west midlands
police and crime
commissioner

Strategic Policing and Crime Board

Date of meeting: 19 March 2019

Police and Crime Plan Priority:

Title: *Strategic Policing Requirement*

Presented by: DCC Louisa Rolfe

Purpose of paper

1. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate to the board compliance with the statutory duties placed on the Police and Crime Commissioner and the Chief Constable relating to the Strategic Policing Requirement (SPR).

Background

2. The SPR was issued in 2012 (and reviewed in 2015) in execution of the Home Secretary's statutory duty to set out the national threats and the appropriate national policing capabilities required to counter those threats. While many threats can be tackled by individual police forces within their own force areas, national threats such as terrorism, civil emergencies, serious and organised crime, public order, a national cyber security incident and child sexual abuse/exploitation require a coordinated or aggregated response in which resources are brought together from a number of police forces. Forces often need to work collaboratively, and with other partners, national agencies or national arrangements, to ensure such threats are tackled effectively.

3. PCCs and Chief Constables are expected to plan and prepare together in support of national arrangements. The policing response that is required nationally to counter these threats, in partnership with other national agencies sets out:

   - The combined national capacity of all police forces to respond to these threats, expressed in terms of the outcomes sought – these are drawn, wherever possible, from publicly available national Government strategies. PCCs and Chief Constables

must have regard to this aggregate capacity when considering the respective contributions they will make;

- The capabilities that police forces, often working collaboratively, need to maintain in order to achieve these outcomes;

- The requirement for consistency among forces for certain key specialist capabilities where the resources from more than one police force need to be integrated, or work effectively alongside each other. In some instances this requirement for consistency may need to involve other key emergency services and agencies;

- The connectivity arrangements by which resources from several police forces may effectively be coordinated or mobilised, together and with those of other agencies – such as the Security Service or National Crime Agency (NCA).

- The combination of consistency and connectivity forms the basis for interoperability between police forces and with other partners.

4. PCCs are required to have regard to this SPR when issuing or varying their police and crime plans. They must keep the police and crime plan under review in light of any changes made to the SPR by the Home Secretary.

5. The PCC and Chief Constable should follow the SPR unless they are satisfied that, in the particular circumstances, there are good reasons not to. They should not depart from it without good reason (and should be prepared to be able to justify any departure from it on a case by case basis).

TERRORISM

6. As part of the national CT policing network, West Midlands Counter Terrorism Unit (WMCTU) continues to work tirelessly to confront the terrorist and domestic extremism (CT/DE) threat and help keep the public safe.

7. The threat to the UK from international terrorism remains at 'SEVERE', meaning an attack is highly likely. Apart from two occasions, it has remained at this level since August 2014. However, since the terrorist attacks in London and Manchester in 2017, there has been a noticeable step change in terrorism, described by MI5's Director General as "*more terrorist activity, coming at us more quickly and harder to detect. It is multi-dimensional, evolving rapidly and operating at a scale and pace we've not seen before.*"

8. The overriding threat to the UK continues to come from Islamist extremist organisations such as Da'esh (also known as ISIL, ISIS or IS), al-Qa'ida (AQ), al-Muhajiroun (ALM) and groups and individuals who are directed, encouraged or influenced by them. The Islamist threat includes the threat posed by UK nationals seeking to return from Syria or Iraq .The level of threat is complex, ranging from lone actors intent on carrying out low-tech attacks, often developing their plans and capabilities very quickly, to sophisticated networks pursuing ambitious and coordinated plots.

9. The UK threat from the extreme right wing (XRW) has also evolved in recent years and continues to grow.

10. Finally, CT policing also works with the security and intelligence services to respond to 'allied matters' including counter espionage, counter intelligence, counter-proliferation and hostile state actors.

Capacity, Contribution, Capability, Consistency & Connectivity

11. WMCTU, working with Staffordshire Police and the Alliance Special Branches, has the following capabilities to deliver HM Government's national counter terrorism strategy, CONTEST:

    *   PURSUE (investigations, family liaison, digital investigations, financial investigations, forensic management, intelligence, analysis, mobile & technical surveillance, operations room, source handling, and undercover operations)
    *   PREVENT (safeguarding, PREVENT case management, consequence management, community resilience and contact officers)
    *   PROTECT (borders, protective security advice, business and community briefings)
    *   PREPARE (organisational learning & development, contingency planning, testing & exercising)
    *   ENABLING SERVICES (human resources, finance, facilities, IT, physical security, operational security, business improvement)

PURSUE

12. Since March 2017, CT policing and security and intelligence services have stopped 18 attacks; 14 were Islamist related and four XRW. The CT policing network is currently working on a record number of investigations which focus on a range of activities, including fundraising, radicalising and preparing acts of terrorism.

13. WMCTU continues to deal with a significant proportion of this investigative demand across the CT policing network. WMCTU expects this demand to continue and most likely increase, as CT policing moves towards managing volume risk with our partners.

14. During times of surge demand, WMCTU has developed and tested interoperability with other Force, regional and national departments such as Force CID, WM ROCU and the National Crime Agency.

15. In 2018/19 the CT policing network secured an uplift in funding to strengthen existing capabilities. As WMCTU recruits to this uplift, there could be an adverse impact on force resources. As all posts are fully funded and advertised across all four regional forces, the majority of the posts are likely to be filled by WMP officers and staff members. WMCTU continues to work closely with both Force CID and ROCU on joint 'academy' programmes in order to identify, recruit and train new specialist officers.

16. WMCTU has improved its connectivity and consistency by fully adopting the Apollo Programme, which focuses on the handling of growing amounts of intelligence and data, helping WMCTU work with network counterparts.

PREVENT

17. The approach to CT PREVENT is changing. A number of these changes have been identified by 'learning the lessons' recommendations as a result of the attacks in 2017. As the nature of CT/DE risk becomes more complex, it is becoming increasingly difficult to define a clear delineation between the PURSUE and the PREVENT spaces.

18. Extra PREVENT workload has been seen due to closer working with PURSUE colleagues, as those who are deemed vulnerable are identified and subsequently safeguarded.

PROTECT

19. Counter-Terrorism Security Advisors (CTSAs) within the CT PROTECT team regularly visit Crowded Places, Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) Sites and Hazardous Substances Sites (HSS) offering protective security advice. The PROTECT team deliver awareness and security training to numerous businesses regionally. Future developments will have a major impact on PROTECT demand, particularly around the Commonwealth Games, Coventry City of Culture, major road developments and HS2.

PREPARE

20. The CT PREPARE team deliver both live-play and table-top exercises, complemented with briefings on risk awareness with regional agencies, as well as in relation to CBRN preparedness. A host of internal mandated training is provided to staff around procedures and internal systems. Similar to PROTECT, PREPARE anticipate an increase in demand due to future events and the growth in staff that will requiring training.

CT Firearms

21. WMP holds Counter Terrorism Specialist Firearms Officers (CTSFOs) within force. These officers are trained to a single system and to the highest level to operate in the CT environment anywhere in the country and provided support in the wake of the Manchester and London terrorist attacks in 2017.

22. WMP Firearms Operations Unit expects to have delivered its uplift in Counter Terrorism Specialist Firearms Officers (CTSFOs) by the end of March 2019. Training is provided to all FOU officers with a wide array of courses including those that assist with national delivery of CTSFO up skilling. The Armed Uplift Programme Funding ends in March 2021.

23. In May 2018 a Birmingham British Transport Police (BTP) Authorised Firearms Officer (AFO) hub opened to provide firearms resource for the rail network across the region. As there is a likelihood of the two teams working together, work is underway to develop a memorandum of understanding (MOU) and operational protocols. WMP FOU has provided BTP with their training facilities while they undergo major armed uplift.

24. The changing terrorist threat means CT Policing need to constantly review practices, structures and processes to ensure the network can meet the challenges, while protecting the public. This requires a comprehensive portfolio of nationally and regionally delivered change programmes. Examples include planning for the 2020 Commonwealth Games and the adoption of 'new ways of working' methodologies as seen across its host force.

25. Within WMP, the Force CONTEST board (chaired by ACC Security) meets on a quarterly basis and reviews the strategic approach to the CT response.

PUBLIC ORDER

26. The Force conduct a Public Order Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment (STRA) every 12 months to identify threat and risk pertaining to public order and the subsequence management of those identified risks at a regional level. This supports the National Public Order Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment (STRA).

Capacity, Contribution, Capability, Consistency & Connectivity

27. The number of public order (PO) trained staff remains stable with approximately 1300 constables trained to Level 2. All FSU officers are PO trained, with 80% of Response trained, with specialist departments and Neighbourhood Teams providing additional resources. Midland Regional Public Order Unit have developed a bespoke course, providing additional resilience in maintaining trained numbers. Primary mobilisation requires three PSUs initially which is achievable with current response and support unit officers within the required timescales. Although WMP can meet our national commitment of 21 PSUs as well as our own mobilisation demand, any mobilisation beyond 3 PSUs or for an extended period would impact on our ability to conduct business as usual.

28. Firearms Operations Unit (FOU) officers offer a supporting role to public order. While no officers are public order trained, they have training in armed response to public order as part of their minimum role profile, allowing the Force to address any major public order disturbance where specialist tactics or capabilities are required.

29. In 2017/18 there were significant mobilisation requests to support the visit of President Trump (22 PSUs over six days), the wedding of Prince Harry and the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting. The force has also had deployments internally for World Cup football,Conservative Party conference and anti-Trump demonstrations, although football policing remains the largest requirement for public order. The number of high risk category fixtures has increased this year with the movement of local teams between leagues.

30. All Public Order trained officers now complete the nationally recognised fitness test and WMP are compliant and able to deploy nationally.

31. Vehicle fleet has undergone modernisation with 40+ public order carriers being delivered. The fleet map has been updated and is available out of hours.

32. A review of PPE was carried out regarding helmets and overalls. Maintenance guidance has been circulated and damaged equipment has been replaced. All public order shields have been replaced and all spare stock is now held at Park Lane for easy access.

33. NPOCC conducted a regional Operation BREAKING POINT exercise in September 2018, replicating a full mobilisation of 33 PSUs. WMP and the region met its requirements at 10%, 40%, 60% and 100% mobilisation. Recommendations made following the exercise are being addressed.

34. Whilst the force Event Control Suite (ECS) provides availability for other agencies to dock their systems during a time of public disorder, the ECS poses logistical delivery challenges past 2019 in terms of its capacity and technology. Work is progressing on the new ECS build.

35. WMP will connect to the national Emergency Services Mobile Communications Programme (ESMCP) in 2023/24, replacing the existing Airwaves system. The Force has been at forefront of shaping this new technology nationally to ensure the maximum benefit for officers and staff and ultimately the people we serve. Due to delays in the national programme, a decision has been made to delay our adoption due to the delivery of the 2022 Commonwealth Games[1].

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[1] http://intranet2/force_messages/2019_force_messages/national_emergency_services_ne.aspx

SERIOUS AND ORGANISED CRIME (SOC)

36. There is a significant threat from Serious and Organised Crime Groups operating across the West Midlands region, particularly within Birmingham, Coventry and Wolverhampton. The threat from SOC is growing in scale and complexity and the region is host to one of the most significant threats from firearms associated with SOC in the UK. The main categories of serious and organised crime offences include: child sexual exploitation and abuse; illegal drugs; illegal firearms; fraud; money laundering and other economic crime; bribery and corruption; organised immigration crime; modern slavery and human trafficking; and cyber-crime.

Capacity, Contribution, Capability, Consistency & Connectivity

37. WMP fund 57% of the regional funding contribution to the West Midlands Regional Organised Crime Unit (ROCU) in order to deliver the core SOC capabilities required through the Specialist Capabilities requirement.

38. Tasking processes between WMP and ROCU are embedded and joint working ensures that relevant investigations are allocated to the most appropriate department within the ROCU based on the scale and nature of the threat. Monthly priority setting meetings are now in place between ROCU, Force Intelligence, Force CID, Neighbourhood Policing Units and the Public Protection Unit to ensure there is a shared understanding of the threat, risk and vulnerability and that a co-ordinated response is developed to meet this.

39. Neighbourhood Policing Unit (NPU) based Lead Responsible Officers (LROs) manage OCGs within their geography, meeting on a bi-monthly basis with Force and regional colleagues to support priority setting and the tasking of resources against the greatest threat from organised crime groups. LROs are responsible for the delivery of 4 P Plans (Prevent, Prepare, Protect and Pursue) which are created for each identified OCG.

40. ROCU has responsibility for all regional covert assets. These assets are accessed by LROs or SIOs via well-defined tasking processes.

41. There are currently a number of capabilities within ROCU that have been subject of Police Transformation Bid funding. This funding is due to cease in April 2021 and options are currently being considered to make these savings whilst maintaining our commitment to deliver all the core capabilities.

42. A Strategic Workforce Group oversees planning for the force to ensure ROCU have sufficient numbers of detective and other specialist resources with appropriate skills and accreditation to tackle organised crime.

43. The force continues to provide professional development opportunities to increase the understanding of SOC threats across the organisation including events on County Lines and foreign national offenders.

44. Force wide governance structures facilitate the identification and prioritisation of SOC threats. This enables a more effective and accountable response in order to drive improved performance against SOC. The force produces a number of tactical and strategic products which aim to assess the SOC threat and guide the force in tackling the threats using the most appropriate force assets. Recent products include SOC local profiles which have been delivered to all NPU Commanders and Local Authority Chief Executives, tactical knife and gun crime assessments and gang tension reports.

45. Serious and organised crime is increasing both in volume and complexity and ongoing advances in technology will continue to transform the future of crime. The use of technologies such as the Dark Web will require rapid, agile and sustainable change to how ROCU respond to OCG's.

46. All cyber dependent crime is recorded nationally by Action Fraud where it is triaged and disseminated or allocated according to nationally agreed rationale. WMP currently utilise the national tasking process to investigate fraud. WMP remain responsible for all other cyber and digital aspects of crime (e.g. cyber *enabled*) reported within the area and ROCU proactively and reactively investigate serious incidents of cyber *dependent* crime impacting on the region including: Malware; DDOS/DOS attacks; Website defacements; Data Exfiltration's; Computer and Network Intrusions/compromise.

47. Current WMP change programmes are providing the force with new capabilities in terms of the analysis of 'big data' sets. These techniques provide the capability for the development of sophisticated network analysis and the building of predictive models of future events based on past experience.

48. Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) inspection[2] judged the force as having "a good understanding of the threats posed by

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[2] https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/wp-content/uploads/peel-police-effectiveness-2017-west-midlands.pdf (published 2018)

SOC....effective ways of assessing the threats and....an effective strategic assessment to address those threats".

49. The Force was assessed as being good at investigating SOC, with almost double the rate of disruptions per 100 OCGs for all forces across England and Wales. Since the HMICFRS review, the Force has continued to show significant improvements in disruptions.

50. ROCU has developed a programme for the recording, storing and dissemination of data regarding OCG disruption activities, enabling standardisation of data, improved data quality and dissemination to relevant NPUs.

51. WMP have progressed levels of transparency and collaboration between partner-agencies through the Partnership Intelligence Liaison Team (PILT) and Partnerships Intelligence Liaison Officers (PILOs), with intelligence assessments helping to drive activity across our partnerships.

52. Serious and Organised Crime Local Profiles (SOCLPs) have been presented to Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs) and acknowledge the direction laid out by the Director General of the National Crime Agency (NCA) in shifting the approach "from tackling the symptoms of serious and organised crime to dismantling the underlying system". Community Safety Partnerships are now in the process of formulating bespoke 4P plans with LROs that incorporate short, medium and long term actions aligned thematically to the issues discussed in the SOCLPs. This will provide a baseline to begin to measure any action undertaken and how to evaluate it upon completion. This will inform partners on any impact on the environment as well as contribute to future SOC strategies.

53. The use of civil interventions/orders with local authorities and CSPs and the use of mediators and mentors helps to prevent violence and disputes between rival gangs, while the WMP SOC lead's engagement with the PCC's Gangs Commission (including specialist providers and statutory and voluntary sector agencies) helps to build community resilience.

54. Additionally, the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner (OPCC) has secured funding from the Early Intervention Fund and work is underway to implement the initiatives to prevent serious violence and SOC. Collaboration with academic institutions, such as the University of Cambridge is helping to identify and establish the utility of early interventions on 'peripheral' gang members.

55. Beyond the violent element of organised crime, a 4P approach to tackling SOC is achieved through partnerships including Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC), Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) and Trading Standards. LROs are encouraged to access the Government Agency Intelligence Network (GAIN) network and the Regional Disruptions Team via the ROCU. This has resulted in recent successes in OCG disruption.

NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY INCIDENT (NCSI)

56. The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) assess the threat to be high and growing, with an expectation the UK will be hit by one or more Category 1 cyber incidents[3].

57. The National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) Specialist Capabilities Programme's priority for cyber in 2019 is delivery of the model and local units, supported by the Cybercrime Hub and Cyber Tools App, developing regional coordination and integrating it fully into national tasking and structures[4].

58. HMICFRS are undertaking a thematic inspection of cyber-dependent crime[5], with fieldwork taking place between April and June 2019 and involving 11 forces and the corresponding ROCUs.

59. Delivery of the current WMP cyber strategy is supported by a Strategic Governance Group which includes representation from the OPCC and leads for each of the '4P' areas of responsibility. While the cyber strategy remains valid and is well embedded, it is being refreshed ahead of 2020.

Capacity, Contribution, Capability, Consistency & Connectivity

60. The NPCC Specialist Capabilities Programme's priority has been to build force specialist cybercrime units that are regionally managed, locally delivered and fully networked into the regional and national response and Team Cyber UK ethos. During 2018, forces have set up cybercrime units as part of the wider Capability Strategy & Annual Plan (2019)[6].

61. WMP has been an early adopter of the national development programme[7] and have been allocated £64,600 from the Police Transformation Fund to support the initial set up of the resourcing capability. Three of the four strategic priorities are well developed and improving capacity and capability through the WMP2020 Cybercrime Project, with the coordinator role recruited[8]. WMP received £24,740 from the national project to purchase the tools for such investigations.

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[3] Specialist Capabilities Programme Capability Strategy & Annual Plan 2019 (CC Peter Goodman, 29th November 2018) p8
[4] Specialist Capabilities Programme Capability Strategy & Annual Plan 2019 (CC Peter Goodman, 29th November 2018) p3
[5] Letter from Matt Parr HMICFRS to Chief Constables and PCCs (29th August 2018)
[6] Specialist Capabilities Programme Capability Strategy & Annual Plan 2019 (CC Peter Goodman, 29th November 2018) p3
[7] Specialist Capabilities Programme feedback form (December) completed by WMP
[8] Specialist Capabilities Programme feedback form (September) completed by WMP

62. The Resilience Unit highlight the vulnerability in preparedness to a national threat from cyber where there still exists limited national support and understanding in roles of key agencies. The Unit have collaborated to create cyber awareness and built a plan to respond to cyber terrorism and national cyber attacks.

63. The NPCC Specialist Capabilities Programme's national project team have delivered the Cyber Investigations Manual and will be part of the new Cybercrime Hub on the Police ICT Company's Knowledge Hub. A Cyber Tools App is being rolled out nationally[9] and WMP has been instrumental in supporting wider adoption through its WMP2020 Mobility Project team[10]. WMP are being used as the Launchpad for the national unveiling of the local Force cyber-dependent capability on 29 January 2019.

64. Developing both capacity and capability has significant challenges, including resourcing constraints and the identification, training and retention of staff[11]. The cyber-dependent team in the Economic Crime Unit (ECU) are in a phase of up-skilling and knowledge transfer. ROCU hosts the regional cybercrime unit (RCCU), meets regional requirements, has the capability to investigate, secure and preserve digital forensic opportunities and has access to support from across the ROCU network and the NCA. NCA and ROCU resources link in to WMP via Mission Support.

65. The Resilience Unit's cyber plan builds awareness and mitigates the knowledge limitations of public order or firearms commanders in responding to a cyber incident. The Unit engages with the national Cyber Preparedness roll out and builds knowledge via training and exercising such as 'Exercise Control, Alt, Delete'.

66. Through delivery against the cyber strategy, WMP has been able to develop its capability to tackle this growing threat.

67. The NPCC Specialist Capabilities Programme's national project team provides guidance on the type of equipment and tools forces may procure to ensure nationally consistent and appropriate capability[12]. Training for force staff will be nationally procured to ensure it meets the required standard and that forces can develop capability consistently.

68. Training is also offered to frontline officers and staff through our relationship with GetSafeOnline and the provision of a Digital PCSO.

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[9] Specialist Capabilities Programme Capability Strategy & Annual Plan 2019 (CC Peter Goodman, 29th November 2018) p3
[10] Specialist Capabilities Programme feedback form (September) completed by WMP
[11] Specialist Capabilities Programme Capability Strategy & Annual Plan 2019 (CC Peter Goodman, 29th November 2018) p8-10
[12] Specialist Capabilities Programme Capability Strategy & Annual Plan 2019 (CC Peter Goodman, 29th November 2018) p3

69. There is currently a well established national tasking process. A Regional Coordinators Working Group has been established to develop and agree regional and local tasking processes and practices[13].

70. The Cyber Plan now offers command models for a cyber incident which can be used as a template for response, connecting national activity into force.

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[13] Specialist Capabilities Programme Capability Strategy & Annual Plan 2019 (CC Peter Goodman, 29th November 2018) p6

CIVIL EMERGENCIES

71. Operations Emergency Planning is now known as the Operations Resilience Unit, merging staff from Emergency Planning and Business Continuity together with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) to undertake all areas of the business. The West Midlands resilience forum community risk register holds seven risks that are considered likely to enact a civil emergency response:

- Influenza type disease

- Flooding

- Severe Weather

- Environmental Pollution and Industrial Accidents

- Loss of Critical Infrastructure

- Fuel Shortages

- Transport Accidents

72. WMP has plans in place to deal with a national civil emergency. Operations Resilience Unit are a key stakeholder within the LRF, force thematic boards and regional colleagues as required under the Civil Contingencies Act. The Unit has integrated the threats and hazards with their planning assumptions into force working groups and drives the Force's capacity levels to respond to civil emergencies and a basis for planning activity and capability.

73. WMP have strategic, tactical and operational commanders supported with 24/7 tactical advice delivered from 11 advisors. The force maintains 300 trained CBRN responders, including tier 1 (specialist) and tier 2 (general) responders to provide regional and national mutual aid in the event of a CBRN event. These form part of the 525 responders made up of WMP, Staffordshire Police, Warwickshire and West Mercia Police. WMP are the driving force behind the regional Multi Agency Specialist Assessment Team staffed by police, fire and ambulance specialists and are deployed to planned events where there is an increased threat of a CBRN incident.

74. Officers and certain critical staff roles undergo CPD including emergency planning and business continuity training, with further development offered through the LRF. Operational commanders and specialists have received Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP) training, and attendance at annual CPD events is encouraged. There is currently no training strategy internally beyond JESIP in place for civil emergencies and no College of Policing support to forces beyond Public Order/Public Safety (POPS) and JESIP. Other training inputs are being reviewed and

further work is being explored between the Resilience Unit and Learning & Development (L&D) to explore wider opportunities in commanders training where further knowledge is required to respond and command effectively to the top hazards and threats.

75. The Unit brings together the Force exercising activity to ensure that all areas of planning and capabilities to respond are effective. Proposed workforce modernisation includes a revised selection process focusing recruitment on securing core skills, allowing for higher level development and providing opportunities for security of tenure and development of expertise.

76. Force-issued emergency planning doctrine have been digitised and made interactive on the intranet and a mobile app is being developed for use on Force devices. The Resilience Unit are reviewing technological enhancements for Action Information Management within Control Rooms (supporting management of critical incidents with a real-time virtual incident room accessible from mobile devices) and the new Command and Control replacement scheme. This review would reduce response times with faster coordination, removing the need to draw staff together within one location. Development of the 'Enabling Services' logistics has allowed 24/7 access, supporting the Unit in identifying availability, capability and accessibility of any area of WMP's workforce and enabling more efficient and effective mobilisation and large scale incident/event logistics coordination

77. The Resilience Unit have a command platform with the ECS. The Unit have authority to draw resource and capability from the entire force if circumstances necessitate. The ECS is also a touchdown point for the military, blue light partners, Highways England, Local Authorities and the region's CCTV network. This has been successfully tested, although work is underway on the new ECS build to further increase its application and capabilities.

78. The Operations Resilience Unit allows for increased flex, shared expertise and best practice across the (now merged) Emergency Planning and Business Continuity Teams. It places a greater emphasis on testing and exercising the force to ensure it can deliver against the SPR and respond to emerging threats and hazards while continuing to be a key participant within West Midlands Conurbation Local Resilience Forum (LRF). A number of small to large scale exercises have been delivered (table top and live exercises).

79. The unit has a proactive approach to organisational learning from incidents and exercises. A new process of recording debrief learning is being put into place for more effective handling across force departments and WMP continually reviews its emergency response plans. This was evidenced following the Parson's Green terror attack when the response of the force to a change in the national threat level was more efficient than during previous incidents.   The HMICFRS PEEL inspection[14] found that the force "carefully debriefs all training exercises and major incidents".

80. The Resilience Unit hosts the Joint Organisational Learning (JOL) SPOC to review national learning to bring back into force. The JOL SPOC is also exploring ways to be proactive in posting learning on to the JOL platform from the forces notable learning.

81. The unit works alongside local authorities, 'blue-light' partners, other partner-agencies and regional policing colleagues. The West Midlands Conurbation LRF provides the overarching framework within which these collaborative arrangements are made and which facilitate the development of plans for responses to major events and civil emergencies. Plans are regularly tested and modified. All plans are shared with partners via resilience direct and via consultation during the planning process, to ensure consistency in response is understood by all partner agencies.

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[14] https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/wp-content/uploads/peel-police-effectiveness-2017-west-midlands.pdf (published 2018)

CHILD SEXUAL EXPLOITATION & ABUSE (CSE/A)

82. The HMICFRS PEEL inspection[15] found that the Force has a good understanding of the nature and scale of vulnerability and has completed profiles for child sexual exploitation.

83. The force has a force wide dedicated Missing Persons Unit and intends to implement the College of Policing Approved Professional Practice (APP) by the end of Quarter 1 of 2019/20. Removing the category of absent, adopting the APP definition of 'missing' and the new risk category definitions, should see an improvement in the risk assessment and information sharing in relation to missing children, in particular those at risk of CSE/A.

84. The Force has worked with the safeguarding leads for the seven Local Authorities to devise an 'exploitation screening tool' which allows decision makers to identify and gauge risk for strands of exploitation. This should assist in delivering a consistent approach to identifying and responding to risk across the force area.

85. WMP developed the Vulnerability Improvement Board (VIB) in 2016 to bring together HMICFRS recommendations and other learning associated with vulnerability. The delivery plan has moved to align with the National Vulnerability Plan, a Terms of Reference has been created and HMICFRS has recently signed off a number of recommendations as completed.

86. WMP have commissioned a Force Exploitation Strategy which should overlap and compliment the Serious Organised Crime (SOC) Strategy. While expertise exists within police and safeguarding partners, there is a need to streamline and rationalise effort to mitigate risks being missed, and to improve consistency across agencies, partners and geographies.

87. WMP represent the region at the NPCC board for child abuse and are uniquely placed to develop knowledge of national best practice, supplemented by hidden crime specialists aligned to CSE/A.

88. Nationally, there is recognition that CSE/A is underreported, consistent with the assessment of WMP. The recording of crime related to child abuse has seen statistically significant increases, whilst the recording of non-crime child abuse

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[15] https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/wp-content/uploads/peel-police-effectiveness-2017-west-midlands.pdf (published 2018)

decreased in May 2015 and has remained stable since. Between 2014 and 2018 child abuse has increased by 173%, driven by the creation of Multi Agency Safeguarding Hubs (MASH), increased accuracy in crime recording and impact of growth of CSE/A committed online. Demand within the Online CSE Team (OCSET) has increased by 45% in the last 3 years.

89. It is projected that levels of reported child abuse crimes are likely to increase. In February 2019 the Public Protection Unit (PPU) have moved to a new operating model. The new model continues to align staff to CSE/A and build resilience to better address the expected continued increase in crime and demand.

90. Operation Encompass (Child Abuse) is a nationally recognised WMP early intervention and prevention model for police to notify the schools of children who have been present during domestic abuse (DA) and ensures the necessary support is in place. This recognises the importance and influence schools can have in assisting the child. This national initiative is running in Dudley, Wolverhampton and Coventry and is currently in the process of being implemented in Sandwell, Solihull and Walsall and is being scoped in Birmingham.

91. The roll-out of BWV has been used to good effect with child abuse investigations, allowing the capture of digital evidence.

92. The creation of Multi Agency Safeguarding Hubs (MASH) over the past 2-3 years has seen an increase in establishment to facilitate screening and case strategy discussions. As MASH's have settled into the child protection infrastructure, HMICFRS have recognised growing consistency across the force area, whilst allowing for local flexibility[16].

93. The trial period of a Multi-Agency Enquiry Team (MAET)[17] has now ended and in February 2019, the model has been rolled out across all 7 Local Authority areas. This continues to allow for up to 40% of crime and non-crime incidents to be dealt with by a small, more rapid response function.

94. Work continues with partners to improve attendance at child protection conferences for all partners including the Police. WMP continue to employ dedicated and expert Case Conference Attenders and continue to work towards a more effective system of

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[16] 'All MASH's generally function well, with no backlogs. Our previous inspections found that working practices differed between each MASH, due to varying demand across the force area. This is still the case, although the practices are now more aligned and the differences are appropriate to the resource levels and demand for services within each MASH'
[17] a dedicated team to conduct joint visits and deal with lower level volume crime and sexting

notification, attendance and report submission to ensure effective decision making for vulnerable children in the area.

95.   The increasing ease of access to digital devices challenges WMP's ambition to pre-emptively reduce threat, harm and risk by safeguarding vulnerable individuals, particularly minors, against cyber-enabled crimes including online-grooming and CSE. A strategic lead has been assigned within force who will incorporate such challenges within a wider cyber strategy.

96.   WMP has a dedicated Public Protection Unit and within this, a specialist Child Abuse function. This function has recently been redesigned as part of a broader Public Protection Change Programme and is aimed at enhancing the consistency and effectiveness of the function, positioning it better to meet the new and increasing challenges and demand with a static work force. The Child Abuse function is led by a dedicated Detective Superintendent and comprises of 7 MASH's, 7 MAET's, 4 'hubbed' child abuse investigation units and 4 complex child investigation teams. In addition there is a dedicated Online CSE Team (OCSET) and a 'Priorities and Vulnerability Team' that offers a proactive capability to respond to vulnerable child and adult related exploitation.

97.   WMP continues to ensure staff are aware of the risk factors and identifiers for CSE. Child Abuse investigators receive bespoke training and accreditation (SCADIP) to allow them to conduct their role. This is supported by departmental led development days, joint partnership training and inputs to ensure practitioners are informed, improve consistency of service and to ensure the quality and spread of skills within its workforce are appropriately aligned.

98.   WMP developed a CSE strategy in 2016 and activity has focused on brigading resources to maximise the impact. Currently WMP is working with safeguarding leads across the region to develop multi agency responses to all forms of exploitation. Specifically, partnership disruption approaches now address criminal exploitation, trafficking, slavery in addition to sexual exploitation. WMP now actively use civil options such as Sexual Risk Orders (SRO) in support of criminal investigation to ensure multiple options to disrupt and prevent offending is explored. A dedicated Police Staff Investigator forms part of the new PPU Operating Model focusing on enhancing the expertise and use of civil interventions across CSE/A.

99.   WMP has the ability to conduct complex CSE/A investigations within the Child Abuse Investigation Team (CAIT). The establishment of a Home Office Large Major Enquiry

System (HOLMES) supported team has given PPU the provision to manage the most complex of investigations. The 'complex' teams within the new operating model will dedicate resource to deal with multiple victim/offender CSE/A, suspicious child death/other complex cases. The model allows for a more professional and efficient way of dealing with complex cases, however, the continued increase in demand threatens the ability of the teams to deliver because there will be more complex investigations than there will be capacity in the team.

100. WMP PPU faces ongoing challenges in terms of staff workloads, retention and recruitment. Career progression for officers from PPU to ROCU and CTU presents challenges in terms of detective vacancies but also capabilities and experience more generally. As part of the PPU Change Programme, the role of PSIO has been created to support the new operating model. This new role supplements the existing workforce mix of warranted officers, PSIs and Police Staff.

101. Technology investment in the child abuse image database (CAID) has enabled collaboration with wider UK policing partners and global law enforcement agencies to identify suspected child abuse victims faster and safeguard the most vulnerable by bringing offenders to justice. WMP has a dedicated Visual Identification Officer (VID).

102. Within the PPU, there is a programme of dip sampling of investigations, peer review of teams and monthly performance reviews. This ensures consistency of practice and continues to drive improved performance. This is owned and driven by the Child Abuse Lead Superintendent.

103. Feedback forms an important element of improving operational practice. Close relationships with CPS and structured partnership debriefs contribute to internal reviews to improve practice and deliver a consistent service. The Child Abuse Teams across the force also take part in multi-agency audits through their local safeguarding boards, sharing learning through a variety of methods to ensure continual improvement and a child-centred approach. Additionally the use of scrutiny panels, consisting of members of the public and magistrates, have been utilised to review the rationale of investigators for out of court disposals allowing for specific feedback and supporting consistency across decision makers.

104. All Local Safeguarding Children Boards (LSCB) have escalation procedures for CSE/A cases within WMP.

105. Within the child abuse investigation, there is a statutory requirement for multi-agency working. Within all local authorities, MASHs and MAETs enable PPU staff to sit alongside staff from children services, health, education and other partners. Neighbourhood Policing Senior Leaders are equally connected into the Early Help and Intervention agenda.

106. The commissioning of an Exploitation Strategy that overlaps with SOC, alongside an Exploitation Hub within Intelligence, demonstrates the desire to bring together the policing response to all strands of exploitation. In June 2018, three workshops were held with partners to understand the confluence between CSE, County Lines and trafficking, aiming to agree approaches with the CPS and social care and other statutory partners. This work has formed the basis of the Exploitation Strategy referenced earlier.

107. Strategy driven activity has advanced partnerships with Multi Agency Child CSE (MASE) meetings managing offenders and CSE Missing Operational Group (CMOG) managing the risk around children who go missing where there are also concerns around CSE. These operate on all 7 Local Authority Areas.

108. There is shared responsibility where neighbourhood officers tackle CSE alongside colleagues in the PPU. Investigation teams are represented at Local Tactical Delivery Boards (LTDB) and bring CSE victims, offenders and locations that require NPU support.

109. Strong relationships exist between ROCU and the regional forces of West Mercia, Warwickshire and Staffordshire. Likewise, the regional agreements for OCSET, CSE coordination and modern slavery all facilitate connectivity around this threat area. The WM ROCU have developed an 'Exploitation' Strategic Governance Group (SGG) to bring together work taking place in the thematic SGG's of County Lines, CSE/A, Modern Slavery and Firearms. WMP attend all groups and currently chair 4 of the 5 groups.

CONCLUSION

110. WMP continues to face a number of challenges in the future, which are exacerbated by funding and resourcing issues. Planning for the Commonwealth Games is underway and will continue to develop.

111. The new PPU model is expected to build resilience to address CSE/A demand, although recruitment/retention remains a risk. The relaunch of the detective academy and the surveillance academy seeks to build capacity and capability in targeting SOC.

112. The new Operations Resilience Unit positions the force more proactively in planning for national incidents and places greater emphasis on testing and exercising.

113. The force is able to mobilise to a national threat, however, to extend that beyond an initial period would impact on our ability to deliver business as usual services to our communities.

114. HMICFRS inspections have acknowledged improvements made by the force across different strands, while also drawing attention to areas requiring further development.

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