having a negative impact on public confidence and legitimacy in safeguarding Police Cadets.	Governance board and review of policies implemented and actions being taken. We are working with the National VPC to implement robust safe policies. We have learnt and amended processes after the lessons from GMP. and can now confirm we are 60% compliant (Aug 2021) in relation to safeguarding training of all Cadet Leaders. Safer recruitment practices we are 100% compliant, Safety we are approx. 80% compliant with residual review of policies being required. We are consistently reviewing policies in relation to safety and safeguarding.	N/A	N/A	New	High
CRR01	Vulnerability and Hidden Crimes	There is a risk that the increased identification of vulnerability in demand, and hidden crimes (includes child exploitation, modern day slavery, human trafficking, domestic abuse, missing people) poses a challenge to the Force to manage its complexity. The risk could also impact the response levels provided impacting the delivery of an effective service to those in need.	Increases in volumes or poor identification impacts on the force's capacity to prevent and respond, creating public confidence and safety concerns, and meet our overall requirement to prevent the unnecessary criminalisation of children and improve the overall quality of investigations involving vulnerable people.	- Relaunch of THRIVE+ - Control Works builds in greater requirement for assessment and recording of rationale at initial contact - DA demand remains elevated with daily crimes recorded akin to Christmas and NY demand. PBB uplift agreed however until officers/staff arrive the amount of DA demand is still outstripping capacity. - V&I officers have been identified across all geographic hubs. The officers perform a co-ordination role to ensure that FCID is responding to the statutory obligations within investigations. The FCID offer is nuanced across the hubs, with the Birmingham based officer embedded within a multi dept. function. In the long term FCID will form part of the SOCEX build - An escalation process for partners has been created, which allows escalation to the duty crime supt in urgent cases. This has been utilised by partners. - Missing from home lead now sits within FCID and regular and active Supervision of Missing investigations is now occurring. Regular performance monitoring daily/weekly/monthly in place. - WMP working with BCT + BCC to negotiate continued use of Lancaster House (Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hub) - extension has been agreed in short-medium term for officers to continue working there until this can be resolved - DA pilot, commissioned services mapping and system capability exercise underway - findings/recommendations expected by the end of June - Structured debriefs from recent operations involving vulnerability have provided organisational learning and resulting learning to be incorporated into learning logs. - Implementation of VSA audit approach, resulting in an enhanced audit and assurance function being established in force. OPCC follow-up audit focusing on 'vulnerability in calls', draft findings (June 2021): areas of good practice, as well as recommendations for maturing the approach of the VSA team further and quicker.	→	→	→	High
CRR02	Serious Violence in Under 25s	Interventions to address multiple risk factors/indicators are not impactful or effective. The increase in volume of serious youth crime and serious violence (gun and knife crime) in the under 25s could lead to the cumulative risk around community safety. There could be a perceived failure that the Force is not responding adequately to prevent and respond to crime involving young people. With restrictions lifting, it is expected that there will be an increase in serious violence across the region.	- Increases in volumes impacts on the force's capacity to prevent and respond to increased demand. - Increases in serious youth violence reporting in the media could undermine community confidence in policing and contribute to safety concerns. - Demand pressures could have an impact on crime prevention initiatives. Force response becomes more reactive than preventative.	- Guardian Grip funding established. - Violence Reduction Unit established - Integrated force violence strategy being implemented - Managed through FTDB, Performance Panel and Strategic Tasking structures plus dedicated ACC led performance meeting - Force Priority with NPU and stakeholder violence reduction plans being developed - including how matrix partners are coordinating approach to serious violence (FRESCO and TORCULAR models) - PH approach launched and working with VRU to deliver. Violence is increasing (14% YTD against 2019/20) - some of this increase is CDI linked and officer assaults. - Dedicated force taskforce allocated to violence suppression- tactically allocated throughout tasking - Youth violence interventions ongoing. - Challenges over last 2 months include demand abstracting resources. NPUs have been at times losing nearly all resources to support demand, NTE has been operating 30% short and VVAs are only 50% deployable in locations. This is impacting ability to surge activity. - Continued collaborative working between FCID, ROCU, CTU and Force Intelligence in relation to youth homicide cases. New Violence Board is bringing together strategic stakeholders to coordinate activity, manage duplication and align workstreams.	↗	→	→	High
CRR05	Demand Management	There is a risk that the Force fails to respond to and manage the effective and efficient policing requirements of the region. Example: The nature of the rise requires an increasing level of sophistication to understand how it moved through the system and may be compounded by resourcing constraints.	Impacts on our ability to create and execute effective plans to ensure effective and efficient delivery of policing. Example: Demand and the management of risk within the P2 grade, which has a service level at 60 minutes. Currently a minority of case are being carried over beyond 24 hours. This is a concern in relation to risk management, service delivery, victim support and impacts on stress to WMP staff seeking to manage this risk when unresourced. Return to 'new normal' at the tail-end of the pandemic creates additional complexity/uncertainty.	- DDI Dashboards to give better access to management information to inform decisions - Summer demand has been a force Mission via FTDB. Summer demand has increased in line with national picture. This has been exacerbated by increasing summer demand as lockdown lifted and staffing challenges. After challenging June and July, there has been a slight reduction this August. Matching resourcing to demand remains a challenge. - Gold group task to look at journey maps for incident types to identify pinch points and give insight into what could be done to make the process more efficient - Closely linked to Control Works and Connect - Exploring opportunities to increase the sophistication of our demand modelling and forecasting approach. - Review being undertaken into baseline responsibilities for Force Contact staff and where ownership of the P2 risk and demand should be. - Robust summer demand plan in place, even though it remains an ongoing challenge for all Forces nationally. Uplift is helping with this, also plan to increase resourcing for DA and front-line demand. - Debrief to be carried out by Intelligence after the summer period.	↘	↗	→	High
CRR17	Organisational Learning	Organisational learning is obtained across the force via its various learning hotspots (i.e., IA / HMIC recommendations, debriefs, inquiries (Manchester Arena bombings), IOPC reports etc.). There is no current organisational learning structure across the force to ensure once learning is identified, it is evaluated and shared across the Force to positively impact policy practise and outcomes. There is a risk that WMP lacks the oversight required to analyse strategic, cross cutting and/ or operational organisational learning to ensure risks and opportunities are managed and evaluated in showing learning and ideas have a route to action including integration into operational practice.	- Lack of coordinated dissemination of knowledge and learning across the Force. - No consistent approach to capturing and sharing OL, no ability to draw out themes - No clear governance or accountability for structured debriefs - Failing to embed the learning across the Force could lead to reputational damage should major incident occur across the region and learning available. - Increased scrutiny from external regulators – such as HMIC	- OL Working Group established - Standardised Learning Log template agreed - Governance flows and business rules drafted - Assessment criteria under-development - Risk prioritisation of debrief recommendations - Debrief policy being redrafted	N/A	N/A	New	High
CRR04	CONNECT Legacy/BRC Data	Data migration into CONNECT could lead to loss of relevant information transferring over from legacy systems into CONNECT. Data loss/gaps could lead to the Force being unable to accurately access historic audit data.	-The impact of this risk may be that data in the back records is missing from the transfer to CONNECT. This could lead to certain data fields in things like DBS historic checks being excluded – e.g. crime reference numbers. -The impact of this risk could lead to potential reputational damage if information provided in DBS certificates do not adequately reflect all current and historic data. -CONNECT Legacy/ BRC Data- Significant issues with this content- not all relevant information has been brought over into CONNECT, plus there are gaps in some outcomes/ markers that did not exist on legacy systems- for example, over 140K post 2018 DA records are no longer identified correctly, and there is currently no solution for accessing audit data.	- CONNECT implementation & assurance board involving a wide range of internal stakeholders (mostly departmental heads) overseeing implementation of system. - CONNECT team continuing to work through system architecture and integration issues with Northgate as part of usual programme management business. - BRC Issue is under investigation by the Project/IT&D/Northgate - until this is resolved WMP cannot delete legacy data. - DBS staff and others involved in investigation and disclosure are aware and are currently checking legacy systems to ensure all relevant information is considered.	N/A	New	→	High

ID	Risk Name	Description	Impact	Key Controls and Activities	Q4 Trending	Q1 Trending	Q2 Trending	Residual Risk Rating
CRR08	Investigative and Criminal Justice Process and Outcome	- There is a risk that the case backlog that exists due to COVID may result in victims and witnesses losing faith in the Criminal Justice system. The backlog also puts at risk the cost recovery from Police Led Prosecutions. There is also the risk of an additional strain on CJS resources, particularly in Witness Care, due to the new court listings process. - Updates to the Attorney General's Guidelines on Disclosure which sits alongside the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act ("CPIA") 1996, has an impact on the working practices of investigations officers and staff, with a short turnaround time for adhering to the guidance.	- The impact is that justice is not served for victims and witnesses and WMPs reputation is at risk as a reduced number of cases are being heard by the Courts (including murder trials). The reduction of Courts will also result in a significant loss of income recovery from PLP. There may also be additional welfare issue for Witness Care staff due to the supplementary work required. The new guidance has implications for how the police engages with other parts of the CJS, in terms of timeliness, mandatory disclosures and digital evidence. In particular, it increases the expectations on the recording of materials in the course of an investigation - extending requirements to unused material and provision of schedules for all Pre-Charge cases. The combined effect of these changes could result in an increase in the number of bail cases and CPS rejections, creating further demands on the force.	CJ are in contact with strategic leads across the CJ system to review how process to reduce the backlog are progressed. - A Victim Retention Strategy is in place with a range of measure to mitigate the risk, these include, additional overtime and staff for Witness Care, Nightingale Courts to allow PLP cases to be heard, additional contact with staff around welfare and temporary removal of some witness care functions to increase capacity - There is also a working group for Out of Court Disposals to ensure that these are being used effectively when appropriate - The force is engaging nationally to review timelines and looking at an accelerated service for high harm DA / U25 knife crime both in PCD and listings. Other alternative options to provide restorative justice (RJ) for victims is being tracked though the crime portfolio outcomes meeting for OOCD/ RJ. - The courts have released the latest iteration of their recovery plan; the force is in step with this in relation to the returning back to the timelines for case to be charged into court. - Working with HMCTS the TSJ backlog is now at 2% pre covid levels. The nightingale courts will remain until 03/22 and looking at how more court rooms can be opened post covid relaxation of rules. - Champions/dept plans are in place for the force, performance is now competed in CMU on a weekly/monthly basis to feed bac. Performance is also being reviewed with the CPS/CJ and FET and there is a force NCALT now live for all officers to complete - Considerable amount of training and checking of disclosures from other departments undertaken.	↗	→	→	**High**
CRR14	Alarms Management	There is a risk that alarm notifications may fail at Force Control Bournville due to the unreliability of receiver equipment and delays in replacing it.	Alarms Management is the responsibility of Shared Services who need to assess current and future requirements regarding both internal and external demand which will inform the possible solutions or upgrades. Alarm notifications may fail at Force Control Bournville due to the unreliability of receiver equipment and delays in replacing it. The alarm receiver at Bournville is 15 years old and is now obsolete. Its backup device at Smethwick is 30 years old. The reliability of both devices is declining. A priced proposal to replace both receivers has been received. Support from IT&D will be important but have conflicting priorities are unable to progress it speedily. While the receivers are not upgraded the force runs the risk of the loss of alarm messages and the consequential failure to act on them.	- Migration to C3 has further raised the risk as equipment could be adversely affected by relocation and reconnection. This would leave the Force potentially unable to monitor and therefore respond to alarm calls. Shared Services urgently need to assess business requirements so the work can be prioritised so resources from IT&D and Property Services can be committed to enable replacement. - The alarm receiver has successfully been moved from Bournville Lane to the new Logistics Centre. The risk still remains though as the equipment is old and has the potential to fail.	N/A	N/A	New	**High**
CRR12	Mutual Aid & Resourcing	**CW Games 2022 Resourcing** There is a risk that significant resources abstractions (police officers and staff) will be required from operational business and duties during the operational period of the Commonwealth Games. There is a risk that a local, regional or national critical incident could see Mutual Aid and / or WMP officers and / or vehicles abstracted to resource the incident response. **Mutual Aid - 2020 United Nations Climate Change Conference: COP26** There is a risk that a local, regional or national critical incident could see Mutual Aid and / or WMP officers and / or vehicles distracted to resource the incident response. There is a risk that the Force may lack the capability and capacity to adequately respond to a critical incident within the WMP region due to the mutual aid requirements of COP26. COP26 will require a mutual aid response greater than any other event in UK Policing, and will include specialist resources.	**CW Games 2022 Resourcing** The impact of this risk may be that WMP will have gaps in the Games staffing model, potentially causing a security / public safety risk. Should vehicles be unavailable, then officers' ability to perform their roles may be impacted and / or alternative transport may need to be found at short notice and with additional cost. **Mutual Aid - 2020 United Nations Climate Change Conference: COP26** - The impact of this risk may be that WMP will have gaps in the COP26 staffing model, potentially causing a security / public safety risk. Should Officers and vehicles be unavailable, then officers' ability to perform their roles may be impacted and / or alternative transport may need to be found at short notice and with additional cost. - Reputational damage and loss of credibility with the community we serve. - Workforce resilience and agility to maintain adequate service levels.	**CW Games 2022 Resourcing** - Officers on mutual aid from another region to CWG would not be sent home unless they hold a specific skill /role that would require them back in force. The force / region that has declared a major incident would initially use their own offices, then regional (Tier 2) resources and then if required would look to NPoCC to request additional officers on mutual aid. In any case each region / force would need to be able to provide primary mobilisation on top of what they are providing to CWG. - In the event of a major event during CWG, if a major incident is declared and Mutual Aid (Tier 3) resources are requested then YES there is a possibility that the Central region would not be requested to provide resources. - Explore scenario / resilience in Business Continuity / Testing & Exercising. - Engage with recruitment Uplift programme to assess opportunities. - Working with the operation to build an abstraction and deployment model and approach to identify with the organisation where resources will be taken from and for how long. **Mutual Aid - 2020 United Nations Climate Change Conference: COP26** - Resourcing plan has been developed including a backfill plan. - Ops SLT working with the Business Partnering Team to plan annual leave for both COP26 and CWG22. Currently a COP26 leave programme in place to ensure sufficient resourcing during the COP26 event - The Force has put in place an annual leave embargo and rest days have been cancelled, a panel has been put together to assess leave requests during this period. - NPU will backfill early and late starts, Response will backfill overtime over the 10-day period. - CWG22 will pick up the logistics for COP26, the intention is to test their processes for next year on the upcoming COP26 event.	N/A	New	→	**Medium**
CRR07	WMP Demographics and Representation	There is a risk that a failure to attract, recruit and retain a diverse and representative workforce across the force that is less representative of the communities we serve could create risk to public confidence. Failure to attract and retain a diverse and representative workforce (both officers and staff) required at every level of the Force to deliver our services to our diverse communities.	A less representative force will lack legitimacy in some communities, hampering its ability to achieve positive outcomes. The impact may be that the legitimacy and trust in WMP is diminished. The impact of not meeting the PCC's target of recruiting 1000 BAME officers may lead to reputational damage.	- Review of approach to Diversity & Inclusion - Review of recruitment and promotions processes - Departmental D&I plans are in place and each dept. has a local D&I governance board. The D&I plans are reviewed as part of QPR process and any key risks are escalated to the Business Partners. The plans are reviewed bi-annually internally and will also be externally reviewed annually. - Key part of recruitment uplift project team. - The D&I Team have contributed throughout the project and have con. The Team have recently engaged with the Aspire4U CIC around the media campaign. The D&I Lead is working on a piece of work to increase awareness of the impact internal, public facing colleagues have around legitimacy, trust and the attractiveness of WMP as an employer. - A stakeholder map has been produced by D&I to support this work, a mandate is being written by the F&B project which will help define scope and deliverables. - A Representation Gold Group was stood up in April with representation from D&I Head, BAPA member, a NPU Commander and core project team. Focus on Black Inclusion Week in addition to the gold group has brought a more integrated plan together.	→	→	→	**Medium**
CRR10	Financial Management	i. There is a risk that WMP's finances are not sustainable over the medium term and/or efficiency savings required may adversely impact the operational services. Whilst the police grant has increased for 21/22 to fund increase in officer numbers, there are still unfunded inflationary pressures. One year settlements do not assist medium term financial planning. ii - There is also a risk that as mandated/national initiatives develop (e.g. ESMCP, National Enabling Programme), the actual costs for delivery far exceed the estimated costs within the affordability envelope.	i - Impact on overall funding position. Medium term financial plan (MTFP) sets out strict budgeting envelope that must be met. ii - The inability to finance all component projects, or needing to de-prioritise other projects within the portfolio if the national changes are mandated.	- Influence National debate on Police Funding - Review and continue to scrutinise financial planning - Revised MTFP and focus on benefit maximisation and continued efficiencies - Prudence in managing long term commitments - Build in scenario planning, with potential savings / investment options available - National Horizon scanning by R & C Manager to ensure we have full visibility of emerging national programmes. - Benefits manager and Finance to review in-flight projects to identify potential underspend. - Updates and developments on national programmes reported into strategic and practitioner level stakeholders. - Work ongoing to provide portfolio leadership to assess current demand and financial picture - Regional working to ensure integrated planning (on ESMCP) - Over the next 2 years all of our services will go through a Priority Based Budgeting process, with phase 1 commencing in June. In addition to this we will adopt a zero based budgeting approach to review some elements of non-pay expenditure'. Furthermore the force will be proactively involved in the 2021 CSR exercise, hoping to influence debate around future funding settlements.	→	→	→	**Medium**
CRR11	Safeguarding - Local Policing	There is a risk that the Force fails follow safeguarding processes to protect the needs of the most vulnerable members of our community. There is also a risk that the Force fails to fully understand the safeguarding needs and experiences of citizens - young and old due to increased demand pressures and the challenging range of commissioned and partner-driven arrangements operating across the region.	- Poor identification impacts on the force's capacity to prevent and respond, creating public confidence and safety concerns. - Risk to vulnerable members of the community. - Potential reputational damage if risk not adequately mitigated.	- Commanders attending adult safeguarding boards - Seeking greater joined up working with PPU - WMP reviewing its own safeguarding arrangements (e.g. Cadets) - Conduct analysis of current and future demand for safeguarding, conduct mapping exercise, including the gap in knowledge that may exist where referrals aren't made (e.g. because of errors or omissions) - Improving data sharing arrangements with partner agencies. - Work is ongoing to enhance our service delivery for Adult Safeguarding. A review of associated reports including 'the poor relation' report has begun as well as liaising with NPU Commanders to understand the current state/baseline. There are a number of associated actions and tasks in various governance meetings which will be developed and reported upon, e.g. vulnerability improvement board.	→	→	→	**Medium**